Balancing Interests in Regulatory Institutions: A Comparison of the Northern Gateway and Keystone XL Pipelines by McKenzie, Janetta
 
 
Balancing Interests in Regulatory 
Institutions: A Comparison of the Northern 











presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 






Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2021 
 
 




Examining Committee Membership 
The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the 
Examining Committee is by majority vote. 
 
 
External Examiner Matthew Hoffmann 
Associate Professor 
Department of Political Science  
University of Toronto 
 
Supervisor(s) Sarah Lynne Burch  
Associate Professor  
Department of Geography and Environmental Management 
University of Waterloo 
 
Internal Member Paul Parker 
Professor 
Department of Geography and Environmental Management 
University of Waterloo 
 
Other Member Jason Thistlethwaite 
Associate Professor 
School of Environment, Enterprise and Development 






Department of Political Science 




This thesis consists of material, all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of 
Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final 
revisions, as accepted by my examiners.  
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
 
 iv 
Statement of Contributions 
In the Department for Geography & Environmental Management, a thesis may be presented by 
manuscript. This type of thesis consists of a set of manuscripts meant for journal publication (at least 
three for which the Ph.D. candidate is first author) and accompanied by an introductory and 
concluding chapter. Following the guidelines set forth by the University of Waterloo, any co-authored 
work must be dominated by the intellectual effort of the student.  
 
Janetta McKenzie was the sole author of Chapters 1 and 5 which were not written for publication. 
Janetta McKenzie was the sole author of Chapters 3 and 4, and lead author of Chapter 2 which will be 
submitted for publication. The dissertation has been reviewed and edited in its entirety by supervisor 
Dr. Sarah Burch and committee members Dr. Paul Parker, Dr. Jason Thistlethwaite, and Dr. Angela 
Carter. Exceptions to sole authorship are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: McKenzie, Janetta and Sarah Burch. “Utilizing pipeline regulation to manage the diffuse 
risks of climate change” (To be submitted 2021, The Extractive Industries and Society).  
Janetta McKenzie was responsible for conceptualization, study design, data collection and analysis, 
and writing and editing of the draft manuscript. Supervisor Dr. Sarah Burch drafted a short portion 





Canada and the United States are facing crucial decisions about the future of their energy resources. 
The severity of climate change, increasing salience of the social impacts of fossil fuel development, 
and mounting calls to rapidly decarbonize energy systems have left these two fossil fuel giants at the 
forefront of international debate. Both countries struggle with balancing these complex socio-
environmental problems with the economic benefit that fossil fuels have historically afforded. Ideally, 
regulatory mechanisms are meant to find this balance through the setting and enforcement of rules. 
However, these mechanisms have increasingly come under fire in the last twenty years, ostensibly for 
privileging the economic benefit of a few over the socio-environmental impacts borne by many. The 
universe of interests has expanded considerably as environmental activists, consumer safety groups, 
and average citizens become aware of the impacts of this multi-billion dollar industry. These groups 
and individual citizens have altered the landscape of energy governance as they call for more socially 
conscious, less environmentally damaging industrial activities. As a result, energy regulation has 
become increasingly politicized and controversy consistently plagues fossil fuel projects, especially 
pipelines, in both Canada and the United States.  
Questions remain regarding the ability of regulatory mechanisms to address an ever-expanding and 
increasingly complex universe of interests. The overarching objective of this project was to examine 
how national regulators address cross-jurisdictional issues with broad and diffuse socio-
environmental impacts in the context of pipeline governance in Canada and the United States. This 
thesis compares the regulatory processes for two major, controversial oil pipeline proposals 
(Enbridge’s Northern Gateway and TransCanada’s Keystone XL), examining public comment data 
and regulatory compliance documents for both projects. This thesis investigates the characterization 
and interpretation of three topics by regulators—climate change, energy security, and the public 
interest—which epitomize the nuance and complexity of contemporary socio-environmental impacts 
from oil pipelines and how regulatory institutions in Canada and the United States have interpreted 
these impacts. 
The first empirical paper asks how climate change is interpreted in regulatory processes for oil 
pipelines. This chapter concluded that pipeline regulators in Canada and the United States interpret 
the risks of climate change in extremely narrow and site-specific contexts, despite the global nature of 
climate impacts. While both regulatory institutions accept that climate change does not respect 
national borders, both processes assess climate change in a vacuum, focusing mostly on the direct 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from constructing and operating pipelines. The extent to which 
climate change is considered for the approval or rejection of these projects is largely left to final 
executive decision-makers, rather than embedded in regulatory procedures. Ultimately, there is a lack 
of regulatory certainty and continuity to assessing climate change in both Canada and the United 
States which renders these institutions incapable of assessing complex global problems like climate 
change.   
The second paper asks how energy security is interpreted by these regulatory mechanisms, regarding 
the public interest, private interest, and government. This paper utilizes the ‘Four A’s’ framework of 
energy security to compare the characterization of energy security in both cases. Relying on public 
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comment data and industry compliance documents, this paper explores the characterization of energy 
security in both projects and discusses the broader implications for regulatory governance. 
Ultimately, it is concluded that regulators are (for the most part) emphasizing overly narrow and oil-
centric interpretations of energy security, focused on maintaining continuity of a relatively 
inexpensive supply of oil, and are not integrating more complex energy security issues into their 
standard assessment procedures. 
Finally, the third paper investigates how the concept of ‘the public interest’ is characterized and 
represented in the governance of oil pipelines in the United States and Canada. Several trends 
concerning the public interest/public participation are identified: first, that the impact assessments 
required by regulators tend to be very localized in terms of tangible effects, but an increasingly broad 
perception of social, cultural, and environmental risk that is not well captured by current regulatory 
mechanisms. Second, that there is a significant lack of understanding of the regulatory requirements 
and the mandate of regulators, particularly with regards to explicit industry planning and 
development. Lastly, there is a lack of trust from a significant portion of the general public that 
believes that regulatory processes are at least partially captured by industry or have no power to make 
and enforce decisions. These trends all point towards regulatory processes that are out of step with 
contemporary challenges and problems, and institutions that rely on a narrow interpretation of the 
public/national interest.  
This thesis finds that oil pipeline regulators began as market-based institutions, coordinating with 
industry and the relevant government department to set tolls, tariffs, and other pricing rules. As the 
universe of interests expanded, encapsulating a wider range of social and environmental impacts, 
these institutions were equipped with a broader assessment toolkit focused on public safety and 
environmental protection. However, the fundamental structures of these institutions encourage oil 
development in support of economic growth, and the evolution of these institutions has not kept pace 
with the expansion of interests and subsequent impacts. As a result, there are substantial gaps in 
regulators’ ability to appropriately evaluate complex issues like climate change and energy security, 
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1.1 Research Objective 
Canada and the United States are at a crossroads in energy development. Increasing attention to 
climate change, the social impacts of fossil fuel development, and the need to rapidly decarbonize 
global energy systems has left these two fossil fuel giants at the forefront of international debate. Both 
countries struggle with balancing these complex socio-environmental problems with the economic 
benefit that fossil fuels have historically afforded. Ideally, regulatory mechanisms (like the Canada 
Energy Regulator or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the United States) are meant to 
find this balance through the setting and enforcement of rules. However, these mechanisms have 
increasingly come under fire in the last twenty years, ostensibly for privileging the economic benefit 
of a few over the socio-environmental impacts borne by many.  As opposed to their initial mandates 
which were largely concerned with market regulation (setting tolls and tariffs, anti-monopoly rules), 
these institutions are now operating in a world where socio-environmental issues are increasingly 
complex, technical, and international in scope. The universe of interests has expanded considerably as 
environmental activists, consumer safety groups, and average citizens become aware of the impacts of 
this multi-billion dollar industry. These groups and individual citizens have altered the landscape of 
energy governance as they call for more socially conscious, less environmentally damaging industrial 
activities. As a result, energy regulation has become increasingly politicized and controversy 
consistently plagues fossil fuel projects, especially pipelines, in both Canada and the United States. 
Governance mechanisms require more attention from both scholars and policymakers; despite initial 
mandates, they now have a significant role in steering energy development that has long-term impacts 
both global and national.  
Various interest groups and scholars take issue with the way that fossil fuel infrastructure like 
pipelines have been governed in Canada and the United States (U.S.); from lack of Indigenous 
consultation, sub-standard environmental assessment processes, and perceived rubber-stamping of 
infrastructure projects by regulatory institutions (Carroll 2020; A. Carter and Zalik 2016; Snyder 
2018; Grasso 2019; Taft 2017; McBeath 2016; M. T. Huber 2011; Espen Moe 2010). Obligatory 
environmental impact assessments and community consultations are useful mechanisms for 
evaluating the environmental and social implications of energy projects, but there is much room for 
 
 13 
improvement, particularly in terms of maintaining long-term consistency in impact assessments, 
further articulation of Indigenous rights, and the possibility of integrating downstream environmental 
impacts into project decisions(Bond et al. 2014; J. Green and Newman 2017; J. M. Baker and 
Westman 2018).  
Further study into the regulation of pipelines is crucial and timely for several reasons. First, there is 
increasing attention, both scholarly and otherwise, that supply-side policies (including stricter 
regulation) for a managed decline of fossil fuel production must work hand-in-hand with demand-side 
measures like taxes or emissions quotas(F. Green and Denniss 2018; Lazarus and van Asselt 2018; 
Piggot et al. 2018; A. V. Carter and McKenzie 2020). Second, civic resistance against fossil fuel 
infrastructure, especially pipelines, has been steadily increasing in both frequency and intensity in 
parts of Canada and the United States and has had an effect on regulatory approval of pipelines in 
both jurisdictions(MacLean 2017; Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015; Ramseur et al. 2014). Lastly, there 
have been significant differences in the ways that energy regulators have operated in Canada and the 
United States over the last several decades. Of major pipeline projects proposed since 2006, only two 
of six have been approved in Canada, whereas seven of nine have been approved in the United States. 
Despite the entwined nature of the US-Canada energy market, these two nations have significantly 
different regulatory experiences.  
The overarching objective of this project is to investigate how effectively national regulators 
address complex, cross-territorial problems with diffuse socio-environmental impacts in the context 
of pipeline governance in Canada and the United States. In pursuit of this analysis, diverging 
experiences of institutional governance in both cases will be examined, uncovering what this means 
for addressing complex, cross-jurisdictional, long-term issues like ecosystem degradation, climate 
change, and global supply chains. Two pipeline projects will be compared in depth: the Keystone XL 
(KXL) and the Northern Gateway project (NGP). Given the analytical focus on institutions, the 
theoretical foundations of this thesis are grounded in the international political economy of energy 
and regulatory capitalism (Kuzemko, Keating, and Goldthau 2018; Kuzemko, Lawrence, and Watson 
2019; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Braithwaite 2008). In addition, given the importance to these 
countries of maintaining affordable supply and continuous demand of energy, theories of energy 






Table 1: Research Questions 
 Questions Corresponding Paper 
RQ1 How is climate change interpreted in regulatory processes for oil pipelines, with 
regards to the public interest, private interest, and government? Why do these 
processes rely on such narrow interpretations of large, complex problems, and what 
does this tell us about the policy goals of these regulators? 
Chapter 2: Utilizing pipeline 
regulation to manage the 
diffuse risks of climate change 
 
RQ2 How is energy security interpreted in regulatory processes for oil pipelines, with 
regards to the public interest, private interest, and government? What is the influence 
of this interpretation on the development of oil pipelines? 
Chapter 3: Cheap, Local, Ethical: 
Addressing energy security 
through pipeline regulation 
RQ3 How is the public interest characterized and  represented in regulatory institutions in 
the United States and Canada? What does this characterization tell us about the 
institutional capacity of these regulators? 
Chapter 4: In whose Interests? 
Interpreting the Public Interest 
in Pipeline Regulation 
 
 
Pipeline regulators generally began as market-based overseers, concerned mostly with setting 
tolls and tariff rates and ensuring continuous supply and demand of fossil fuels. Beginning in the 
1970s and continuing to the present day, these mechanisms were asked to take on a much broader 
mandate—including environmental protection, social inclusion, and broadly representing the 'public 
interest'—without a sufficiently reformed foundation for assessment and decision-making. 
Comparatively, Canadian and American regulators undertake extensive assessment of environmental 
risk and public consultation. Most fossil fuel regulators do not require the extent of assessment as the 
federal processes in Canada and the U.S.; even subnational regulators in both countries are 
considerably streamlined. However, both Canada and the U.S. are the best of an inadequate bunch, as 
pipeline regulators around the world fail to address cross-jurisdictional social and environmental 
issues.    
Keeping in mind that the bar is set relatively low, American and Canadian federal regulators 
have increased their scope and compliance requirements in the last several decades. These regulators 
now assess environmental and engineering specifications, and solicit significant public consultation, 
but these new mandates are built on top of a narrow foundation of market-based rules. 
Fundamentally, these institutions have not evolved at the same pace or to the same extent as their 
mandates would require. The universe of interests surrounding these large pipeline projects has 
expanded—but these regulators still rely on outdated and vague frameworks to assess increasingly 
complex issues like climate change, energy security, and the public interest. 
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1.2 Regulating Oil Pipelines in Canada and the United States 
Any investigation of pipelines requires an understanding of the logistical aspects of the sector, which 
impacts disparate communities far beyond the points of extraction or consumption. As of 2020, the 
United States and Canada are the first and fourth largest producers of oil, respectively; the United 
States decreased production as reserves dwindled in the 1990s, but recently ramped up production as 
further reserves were discovered in the Permian Basin (EIA 2019b; Natural Resources Canada 
2017a). Since 2010, the United States has regained its spot as the top producer of oil resources. 
Canada has been a top-five oil producer since the 1950s.   
The vast majority of American oil reserves are in Texas, which produced over a third of the 
U.S. total of 3,413,375 tbu (thousand barrels of oil) in 2017 (EIA 2019b). North Dakota, Alaska, 
California, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Colorado all have significant shares of oil production as 
well. The United States has undergone a ‘shale revolution’ in the last decade, as hydraulic fracturing 
techniques have allowed for the extraction of oil and gas from shale rock formations, which are 
typically much harder and more costly to exploit than conventional crude oil, which has often 
migrated to more permeable rock like limestone or sandstone. Currently, the US has almost 20% of 
global recoverable shale oil resources, many of which are located in the Permian Basin, which has 
seen a dramatic increase in extraction in the last five years (Gaswirth et al. 2018).  
Canada has been a major player in the global oil industry since Imperial Oil discovered oil 
near Leduc, Alberta in 1947, and vast reserves of conventional crude oil were quickly proven in the 
Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin. Canada has 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves, 96% of 
which are in the Athabasca oil sands in Alberta (Natural Resources Canada 2016c). Saskatchewan 
also produces crude oil, and Newfoundland and Labrador extracts most of Canada’s offshore oil since 
plans to drill in the Arctic have long been delayed due to environmental concerns. Alberta, however, 




Figure 1: Major Oil Pipelines in Canada and the United States (2014) 
After oil is extracted, it is sent to transport hubs for pricing and then on to refineries. One 
such hub is in Hardisty, Alberta, where Canadian oil is priced. Another is in Cushing, Oklahoma, 
where the West Texas Intermediate market price is calculated; Cushing is the largest transport hub in 
North America, and several major pipelines intersect there. From the pricing hubs, oil goes on either 
to refineries (largely in the United States; Canada has only 14 refineries due to the operations cost and 
increased transportation involved). The Gulf Coast refineries in Texas and Louisiana are the most 
productive in North America. The refined oil is then either disseminated to final destinations or 
moves to a port terminal for shipment overseas. The Burnaby Terminal in British Columbia is one 
such terminal, and the Houston and Port Arthur terminals in Texas are the largest and busiest in North 
America.  
While trains and trucks are utilized for petroleum transportation, the most popular, efficient, 
and cost-effective method of shipping oil overland is through pipelines. Canada has more than 
840,000 km of oil and natural gas pipelines, almost half of which operate solely within Alberta 
(Natural Resources Canada 2016a). However, the largest and most controversial pipelines cross 
provincial or national borders; many smaller pipelines that operate intra-provincially move oil from 
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an extraction plant to the larger hubs and pipelines. The United States has more than 4.1 million km 
of pipelines, many of which are concentrated in Texas and Louisiana (United States Department Of 
Transportation 2019).  
The temporal aspect of oil extraction and pipeline operations is also essential to consider both 
for regulators and long-term policy decisions; building a large pipeline with high daily capacity 
contributes to carbon lock-in by committing to a certain amount of oil extraction for several decades 
(Unruh 2000). Pipelines are built to last—upwards of 50 years, if properly maintained, and they 
require significant up-front investment as well—and they are built with the tacit assumption that they 
will be utilized for most of that time. While specific oil fields and deposits may have shorter or longer 
lifespans, the large pipelines analyzed in this project transport oil from a multitude of fields, facilities, 
and firms. But the decommissioning of pipelines comes with its own risks; since most 
decommissioned pipelines remain in the ground to reduce soil disturbance, they must continue to be 
monitored even after the line is retired (Natural Resources Canada 2016a).   
The regulatory regimes for the construction, operation, and decommissioning of oil pipelines 
in the United States and Canada are complex. Both are federal states, requiring a careful negotiation 
between subnational, national, and occasionally global jurisdictions. Canadian regulatory processes 
for oil pipelines are more centralized and regimented than the American, which are much more state-
controlled and therefore fragmented. However, regulatory processes in both countries are 
characterized by a lack of continuity between projects, leading to uncertainty and context-specific 
socio-environmental assessment (McBeath 2016; Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014).  
1.2.1 The United States 
The American processes for onshore oil pipeline regulation are patchwork at best, with 
federal and state authorities sharing responsibilities and jurisdiction. There is no centralized regulator 
for onshore cross-border oil transportation, although the governance for offshore oil development is 
centralized with the Bureau of Ocean Management, and natural gas pipelines are largely regulated by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (McBeath 2016). FERC also deals with 
regulating the tolls and tariffs for oil pipelines but has no other involvement in their regulation, and 
FERC approval is generally not necessary prior to commencement of pipeline service (Parfomak 
2015). 
Generally, the primary regulators for oil pipelines are the relevant state authorities (i.e. the Texas 
Railroad Commission or the North Dakota Industrial Commission), which deal with leasing, 
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environmental impact assessment, land use, and compliance determinations (McBeath 2016). Other 
state departments, generally responsible for health and environment, also have some regulatory 
responsibilities (McBeath 2016). The State Department is responsible for international energy 
policies and pursuing American energy security. The State department is also responsible for 
“receiving applications for Presidential permits for cross-border pipelines and advises the Secretary if 
the infrastructure would serve the foreign policy interests of the United States” (Bureau of Energy 
Resources 2020).  
There are some federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities other than FERC. Any time a 
pipeline crosses a federally-managed area (approximately one-third of land in the US) the relevant 
federal agency steps in to steer the regulatory process, which may (but not necessarily) include 
environmental impact assessments or in-depth compliance requirements (McBeath 2016). To 
reiterate, these agencies are only responsible for the portion of pipeline that crosses land under their 
jurisdiction. In particular, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the United States Forestry 
Service (USFS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) 
are often involved in pipeline approval.  
The role of the EPA in pipeline regulation is of particular interest in this thesis, given the 
emphasis on climate change in RQ1, as well as the role of environmental concerns more generally in 
delineating the public interest. The EPA is often involved in the regulatory processes for oil pipelines, 
under the auspices of the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) (Dillon et al. 2018; 
McBeath 2016). NEPA is the central piece of federal environmental legislation and requires federal 
agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for all actions that significantly affect 
the human environment on federally governed land. There are two points to emphasize with regards 
to NEPA’s jurisdiction, and how it has been applied to oil pipeline regulation. First, NEPA is only 
invoked for federal agencies to assess activities on land under their jurisdiction; private companies 
usually do not draft the EIS (unlike in Canada) and NEPA has less authority over activities that occur 
on privately-owned land. Second, the definition of ‘significant’ impacts on the human environment is 
vague at best; there is no standard threshold for significance, and this is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis (McBeath 2016; Council on Environmental Quality 2019). Importantly, NEPA evaluation does 
not require the decision-making authority to choose the least environmentally destructive action, only 
that they be aware of the potential consequences. NEPA implementation is managed by the 
President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the members of which are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate (Council on Environmental Quality 2019).  Outside of NEPA, 
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there is a wide spectrum of socio-environmental assessment conducted in oil pipeline projects, 
depending on the state; some states require an EIS, which are generally short, broad statements that 
the environmental impacts of a pipeline are negligible within the state borders; some projects trigger a 
more detailed Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which is much more in depth and requires 
engineering and environmental surveys, and sometimes public consultation, to be conducted. Some 
states require little compliance documentation for intrastate pipelines beyond a submission of the 
pipeline route and dates of construction.  
On the human impacts side, regulation is also piecemeal. The federal Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is responsible for setting and monitoring safety standards 
and accident response, both pre- and post-construction, although operationally this tends to take the 
form of field inspections and incident investigations rather than the evaluation of projects as a whole 
(Office of Pipeline Safety 2021). Municipal authorities also have some jurisdiction over oil pipeline 
routing, but this is usually coordinated through the relevant state agency. Indigenous communities 
have a unique and contested relationship with the federal and state governments as well as private 
sector entities that propose pipeline routes through tribal land; this land is sovereign and therefore not 
subject to eminent domain. Some tribes have a degree of off-reservation authority with regards to 
traditional land jurisdiction, under the National Historic Preservation Act and the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, but in practice this jurisdiction is murky and not well-
defined, and requires consultation but not acquiescence of the tribes involved (McBeath 2016; 
Mengden 2016). 1  
Ultimately, assessments of environmental and human impacts of oil pipelines are dispersed to 
a variety of state and federal agencies, and a great deal of inter-departmental coordination is required 
between and within states to make any sort of grand determination of the public interest and the 
socio-environmental impacts associated with these large and disruptive infrastructure projects. As per 
Executive Order 13337, issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush, in cases where the proposed 
pipeline project crosses international borders and is considered ‘significant’—like KXL—the State 
 
1 An example of the murky waters of tribal jurisdiction is the Dakota Access natural gas pipeline (DAPL), subject to 
significant controversy for its route through the traditional lands of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in North and South 
Dakota. DAPL was legally challenged under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, due to a lack 
of meaningful consultation and discovery of ancient burial sites. This pipeline was also challenged for its potential 
impacts to the upper Missouri River (the only water supply for the Standing Rock Reservation,)which was not 
situated on reservation lands and therefore not under tribal jurisdiction, but rather the Army Corps of Engineers.  
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Department administers the regulatory process and manages all the relevant departments and 
stakeholders, resulting in a more coordinated process that sometimes allows for a more centralized 
assessment of the pipeline.  
 
 
Figure 2: Federal and Native American Lands in the United States. Credit: U.S. Geological 
Survey 
A crucial characteristic of the American regulatory regime is that only in exceptional 
circumstances does one regulatory entity assess the entirety of a pipeline project. Rather, regulation is 
piecemeal, with several different departments, both state and federal, responsible for a small portion 
of the pipeline. There is rarely an in-depth Environmental Impact Assessment conducted for whole 
pipeline projects, and projects are often given blanket permits in an effort to streamline the regulatory 
process (Arkfeld 2017).  
This type of regulation emphasizes local and specific impacts over broader socio-
environmental effects, and ultimately favours pipeline approval over rejection. Rarely has there been 
one entity assessing the socio-environmental impacts of the entire pipeline, let alone diffuse global 
impacts of issues like climate change; therefore, there has rarely been an outright rejection of a whole 
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pipeline project (Keystone XL was an exception to this trend), but rather directives to make routing 
changes or undertake smaller, site-based environmental impact assessments.  
1.2.2 Canada 
The Canadian process is more standardized and regimented; pipelines that do not cross provincial 
borders are dealt with by provincial authorities, and all interprovincial/international pipelines are 
regulated by the Canada Energy Regulator (CER). In 2020, the CER was established and its 
predecessor, the National Energy Board (NEB) was dissolved; however, this thesis is focused on the 
evolution of regulatory institutions, and on the Northern Gateway pipeline (NGP) in particular, which 
was regulated under the NEB. Therefore, the regulator under scrutiny here is the NEB, although the 
CER will be referred to where appropriate.   
To build and operate an interprovincial or international oil pipeline in Canada, pipeline 
companies submitted an application to construct with the NEB, which included (but was not limited 
to) a commercial justification for the project, details of land rights/acquisitions, technical 
specifications, health and safety protocols, accident response measures, comprehensive summaries of 
consultation with municipalities and Indigenous communities, and a variety of relevant socio-
environmental impact assessments (National Energy Board 2013). After this application was 
submitted, an independent review overseen by the NEB Board was initiated. This review included a 
public hearing which allowed ‘intervenors’—individuals and groups who were considered to have a 
direct interest in the project, with a special emphasis on affected Indigenous communities—a chance 
to speak on the record as well as the company itself (National Energy Board 2013). After the hearing  
concluded, the NEB Board issued a finding, which approved the project as is or required specific 
conditions to be met before construction began. Pipelines were rarely rejected outright at this stage; 
however, companies could withdraw applications if the burden of conditions was too high, or if the 
commercial environment had changed. Legal challenges could also take place at any time during the 
review process, but typically were not filed until after the NEB issued a ruling. There was also an 
opportunity for executive involvement; until 2012, NEB project approvals had to be ratified by 
Cabinet, but rejections could not be overturned and no additional conditions could be submitted. In 
2012, amendments to the NEB Act conferred more power to the Cabinet, and the role of the NEB was 
relegated to make a recommendation to Cabinet, rather than issue a decision itself (Harrison 2013). 
The NEB underwent further evolution in 2019, where the controversial Bill C-69 created the Canada 
Energy Regulator (CER) in place of the NEB, but the decision-making power of Cabinet from the 
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2012 amendments was retained. The advent of the CER was an attempt to clarify the regulatory 
process for industry shareholders, increase Indigenous consultation, and introduce more rigorous 
environmental assessments; but as the Northern Gateway project is one of the cases selected for this 
project, and was under the auspices of the NEB, the CER will be discussed only in the context of 
Canadian regulatory evolution more broadly.  
So the NEB, until 2019, was the central energy regulator in Canada for 
interprovincial/international pipelines. Intra-provincial pipelines are solely under the jurisdiction of 
provincial authorities (ie. the Alberta Energy Regulator). The NEB’s powers were established by 
several acts and regulations: the National Energy Board Act of 1959, Canadian Oil and Gas 
Resources Act, and the Canadian Petroleum Resources Act. The NEB was also responsible for 
sections of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the Species at Risk Act, among others. 
However, in contrast to the United States, the NEB had jurisdiction over all relevant pieces of all of 
these acts and regulations, where in the US different departments are responsible for different pieces 
of legislation.  
1.2.3 Northern Gateway and Keystone XL  
This thesis will compare the regulatory processes of two large, controversial pipeline projects in 
Canada and the United States, both from the last 10 years, and both cancelled (or likely to be, in the 
case of KXL). In order to situate the analysis, a brief overview of both pipelines is useful.  
The Northern Gateway pipeline project was initially announced in 2005 by Enbridge Inc., a major 
player in North American energy infrastructure. NGP would have carried diluted bitumen (dilbit) 
1170 kilometres from the Athabasca oil sands in Bruderheim, Alberta to a new port terminal in 
Kitimat, British Columbia, where approximately 220 VLCCs would have shipped 525,000 bpd, 
largely to Asian markets (Natural Resources Canada 2016e).  The NEB and Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency suggested the creation of a Joint Review Panel (JRP) which would allow the 
project to be subject to a single set of socio-environmental assessment/public hearing requirements, 
which was approved by the Minister for Environment. In 2006, Enbridge prioritized other projects 
and NGP was paused until 2008, when Enbridge informed the JRP that it had re-invigorated the 




Figure 3: Proposed Northern Gateway Route (Natural Resources Canada) 
Enbridge began the regulatory process in earnest in 2010, with the filing of the NGP proposal 
which included:  
• project justification and alternatives 
• economic feasibility and contractual arrangements 
• land requirements/land rights & acquisition 
• detailed engineering specifications and routes 
• records of public consultation (with municipalities/groups directly affected) 
• aboriginal engagement, consultation, and traditional knowledge (TK)2 
• environmental and socio-economic impact assessments (ESA), which include impacts 
on: 
o atmospheric environment 






2 For decades in the NEB process, ‘Aboriginal’ was the widely-accepted term to refer to Indigenous, First Nations, 
Inuit, and Métis communities. However, in 2015, the term ‘Indigenous’ began to be adopted by governments and 
organizations, largely due to calls within Indigenous communities in Canada and internationally. Therefore, while the 
term ‘Indigenous’ (including reference to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis communities) will be generally utilized, the 




o surface water resources 
o freshwater fish and fish habitat 
o hydrogeology 
o paleontology 
o effects of the environment on the pipelines and tank terminal  
• human environment, a portion of the ESA which includes impacts on: 
o national and provincial economies 
o human health 
o non-traditional land use 
o heritage resources 
• risk assessment and spill management protocols 
• ESA and risk assessment for the Kitimat marine terminal (under the TERMPOL review 
process, administered by the Department of Transportation specifically for marine 
transport, but with many of the same requirements as the pipeline itself) 
After this initial application, and several clarifications sought from the JRP and officially 
designated intervenors, the NEB held a public hearing and the JRP issued a certificate of approval in 
December 2013—subject to 209 conditions, which had to be addressed by Enbridge before 
construction could begin (Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014a). Most of these 
conditions required additional engagement with Indigenous communities, further due diligence with 
regards to watercourse crossings, and additional details on marine spill mitigation and cleanup; in 
particular, Enbridge had to commit to a remediation fund of $950 million for any accidents (Joint 
Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014a). In 2014, Prime Minister Stephen Harper approved 
NGP (subject to these conditions) despite opposition from a variety of stakeholders, including 
Indigenous groups, environmental activists, municipal authorities, and the government of British 
Columbia. 
In late 2015, the Federal Court of Appeal presided over a legal challenge from a coalition of eight 
Indigenous groups, four environmental organizations, and Unifor (the largest private sector trade 
union in Canada), which alleged that Enbridge had failed to meaningfully consult with Indigenous 
communities along the pipeline route, and that the 209 conditions were insufficient in correcting this 
failure. The courts ruled in their favour, and overturned Cabinet approval of NGP. In January 2016, 
shortly after his election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed the rejection of NGP and after a 
long, contentious regulatory process, the project ultimately failed.   
The KXL process has concluded in a similar manner, with President Joe Biden cancelling the 
project in January 2021(after it was conditionally rejected by President Obama in 2012, rejected again 
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via Presidential veto in 2015 and reinvigorated by President Trump’s executive order in 2017), 
although the regulatory journey is quite different. Proposed in 2008 by TransCanada Pipelines 
Limited (Now TC Energy), KXL would have been an expansion of the current Keystone pipeline 
system which ships crude oil from Hardisty, Alberta to several shipping hubs in the United States 
(including Cushing, Oklahoma; Pakota, Illinois; and Port Arthur, Texas). The KXL expansion would 
run through Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska to its terminus in Steele City, Nebraska. In 2010, 
TransCanada submitted its regulatory application to the NEB for the short Canadian portion of the 
pipeline, which was approved with relatively little fanfare or controversy. TransCanada also 
submitted a similar project proposal to the State Department to pursue a Presidential Permit. Due to 
Executive Order 13337, which places international pipelines under the auspices of the State 
Department, the KXL process is more centralized than many other domestic American pipeline 
projects.  
 
Figure 4: Proposed Keystone XL Route- 2019 (TC Energy) 
In 2010, the State Department released a draft EIS with input from multiple federal agencies; the 
ACE, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of the Interior, PHMSA,  and 
the EPA (Ramseur et al. 2014; Denchak 2021). Relevant state agencies also participated (the Montana 
Department of Environmental Quality, certain county authorities in Nebraska, and two Natural 
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Resource Districts in Nebraska), and an open call for public comments was held. The environmental 
review covered many of the same topics as the NGP process: 
• Geology/ geologic hazards 
• Paleontological resources 
• Soils and sediments 
• Potential erosion and impacts to soil productivity 
• Water resources (including groundwater and surface water) 
• Wetlands 
• Terrestrial vegetation 
• Wildlife and endangered species 
• Fisheries 
• Land use, recreation and visual resources 
• Socioeconomics 
• Environmental justice 
• Cultural resources 
• Air quality and noise 
• Accident response protocols 
• Cumulative impacts 
The 2010 draft EIS, which included an assessment of alternative options, stated that the project 
would have a limited impact on the environment (State Department 2010). In response to the 2010 
EIS, opposition to the project began to coalesce, with landowners in Nebraska wondering about the 
appropriateness of the route, the EPA questioning the justification for the project, and activists 
interrogating the EIS process and demanding further environmental oversight (Denchak 2021). In 
response, the State Department extended its environmental review until 2011, which further reiterated 
the finding of limited environmental impact. In response, protests were staged at the White House and 
Parliament Hill; in Washington, D.C. more than 1200 protestors were arrested (Beinecke 2011). One 
outcome of the new 2011 EIS was a State Department request that TransCanada reroute KXL away 
from the ecologically sensitive Sand Hills region in Nebraska, to which TransCanada agreed. In 
December 2011, Congress imposed a 60-day deadline on the Obama administration to issue a 
decision on the project; in January 2012, President Barack Obama rejected the proposal on the 
grounds that this accelerated timeline did not leave enough time to properly review the new route, and 
invited TransCanada to submit another application (Denchak 2021).  
In 2012, TransCanada submitted a new route to Nebraska state authorities and in turn submitted a 
new application for Presidential Permit. Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman approved the new route 
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in 2013 despite landowner resistance, but opponents filed a legal challenge claiming that the state law 
used to approve this new route was unconstitutional; in 2014, a Nebraska county district judge ruled 
in the opponents’ favour, stalling the regulatory process. In 2015, the Nebraska Supreme Court struck 
down the county decision, allowing the State Department process to move forward. The Republican-
controlled federal Congress announced that it would make KXL a priority, but at this point the 
Obama administration has increasingly turned against the project due to environmental concerns and 
public opposition; during a 30-day public comment period in 2014, over two million comments 
opposing the project were submitted (Swift 2014). In January 2015, the U.S. Senate approved a bill to 
approve KXL, but President Obama vetoes the bill, and eventually rejects the project.  
In January 2017, newly-elected President Donald Trump, acting on campaign promises, 
signed a memorandum inviting TransCanada to re-submit their application. By March 2017, Trump 
has issued a Presidential Permit for KXL. In November 2017 the Nebraska Public Service 
Commission approved the project as well, but required additional reroutes from TransCanada which 
they submitted; in August 2019, the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the reroute and upheld the 
Public Service Commission decision (M. Smith 2019). In November 2018, a U.S. District Judge 
blocked the Trump Administration permit, citing the need for more environmental review. In 2019, a 
Supplemental EIS was released and another period of public engagement was opened, soliciting 
another 120,000 comments.  By December 2020, the KXL pipeline was set to begin construction and 
become operational by 2023. However, several significant legal challenges were still in progress, 
issued by cohorts of environmental activist organizations and tribal councils.3 In 2020, a federal judge 
invalidated the water crossing permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers on the grounds that 
utilizing Nationwide Permit 12 (“nation-wide permits” are high-level, fast-tracked review processes 
that allow one permit to be issued for a whole project without rigorous, site-specific environmental 
assessment), for the entirety of KXL violated the Endangered Species Act. Finally, President Joe 
Biden cancelled the project upon his inauguration in January 2021, and it is very unlikely that the 
pipeline will be built.  
 
3 See: Northern Plains Resource Council et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers et al. and Bold Alliance et al. v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior et al.   
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1.3 Literature Review  
This project is examining the efficacy of regulatory mechanisms in characterizing and interpreting 
complex socio-environmental problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Each empirical chapter 
(II, III, and IV) will focus on a different problem—climate change, energy security, and the public 
interest—and so will utilize a different area of scholarship to frame and analyze the interpretation of 
that problem by regulators. The three main areas of scholarship presented here are 
• theories of regulation, with an emphasis on regulatory capitalism 
• international political economy of energy 
• energy security, in particular the Four A’s framework 
These areas of scholarship are not always explicitly related to each other, but they all relate to the idea 
that regulatory mechanisms have neither the mandate nor the capacity to properly interpret the 
impacts of complex socio-environmental problems. These areas of scholarships will be discussed in 
depth in this section, and specific theories utilized in each empirical chapter (as seen below). 
 
 




1.3.1 Theories of Regulation  
The need to regulate certain industrial activities is ancient, but most modern regulatory agencies were 
created in the aftermath of the Second World War(Lodge 2012; Walby 1999). As these agencies 
grew, so did the idea of the “regulatory state”—that state power in democratic, industrialized 
countries was more often deployed via regulation (Walby 1999; Braithwaite 2006). Regulatory theory 
has undergone significant shifts since the 1950s, but largely focuses on the relationships between 
regulators, the regulated, and the public. Entrenched power structures, broader socio-political 
pressures, and increasingly complex externalities are significant variables in proposing theories of 
regulation(Carrigan and Coglianese 2011; Balleisen and Brake 2014; Feintuck 2010; Moran 2002).  
Theories of public interest regulation, regulatory capture, and regulatory capitalism examine these 
power structures and pressures in different ways, and will be explored in the following sections.  
Public Interest Regulation 
The contemporary regulatory state largely rests on the concept of the ‘public interest’—the idea that 
state-sponsored regulation is meant to protect social welfare as opposed to private stakeholder 
interests—known as the public interest theory of regulation (Posner 1974; Feintuck 2010; Huntington 
1952). Beginning in the 1960s but becoming popular in the 1970s in most wealthy industrialized 
nations (including Canada), consumer safety was given serious consideration in sectors like 
agriculture, and environmental site assessments and hazard assessments were integrated into the 
regulatory compliance process for large projects like energy infrastructure (Doern, Prince, and 
Schultz 2014; Quirk and Derthick 1985). The broad trend was towards regulatory agencies that were 
more inclusive of consumer safety, environmental sustainability, and measures to reduce vulnerability 
in an effort to both protect the public and encourage economic growth (Levine and Forrence 1990). 
Public interest regulation typically emerged in the creation of new regulatory agencies, like the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, and through new powers given to older agencies like 
the NEB, which originated largely as an economic regulator in 1959, but grew to manage all facets of 
interprovincial/international pipeline regulation in the 1970s (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014).   
Public interest regulation theory forms the basis of most contemporary discussions about 
regulation, because it explicitly deals with regulation as a tool to achieve positive public outcomes 
that would not occur without intervention of some sort (Feintuck 2010; Bartle 2009). Notions of 
‘market externalities’ are crucial to understanding public interest regulation; meaning that markets 
can produce negative results because certain factors that are not considered in the market transaction 
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are considered ‘external’ (Hood et al. 1999). Regulations are one tool utilized to ‘internalize’ these 
externalities. Environmental issues are often considered negative externalities, as they are not 
generally accounted for by the market. As a result, environmental protection has become one of the 
largest regulatory issues in the 21st century, not just regarding oil and gas development but across 
industrial activities (Bartle 2009; Castree 2008b; Vormedal, Gulbrandsen, and Skjærseth 2020). There 
has been a huge increase in environmental, social, and consumer safety regulations since the 1970s; in 
the context of energy regulation, these protections make up the bulk of compliance for firms 
(Carrigan and Coglianese 2011). But these additional regulations were largely added on to existing 
institutional scaffolding; the concept of the public interest, which is the foundation of most 
contemporary regulatory institutions, tends to be understood in narrow economic/financial terms 
(King, Chilton, and Roberts 2010). 
Public interest regulation is appealing; it promotes a normative ideal of what regulation could 
and should be. However, a lack of clarity over what constitutes the public interest—how it is to be 
operationalized within regulatory decision-making, and how it functions in practice—mean that a 
more refined notion of regulatory governance is needed. Social protection and environmental 
assessment now constitute the bulk of regulatory requirements in Canada and the United States, but 
we need to engage with the concept of the public interest more purposefully. Without fundamentally 
altering the interpretation of the public interest by regulators, these mechanisms will fall back on 
conventional framing that privileges economic growth. The decisions that regulators made decades 
ago have implications for industrial development today; the choices they make today will influence 
the future of energy development in Canada and the United States.   
Regulatory Capture 
Capture theory, (also referred to as the economic theory of regulation) is fundamentally the idea that 
regulatory mechanisms may evolve to emphasize private interests over public. Crucially, much of 
capture theories applications focus on regulatory mechanisms that may have been created in the 
public interest, but whose mechanisms can be manipulated by powerful private sector actors—leading 
to a condition of ‘regulatory capture’(M. H. Bernstein 1955; Huntington 1952).   
Capture theory grew out of the work of economic theorists like Anthony Downs, Mancur 
Olson, Richard Posner, and George Stigler. Downs applied economic models for utility maximization 
to firm behaviour, positing that private sector actors are no different than individuals in that they will 
support policies that are friendly to their actions, and in turn regulators pursue policies that will garner 
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the most support from the most powerful actors (these private firms) (Downs 1957; Posner 1974). 
Olson elucidated the challenges of collective action which privilege a small, powerful group of actors 
who can coordinate to further their own interests over the broader but more chaotic public interest 
(Olson 1965). George Stigler made the claim that regulation is the same as any other product 
produced in the market and is “acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit” (Stigler 1971).   
All of these threads of scholarship come together to create capture theory, which paints the 
(admittedly cynical) picture of a regulatory state that is built for, and manipulated by, private sector 
interests rather than the public good. However, while industry influence on regulatory agencies is at 
this juncture undeniable in some instances, the strength of this influence ebbs and flows across 
regimes, administrations, and institutions (Carrigan and Coglianese 2011). For instance, different 
regimes have unique policy goals, which may change the level of access industry has to both 
regulators and political representatives, or exogenous shocks like an industrial accident may spur 
institutional reform and widen the gap between regulator and industry. A clear example of the latter is 
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig fire and associated spill, an investigation of which revealed 
extremely close relationships between industry representatives and regulators and resulted in the 
dissolution of the Minerals Management Service, replaced by three new agencies in 2011 (Carrigan 
2013). 
Regulatory capture, after a confluence of scholarly work in the 1970s and 1980s, was largely 
left aside by political economy scholars. Although economists (including Nobel-winner Jean-Jaques 
Laffont and Jean Tirole) produced pathbreaking empirical work on principal-agent relations in 
regulation, they were less concerned with testing the central problematic of capture theory— that 
regulation is essentially for sale—than with mathematically understanding the inefficiencies of 
regulation and asymmetries of information (Laffont and Tirole 1991). On the matter of examining the 
social and political aspects of interest group-regulator relationships, however, little work was being 
done. Having said that, the potential of regulatory capture was one variable contributing to 
deregulatory impulses in Canada and the United States in the 1970s and 1980s (Quirk and Derthick 
1985; Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014; Doern and Gattinger 2003).  
It should be noted that capture does not have to be a dichotomous condition, but rather can 
exist on a scale and in several different forms. David Carpenter and David Moss posit that while 
claims of capture are often misdiagnosed and misinterpreted, one of the most significant problems 
with capture scholarship is “its lack of nuance in describing how and to what degree capture works in 
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particular settings” (Carpenter and Moss 2013). It is not that capture does not exist, but rather that 
proposing capture as the cause of every regulatory failure suggests an inherent brokenness in 
contemporary regulation more broadly, which is a very bold claim to make; simply because 
regulation fails, does not necessarily mean that it is fully captured (Carpenter and Moss 2013; Novak 
2013; Shapiro 2011). There is also a question of by whom regulatory mechanisms are captured; the 
focus is often on industry capture, but regulatory capture can concern concerted shifts away from the 
public interest in favour of any interest group, including activists, unions, or consumer interest 
groups(Levine and Forrence 1990; Novak 2013).  
Several distinctions must be made within the regulatory capture literature before moving 
forward, to help situate this thesis, and its case studies, within the regulation literature as well as 
political economy scholarship more broadly. First, that regulatory capture should be conceived of as 
‘strong’ or ‘weak’, when it does exist, rather than a strict dichotomy of ‘completely captured’ or 
‘completely independent from capture’ (Carpenter and Moss 2013). Strong capture, as proposed by 
Carpenter and Moss, is a state in which institutions are so far removed from the public interest that 
the public would be better off with no regulation at all or a complete replacement of the institution in 
question; while this condition may exist at times, the bar is high to prove as such. Weak capture, 
conversely, occurs when the net benefit of regulation is still positive, but diminished due to external 
influence.  
The second distinction that must be made is between traditional entry-barrier capture and 
more contemporaneous corrosive capture. Stigler, Olson, Samuel Huntington, and others from the 
initial wave of capture scholarship were concerned largely with instances in which regulators 
heightened barriers to entry in certain industries in order to privilege incumbents over new entrants, 
marking the appropriation of regulation as the foundation of capture (Stigler 1971; M. H. Bernstein 
1955; Huntington 1952). The remedy to such entry-barrier capture was, as Stigler proposed, 
deregulation; if there were fewer regulatory institutions with less power, then barriers to entry would 
diminish, encouraging economic growth (Stigler 1971; Olson 1965) . This deregulatory impulse 
espoused in the 1970s, quickly echoed in policy decisions in both the United States and Canada, 
suggested an ideological bent to capture theory that the literature has been unable to shake (Quirk and 
Derthick 1985; Doern and Gattinger 2003). There was opposition to the deregulatory impulses of 
initial capture scholarship; for instance, historian Gabriel Kolko, a critical theorist whose work would 
inspire scholars of regulatory capitalism, proposed that the very concept of government regulating 
business was rooted in what he called political capitalism and not in the public interest (Kolko 1965). 
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But the overwhelming tendency of capture theory in the 1970s and 80s was in favour of deregulation 
to mitigate barriers to entry.  
However, as the distributive effects of the Cold War-era neoliberal impulses become clear, 
regulatory capture has largely taken on a very different character in the last few decades. Carpenter 
and Moss propose “corrosive capture” to explain captured institutions that result in fewer regulatory 
barriers, rather than more as in entry-barrier capture (Carpenter and Moss 2013). Corrosive capture 
“dismantle[s] regulation even in the absence of public support or a strong welfare rationale for doing 
so” (Carpenter and Moss 2013). Corrosive capture could result in reduced entry barriers, as an 
antithesis of the Stiglerian capture, but is more likely to take the form of reduced compliance 
requirements, less oversight, and shorter operating procedures in an effort to reduce costs. Lastly, the 
concept of “cultural capture”, proposed by James Kwak,  proposes that regulation can be captured 
through the manipulation of norms, conventions, and discourses that underlie certain industries 
(Kwak 2013). Cultural capture as a mechanism does not exist on its own, but rather in service of 
either corrosive or entry-barrier capture. When it comes to environmental and social impacts, which 
have become major components of energy regulation only since the 1990s, corrosive capture is far 
more likely as environmental assessments tend to be costly, social impacts can be controversial, and 
both significantly increase the regulatory burden on the private sector.  
Regulatory Capitalism 
Both public interest regulation and capture theory seek to analyze the purpose of regulatory 
mechanisms and the interaction between the regulator, the regulated, and the consumers of the 
regulated product. As a critical counterweight to both of these theories, the theory of regulatory 
capitalism suggests that the goal of regulation is not to protect the public good (even under capture 
theory, regulatory agencies rarely start out captured), but rather as a tool of commodity accumulation 
(Drahos and Braithwaite 2001). As defined by David Levi-Faur, regulatory capitalism suggests that 
“regulation made, nurtured and constrained the capitalist system and capitalism creates the demand 
for regulation” (Levi-Faur 2017). Regulatory capitalism emphasizes the cyclical and interdependent 
relationship between the state, the market, and society (Levi-Faur 2005). Under a framework of 
regulatory capitalism, regulatory mechanisms are one of many institutions that constitute the capitalist 
state and can be manipulated to cultivate strategies of commodity accumulation, the raison d’être of 
capitalism. Regulatory capitalism extends the concept of the ‘regulatory state’, where state power is 
often deployed via regulation, rather than a monopoly on violence or welfare provision (Walby 1999).  
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In the 1990s, after a period of de-regulation in the 1980s in many liberal democracies, a kind 
of “regulatory explosion” took place, with a rapid and sharp increase in the number of regulatory 
agencies(Braithwaite 2008). To some scholars, notably John Braithwaite, David Levi-Faur, and Jacint 
Jordana, this represented a shift in the way we think about regulation; the concept of the ‘regulatory 
state’ seemed to place too much emphasis on state actors, without accounting for broader global 
social/political/economic forces; but neither public interest regulation nor capture theory could 
explain this rapid expansion in regulatory services (Braithwaite 2008; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; 
Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005a; Levi-Faur 2017). So the theory of ‘regulatory capitalism’ was instead 
proposed; that regulation was increasingly transforming into a part of government, with all its 
associated ideological accoutrements, rather than an administrator to ensure the provision of public 
and private services (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Braithwaite 2008).  
Regulatory capitalism pushes back against the idea that neoliberalism has been the guiding 
institutional principle of politics since the 1970s. Neoliberalism as a concept is somewhat contentious 
in both scholarship and beyond; but broadly, under a neoliberal directive, there is a tendency towards 
privatization, deregulation, and ‘small government’ (Castree 2008b; MacNeil 2014a; McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004). And there were deregulatory impulses in the 1980s across the world; as evidenced by 
the Thatcher regime in the UK and Reagan administration in the US, the Mulroney Conservatives in 
Canada in 1984, and beyond in Europe, Latin America, and Australia (Quirk and Derthick 1985; 
Braithwaite 2008). There were of course exceptions; while the Washington Consensus of 
neoliberalism had swept much of the world (most dramatically in the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union), many East Asian countries had economic success despite a resistance towards these broadly 
neoliberal impulses (although this success was briefly interrupted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis) 
(Braithwaite 2008). Regulatory economist Joseph Stiglitz pointed to the rapid recovery of Asia from 
the financial crisis as proof that the Washington consensus, and thus neoliberalism, was no longer the 
dominant governing principle in the world, if it ever truly was (Stiglitz 2003). As Levi-Faur and 
Jordana proposed, the regulatory explosion in the 1990s suggests that with regards to regulation in 
particular, deregulatory impulses were short-lived; we have been in a broad period of re-regulation (in 
terms of regulatory agencies and rule-setting) for decades (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004).  
In summary, institutional analysis in terms of regulation began in the ‘night watchmen’ 
regulatory state, which focused largely on certain constraints on activity as embedded in law pre-
World War II; moved to public interest regulation, then to capture theory, then to notions of the ‘new 
regulatory state’. Regulatory capitalism takes this notion of regulation as a tool of state power one 
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step further, intimating that increased regulation, both from within the state and without, actually 
further entrenches global capitalist power structures by privileging large multinational corporations 
(MNCs). These firms are often much better equipped to satisfy a heavy regulatory burden than small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), and they have the technical expertise and financial resources to 
propose regulations that privilege their business development. Regulatory capitalism, and this is 
borne out by the evolution of regulatory institutions globally, suggests that both markets and the state 
have become stronger, and regulatory institutions have evolved to strengthen the state-market 
relationship. The state increasingly shares governance with non-state actors (like industry 
associations, NGOs, civil society organizations, etc.), but the wealth and market power that is 
produced under contemporary capitalist structures in turn gives states the capacity to regulate more 
than ever, therefore maintaining its own power over market forces.  
1.3.2 International Political Economy of Energy 
Contemporary international political economy (IPE) was borne out of the rapid globalization and 
subsequent economic shocks of the 1960s and 1970s. Prevailing realist theory (from the international 
relations literature) was unable to explain events such as the 1973 oil shock as there was little space 
for economics or non-state actors in the foundation of these theories (Cohen 2008). IPE, 
intellectually, was meant to examine the inextricable relationship between global market “structures” 
and the “agents” of political-economic interaction, like states (Van de Graaf et al. 2016). It is in this 
space of the inherent complexity of interaction that IPE and energy have something to offer one 
another; energy research is often done under the auspices of economics (trade), natural sciences 
(technical development), or state-centric international relations (geopolitics & security) (Kuzemko, 
Keating, and Goldthau 2018). IPE offers an alternative lens with which to view the unique importance 
of energy and the vast network of actors and institutions involved in its proliferation. 
IPE is by no means a homogenous discipline; however, there are some central tenets to the 
field. In the essential text The Political Economy of International Relations, American scholar Robert 
Gilpin states that “the parallel existence and mutual interaction of ‘state’ and ‘market’ in the modern 
world create ‘political economy’”(Gilpin 1987). Despite the intellectual heterogeneity of the field, the 
foundational assumption underlying IPE is that politics and economics cannot be analytically 
separate; that economic structures and conventions are directed by political action; and that domestic 
and international levels of analysis are inherently intertwined (Underhill 2001).  
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IPE scholarship draws from its intellectual roots in political science to conceive of its central 
problematique—the state-market relationship—from three broad perspectives: realist, liberal, and 
critical thought. It is worth noting that as the discipline has evolved, these categories have perhaps 
become overly simplistic as there is significant diversity of thought within these perspectives. 
However, they were crucial in defining the discipline’s origins, and much of the scholarship still 
draws from these distinctions (Underhill 2001). The role of energy systems is generally viewed 
differently from each of these perspectives, depending on the conception of state-market relationship.  
Realist IPE 
Broadly, realist thought, drawing from international relations, considers the international system to be 
anarchic with the state as the only legitimate actor. Under this paradigm, markets are ultimately a tool 
of the state (Gilpin 1987). Operating from this premise realist political economy, while still a 
foundation of IPE scholarship, has struggled to account for contemporary trends in globalization 
(Kirshner 2009). In the 1980’s, realist political economy attempted to engage with globalization 
through ideas like hegemonic stability theory—that the international system is more likely to remain 
stable with the presence of a clear dominant world power (Kindleberger 1986; Krasner 1976). This 
view was popular amongst realist theorists in the 1980s, but has largely fallen out of favour as 
contradictory empirical evidence has emerged (Webb and Krasner 1989).  
Given that realist political economy emphasizes state structural power over other power 
relationships and governance mechanisms, the role of energy systems is considered as subordinate to 
state power. Realist thought tends to consider energy in two ways; first, that energy security—having 
consistent and reliable access to energy supplies—is paramount for national security (Goldthau and 
Sovacool 2012; Stoddard 2013). This line of thinking was a response to the 1973 OPEC-induced oil 
price shock; suddenly, industrialized importing states were forced to confront the impacts of 
interrupted energy supply (Goldthau and Sitter 2015b; Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf 2012). 
This gave rise to the energy security and energy independence literature, which drew from neorealist 
political economy to emphasize the need for states to secure consistent energy supplies through 
increased domestic production (Cherp, Jewell, and Goldthau 2011; Tugwell 1980). Tangential to the 
energy security literature is the relationship between energy resources and conflict, which falls largely 
under the purview of security theorists and international relations scholars rather than IPE (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Klare 2001; Ross 2006). 
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The second perspective of energy from the realist political economy perspective conceives 
energy systems as indistinguishable from any other resource, industry, or global system. IPE scholar 
Robert Gilpin discussed energy as an important industry, but not fundamentally unique, which 
suggests that IPE could be applied to energy the same way it could be applied to trade, globalization, 
or poverty (Gilpin 1987). Many political economists, realist and otherwise, have taken Gilpin’s view, 
arguing that while energy is fundamental to the function of the international system, it is not unique 
enough to warrant special consideration (Kirshner 2009; Cohen 2008; Morse 1999). However, there 
has been pushback to this point of view, particularly since the early 2000s and especially from liberal 
and critical thinkers in political economy. 
Liberal IPE 
From the liberal perspective in IPE, the state and market operate largely independently, with the 
primary role of the state to ensure the orderly operation of markets. When the field began to coalesce 
in the 1970s, the works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye heralded the emergence of a distinctly 
liberal IPE in the United States (Ravenhill 2007; Cohen 2007). The rapid globalization that occurred 
in the 1980s and 1990s is a direct result of the promotion of liberal IPE ideals; and as a result of that 
globalization, liberalism is the dominant theory in contemporary IPE (Frieden and Martin 2003). 
Liberal political economists operate from an individualist ontology, with individual interests the 
analytical starting point (Keohane 1988; Blyth 1997). Liberal scholars tend to assume that power 
comes from different sources in different systems, but largely is influenced by the operation of 
institutions both global and local (Keohane 1988).  
 Liberal IPE also emphasizes the role of institutions, both domestic and international, as a 
vehicle for the production of certain power relationships. Institutions are considered the analytical  
‘building blocks’ of IPE (Frieden and Martin 2003). In the early 1980s, liberal IPE scholar Robert 
Keohane, while operating from a state-centric perspective similar to his colleagues from the realist 
tradition, posited that international regimes were the key to solving market failures and the lack of 
state-to-state cooperation (Keohane 1984). There is a lot of space for non-state actors in the liberal 
conception of IPE; multinational companies (MNCs), international organizations, banks, civil society 
groups, and individuals all have the capacity to interact and affect the state-market relationship (Van 
de Graaf et al. 2016). Mainstream emphasis on international regimes has also contributed to an 
increase in scholarly interest in ‘global governance’.  
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 Until the 2010s, the role of energy in the liberal IPE was similar to that of its realist 
counterparts. Energy was considered a commodity like any other; when scholars did single out 
energy, it was generally to advocate for the privatization of energy suppliers or to analyze fossil fuel 
price shocks (Van de Graaf et al. 2016). However, recently energy scholarship has been reinvigorated 
in liberal IPE. The idea of ‘global energy governance’, concerned with the global network of energy 
regimes and institutions, has pushed back against purely technical conceptions of energy to propose 
that the underlying structures of energy systems influence certain path dependencies (Kuzemko, 
Keating, and Goldthau 2018). Liberal IPE is still grappling with the ‘uniqueness’ of energy within the 
grander IPE paradigm, and scholarship from the last five years suggests a turn to focus on energy 
resources and systems (Goldthau and Sitter 2015b). While the study of international energy politics 
has been established for decades (see Keohane 1984, for instance), the liberal-eye view of market 
supremacy in global energy dynamics has expanded in the last decade, with an emphasis on energy 
transitions and the volatility of oil and gas markets (Van de Graaf and Colgan 2016).  
Critical IPE 
Critical theory came to contemporary IPE largely as a response to practical, real-world issues that 
could not be satisfactorily explained by existing theoretical approaches. In the late 1980s, as the post-
war American hegemony began to wane, the practical problems of a globalising world led to 
increased interest in developing new theories in the field, as theories like HST seemed unable to 
explain current trends (Strange 1996). Some scholars felt that the fairly homogenous IPE, at that point 
represented by American scholars like Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Charles Kindleberger, and 
Steven Krasner, did not fully address social theories or fill the gap between international relations and 
global economic processes (Strange 1988).  
Two major publications signaled the rise of critical theory in IPE, and a major turn towards 
neo-Gramscian thought; Susan Strange’s States and Markets, a crucial text for students of energy in 
particular, and Robert Cox’s Production, Power, and the World Order. Strange argued that energy 
markets have proven to be highly vulnerable to political forces (hence the ability of OPEC to disrupt 
the global economy through a manipulation of fossil fuel production in 1973), and so an exclusive 
focus on either the economics or the politics of energy cannot fully account for the role that energy 
systems play in the global economy or in international politics (Strange 1988).   
 Cox, inspired by Gramsci’s concepts of historic blocs of power and hegemony, adapted these 
ideas as a framework for analyzing global political economy. In this neo-Gramscian IPE, hegemony 
 
 39 
is created by the globalization of certain institutions and norms, led largely by the economic power of 
a superpower and cemented by the normalization of its ideologies and structures  (R. W. Cox 1926- 
1987). This was in direct response to the failure of HST to explain rapid globalization and the role of 
the United States in the international system. The neo-Gramscian turn in IPE is not without its critics; 
some critical theorists feel that too much attention is given to concepts of hegemony and historical 
contingency, to the exclusion of other strands of critical thought (Farrands and Worth 2005). 
In 2016, Tim DiMuzio proposed the idea of “carbon capitalism: the notion that the magnitude 
and universalization of capital accumulation, along with high energy–intensive forms of social 
reproduction, would have been impossible without abundant, affordable and accessible fossil fuels” 
(DiMuzio 2016). This explicit integration of carboniferous energy systems into the reproduction of 
the capitalist world order took energy systems from the periphery of IPE, where critical scholars 
argue that fossil fuels’ centrality to capitalist systems supports and entrenches those systems, allowing 
for the continuation of  a “petro-capitalist” political economy despite the social, ecological, and 
political crises that such dependence on fossil fuels engenders (Matthew Huber 2009; 2013; Pineault 
2018). 
1.3.3 Energy Security 
The notion of energy security emerged in the 1970s, both in policy and in theory, largely in response 
to disputes over oil supply in the 1973 oil crisis and led to U.S. President Jimmy Carter infamously 
declaring in 1980 that efforts to disrupt the supply lines of oil from the Persian Gulf would be 
considered an attack on the “vital interests of the United States” (J. Carter 1980). As a policy 
problem, scholarly interest in energy security waned in the late 1980s/1990s, as prices stabilized and 
embargoes were lifted, and was re-invigorated in the 2000s as energy demand began to rise sharply in 
Asia while environmental concerns globally put pressure on national governments to begin 
decarbonizing their energy systems (Cherp and Jewell 2014). 
Conceptualizing energy security is difficult; governments, organizations, and firms tend to 
propose the definition that supports their own economic/political/social interests, and there is little 
consensus amongst scholars (Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brown 2010). Energy itself is a complex and 
multifaceted concept; as was discussed above in section 3.2, there is some debate as to whether 
energy deserves special consideration within the study of international political economy, or whether 
it is just another commodity. Within the security scholarship, there are some broad categorizations of 
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notions of energy security, but again these are contested and malleable, and range from narrow and 
specific to broader and holistic concepts. 
  The ‘economic’ aspects of energy security are narrow, focusing on minimizing price 
volatility and consistency of supply and demand(World Bank 2005). Other scholars focus on the 
environmental aspects of energy security, which recognizes that certain energy sources are finite and 
have present and future impacts on planetary and human health; this view prioritizes sustainability, 
long-term planning, and diversification of energy sources (Indriyanto, Fauzi, and Firdaus 2011).  
 However, there are some points of convergence when we talk about energy security. For example, 
the International Energy Agency defines energy security as “adequate, affordable, and reliable access 
to energy fuels and services, it includes availability of resources, decreasing dependence on imports, 
decreasing pressures on the environment, competition and market efficiency, reliance on Indigenous 
resources that are environmentally clean, and energy services that are affordable and equitably 
shared” (International Energy Agency 2019).  This definition elucidates the ‘four As’ of energy 
security, which is a common and widespread approach as can be found in the scholarship and was 
explicitly proposed by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre 
2007).  
The ‘Four A’s’ approach to energy security proposes that there are four main aspects to 
energy security: availability (of fossil fuels, unconventional energy sources, and renewable energies); 
accessibility (regarding economic, political, or physical barriers to accessing energy, as well as 
energy poverty); affordability (concerning price volatility and costs of infrastructure); and 
acceptability (largely concerned with the social and environmental impacts of resource extraction and 
consumption, including climate change) (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre 2007; Benjamin K. 
Sovacool 2011b).  
These are commonly cited aspects of energy security within the literature; in 2010, 80% of 
the energy security literature mentions availability, 50% discuss affordability, and 25% discuss 
acceptability in terms of sustainability and other environmental impacts (Benjamin K. Sovacool and 
Brown 2010). In the last decade, significant attention has been paid to the accessibility facet, largely 
in terms of energy poverty(Benjamin K. Sovacool 2012b; González-Eguino 2015; Ali et al. 2020; 
Delina and Sovacool 2018; Abramovay 2014; Herington and Malakar 2016). Availability and 
affordability feature prominently in two classic treatises on energy security (Deese 1979; Yergin 
1988), and have been included in most organizational/state definitions since the 1980s (Benjamin K. 
Sovacool 2011b).  Accessibility and acceptability were not explicitly proposed as aspects of energy 
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security until the 2007 APERC report, which put forward the full “Four A’s” framework (Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre 2007). The Four A’s framework was quickly taken up by energy security 
scholars (Kruyt et al. 2009; Chester 2010; Winzer 2012; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Vivoda 2010; 
von Hippel et al. 2011b). However, this framework is often altered or modified, reinforcing the idea 
that energy security scholarship, as Lynne Chester proposed in her own seminal article on 
conceptualizing energy security, as “slippery and multi-dimensional”(Chester 2010). 
However, there has been pushback against relying on this ‘four A’s’ conceptualization of 
energy security. While these aspects of energy security worked for issues in the 1970s/1980s, which 
were largely concerned with ensuring stable supplies of inexpensive oil for the West, contemporary 
energy security is much more complex, multifaceted, and critical of fossil fuel-centric analysis (Cherp 
and Jewell 2014; Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brown 2010; Matt Huber 2016; Proskuryakova 2018; 
Bradshaw 2014; Proedrou 2018).  
Cherp and Jewell attempt to overcome the myriad of similar but contested definitions of 
energy security by proposing a ‘vital energy systems’ approach (Cherp and Jewell 2014). Working off 
of the assumption that energy security is not fundamentally different than any other security issue, 
they begin with David Baldwin’s definition of security—ensuring a “low probability of damage to 
acquired values” (Baldwin 1997). Of course, security as a concept is also contested. Baldwin’s 
definition attempts to detangle the concept of security from normative value judgments and empirical 
discussions regarding the magnitude of threats (Baldwin 1997). This definition proposes that specific 
security issues should be oriented at least around these questions (Baldwin 1997; Little and Buzan 
2000): 
• Security for whom?  
• Security for which values? 
• From what threats? 
The Four A’s framework answers these questions only partially or not at all. In classic 
1970s/1980s scholarship, the referent object of security were oil-importing Western states, as most of 
the energy security discussions were circled around the 1973 oil crisis. Today, energy security 
depends on where you’re standing: from the perspective of an oil producing nation, security of 
demand is paramount. For the energy importer, security and consistency of supply is crucial. Non 
state-actors like production networks, industrial associations, regional authorities, and individual 
consumers all complicate analyses of the Four A’s, especially with regards to affordability and 
acceptability(Bridge 2008; M. T. Huber 2011; Benjamin K. Sovacool et al. 2013). Energy security, 
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like most security issues, is ultimately about managing risk; but concepts of risk and resilience are not 
overtly discussed in the Four A’s framework (although they tangentially appear in discussions 
regarding attacks on energy infrastructure)(Farrell, Zerriffi, and Dowlatabadi 2004; Lilliestam 2014).  
Cherp and Jewell propose that, following from contemporary security studies, energy security is 
about ensuring the “low vulnerability of vital energy systems”, which emphasizes a malleable and 
context-specific approach that emphasizes resilience and allows for energy security to represent 
political and environmental interests, as opposed to the emphasis on energy markets that the Four A’s 
framework tends to elucidate (Cherp and Jewell 2014). 
The Four A’s framework has its shortcomings; notably the lack of attention paid to security 
itself. Cherp and Jewell bring the ‘security’ back into ‘energy security’ by focusing on what exactly is 
being secured. However, there is much to draw on analytically from the Four A’s; there has been 
increasing attention to the accessibility and acceptability aspects in particular, with regards to energy 
poverty, environmental sustainability, and climate change (Ali et al. 2020; González-Eguino 2015; 
Naeem Nawaz and Alvi 2018; Proskuryakova 2018; Shah et al. 2019; Herington and Malakar 2016; 
Delina and Sovacool 2018). Ultimately, the Four As framework provides a conceptual starting point 
for discussions regarding energy security, although critics are correct in that we need to consider the 
perspective and direction of what is being secured, for whom, and against what threats in order to 
properly integrate challenges of sustainability and equity into questions of energy security. In order to 
consider the scope of energy security challenges, we need to define the boundaries of the threat. The 
next section, focused on the jurisdictional aspects of resources and their regulation, discusses the 
dynamic nature of some of those boundaries.  
1.3.4 Resource Geographies, Territory, and Sovereignty 
This project endeavours to understand how the relationships between states, markets, and non-state 
actors affect the development and application of oil pipeline regulation. Due to the diffuse 
geographical nature of pipelines, it is necessary to explicitly integrate aspects of human geography 
into the analysis. In particular, there needs to be a focus on concepts of territory and space, which are 
often contested notions with regards to pipeline regulation. Theories of IPE and energy security 
(which falls under the international relations umbrella) tend to take conceptions of the state for 
granted; states exercise power via a set of specific institutions over a specific geographical area (J. A. 
Agnew 2009; Sassen 2008). The question of sovereignty—state control and authority—over certain 
territories and spaces is embedded in an examination of oil pipelines. These pipelines cross local, 
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subnational, and sometimes international borders, as well as lands claimed by Indigenous peoples and 
protected environmental areas. Additionally, the impacts of these pipelines are not solely at the site of 
construction. Risks to water sources can have downstream effects on human and animal populations 
far from the pipeline itself; while a single pipeline creates negligible GHGs, the oil flowing through it 
will contribute significantly to climate change.4  
Historically, resource regulation has been considered to be state-centric, concerned with 
managing resource flows to the advantage of that state (Rees 1990). However, there has been an 
explicit acknowledgement of the political economy of resource management, as it has become clear 
that firms and markets have significant influence on the way that resources are developed, extracted, 
and consumed(Rees 1990; Blowers 1998; Peluso and Watts 2001; Le Billon 2001; Bridge 2008). The 
expansion of resource regulation beyond a narrow, state-centric, administrative role can be seen in: 
the proliferation of non-state actors, especially market-based assessment mechanisms(Castree 2008b; 
Bakker and Bridge 2006; McCarthy and Prudham 2004), the expansion of responsibility to include 
environmental protection (Gunderson and Holling 2001) and new challenges to commodity-centric 
logics of resource development from civil society, Indigenous communities, youth groups and beyond 
(Bakker and Bridge 2006; Martínez-Alier 2012; McCauley and Heffron 2018; Strambo and Espinosa 
2020).  
We can return to IPE scholars for discussions of territory and sovereignty as well. The realist 
view of state territoriality—that the state has ultimate authority over a specific geographical region 
with little interaction with outside forces—has waned in recent years, but is still a central feature of 
both IPE and IR theory (J. Agnew 1994; Underhill 2001; Bridge 2014). Matters of security (including 
energy security) tend towards these types of strict, closed definitions—when territory (and therefore 
sovereignty) is not absolute, observations about the relationships between the state and non-state 
actors become much more muddled, albeit more representative of real-world activities. The 
classically liberal view of state territory and sovereignty proposes that state power is eroding due to 
forces of globalization, but is still crucial; however, this argument still draws from strict territorial 
definitions as it proposes that power is eroding in relation to ‘closed’ views of territory and 
sovereignty (Keohane 1984). From the critical perspective, Cox proposed in 1981 that states are 
 
4 In both Canada and the United States, the direct GHGs associated with the construction and operation of oil 
pipelines are calculated with reference to land use changes, electricity use, fuels for construction-related vehicles, 
and an approximation of possible fugitive emissions.  
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continually reconstructed as a result of global and local material conditions (R. W. Cox 1981), 
allowing for a more context-specific conception of territory and sovereignty.  
Alongside the concepts of territory and sovereignty, there has been increasing attention paid 
to scale by political geographers—a concept largely left to the side by IPE and IR scholars, but which 
has implications for the way we consider power, wielded both within and without the state. After the 
“spatial turn” in studies of human geography, which emphasized a re-conceptualization of previously 
simplistic and technical definitions of space, place, and scale, there was a turn to constructivist and 
post-modern theories to interrogate these concepts. The consensus in the early 1990s was that social, 
political, and economic interaction is not simply organized horizontally, with neat regions fitting 
together, but rather vertically, with overlapping and hierarchical scales that organize social spaces 
according to local, regional, national, and global scales(Marston and Smith 2001). In particular, the 
constructionist view of scale has resulted in an examination of how geographical scales are produced, 
and in service of whom(Silvern 1999). The politics of scale construction can contribute a lot to an 
examination of pipelines that relies on IPE and IR, as this one does, because ultimately these scales 
represent the distribution of power between these differentiated scales, and the contested nature of 
that distribution (Silvern 1999; Wissen 2009).   
Geographical scale is not only the product of these socio-political processes but also helps to 
constitute them. Existing scales of power and hierarchy are intertwined with the concepts of territory 
and sovereignty, and are further enabled by them; the further one moves up in terms of scale, the 
more power one has accumulated, to be deployed over a larger territory(Jonas 1994). These scales are 
not always strict or explicitly delineated, and the boundaries between scales are often fluid. 
Geographical scale is often taken for granted in studies of IPE and IR, but we need to be aware of the 
ways that scale impacts power relationships and institutional change. For instance, Canada as a 
federal system has two explicitly defined scales of political power and jurisdiction; this has 
implications for the way that we regulate pipelines, as it distributes the authority for 
interprovincial/international pipelines and intraprovincial pipelines in ways that affect industrial 
development and socio-environmental regulation. 
Ultimately, there has been critical pushback against simplistic definitions of territory, 
sovereignty, and scale. This has generally led to a more nuanced and contextual, but less clear, view 
of territorial and scalar relations. We cannot abandon the more simplistic notions of territory and 
scale, because states themselves often ascribe to these definitions. In terms of the KXL pipeline, for 
instance, we can analyze market forces and the myriad of non-state actors, from environmental 
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activists to Indigenous groups to industrial lobbyists, but ultimately state authority makes the 
decisions.  
The takeaway from all of this literature, including the IPE, regulatory capitalism, and energy 
security scholarship, is that while notions of the state and state power have certainly evolved—and in 
many aspects eroded—states still matter, although other actors and institutions have an increasing 
amount of influence. This project will utilize these distinct but related pools of scholarship to examine 
the relationships between states, markets, and non-state actors to understand how regulatory 
institutions have developed and have in turn influenced those relationships. 
1.4 Methodology 
In support of the critical theoretical foundations of this thesis, this project rests on a constructivist 
ontology, emphasizing that realities are context-specific and malleable. As a result of its constructivist 
ontology, epistemologically this thesis comes from an interpretivist position as opposed to positivist, 
and is less concerned with proposing causal relationships between variables and is more concerned 
with understanding certain outcomes and behaviours. Interpretivist epistemologies and constructivist 
ontologies necessarily follow one another, as both rely on an understanding that the world is socially 
constructed, as opposed to views that reality exists outside of our interactions with it. Although these 
realities may be the result of social construction and therefore centralizes the role of actors and 
individuals, these actors are in turn affected by certain tangible materialities (ie. 
geographical/political/social characteristics) (Furlong and Marsh 2010). Within the constructivist 
ontology there is further division between post-modern constructivism and modern constructivism—
to which this thesis ascribes—which emphasizes that we can still make observable claims about how 
the world works, despite the role that social construction plays in affecting actors, structures, and 
discourses (Furlong and Marsh 2010).   
An emphasis on the importance of institutions persisted in political inquiry until the 1950s, 
when the ‘behavioural revolution’ highlighted actors and individuals in the study of political 
outcomes (Lowndes 2010) . However, the study of institutions evolved and persisted, resulting in a 
“new institutionalism” which has several variants of its own (rational choice, historical, and 
sociological) (Hall and Taylor 1996). Under this new paradigm, institutions are more broadly defined 
as “stable, recurring pattern[s] of behaviour” (Goodin 1996), allowing for an inclusion of informal 
political structures as well as formal governance mechanisms. Additionally, ‘new institutionalist’ 
theory suggests that it is often informal institutional norms and conventions that impacts social and 
 
 46 
political behaviour (Finnemore 1996). Institutional choices—whether those are explicit policy 
outcomes or tacit approval/condemnation of certain economic and political behaviours—has long-
term impacts on development pathways. Unlike rational choice approaches, which mostly disregard 
the normative nature of any institutional decision—for instance, Karl Polanyni’s classic position that 
the choice to allow market determination of outcomes is, in itself, a normative decision (Polanyi 
1944)— historical and sociological institutionalists ascribe embrace the normative; the effects of 
historical context and long-term path dependencies are both of interest to these institutionalist 
scholars (Sanders 2006). Constructivist institutionalism, a newer variant, differs from its 
institutionalist comrades by focusing on institutional change, and are less convinced by locked-in 
path dependencies.  
The ‘new institutionalist’ perspective for a project of this type, given that regulatory 
mechanisms are one integral component of those institutions that constitute oil governance, and that 
these mechanisms themselves are affected by formal and informal relationships between state and 
non-state actors.  In particular, and with respect to its constructivist ontology, this thesis proposes a 
constructivist institutionalism that aims to understand the dynamics between institutions and the 
groups/actors that are involved in such institutions, and how these dynamics change over time 
(Lowndes 2010; Hay 2006).  Constructivist institutionalism (CI) “seeks to identify, detail, and 
interrogate the extent to which—through processes of normalization and institutional-embedding—
established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret 
environmental signals. Yet, crucially, they are also concerned with the conditions under which such 
established cognitive filters and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced” (Hay 2006).  CI 
pays more attention to the behaviours of strategic actors, the effects of those actors on institutional 
change; actors are in turn acted upon by institutions (Hay 2008). CI also places more emphasis on the 
ineffectiveness or contested nature of institutions (all though this is not exclusive to CI—the borders 
between types of institutional theory are overlapping and porous) (Blyth 1997; 2003). 
The ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis— constructivist institutionalism and 
interpretivism—are appropriate for the questions that this thesis asks. Ultimately, this project 
endeavours to understand the ways that regulatory governance has evolved and how regulatory 
mechanisms can address contemporary issues that are far beyond their initial scope. To answer this 
question, I draw on critical theories of regulatory capitalism and constructivist institutionalism, both 
of which centralize the interactions between state power, market forces, and non-state actors to create 
a status quo that privileges economic growth while struggling to address concerns regarding 
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inclusivity and sustainability. These middle-grade theories are not attempting to paint a causal picture 
drawing a line from A to B; rather, they propose to understand entrenchment of certain institutional 
characteristics and behaviours, underlying the socially constructed origin of these institutions.   
1.4.1 Comparative Analysis 
Comparative analysis has its roots in institutionalism, and contemporary institutional theory has only 
cemented the role of institutions in comparative political inquiry. This commitment to the study of 
institutions means that comparative analysis is an appropriate and relevant method for an analysis of 
regulatory mechanisms, which make up the institutional arrangements that govern fossil fuel 
development.  
A comparative analysis of the regulatory processes of two pipelines will be undertaken in this 
thesis; the Keystone XL and Northern Gateway projects, in the United States and Canada 
respectively.5 This thesis will be of an exploratory nature, analyzing the efficacy of pipeline 
regulation with regards to the public interest, climate change, and energy security.  
As Arend Lijphart contended in his formative 1971 article, the main difficulty with the comparative 
method is that it tends to deal with “many variables, small number of cases” (Lijphart 1971). While 
all social inquiry must contend with the problem of too many variables, analysing a small number of 
cases is quite unique to comparative analysis. However, by focusing the analysis on key variables; 
that is, by condensing the scope of the inquiry of how three concepts (the public interest, climate 
change, and energy security) interact with specific institutional processes (the approval of large oil 
pipelines), the analysis can be considered legitimate (Teune and Przeworski 1970; Lijphart 1971).   
Comparative analysis is appropriate for this type of project; constructivist ontologies and 
interpretivist epistemologies in particular lend themselves to comparative work, due to the desire to 
focus on complex, context-specific interactions rather than propose a more straightforward causal 
relationship (Furlong and Marsh 2010). In particular, small-n comparative work is appropriate for 
constructivist-oriented analysis, as large-n studies can sometimes mask nuance in favour of drawing 
out larger trends.   
 
5 Although the KXL pipeline does originate in Hardisty, Alberta, data collection and analysis focused on the American 
portion only. The Canada portion of KXL was approved by the NEB in 2010 and includes 529 km of new pipeline, 
running from Hardisty, Alberta to the American border at Monchy, Saskatchewan. 
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1.4.2 Case Selection 
Case study selection is a crucial component of most social inquiry and particularly of comparative 
analysis. When undertaking ‘small-n” qualitative study, a random selection of cases can often lead to 
a sample that is unrepresentative of the population and therefore statistically insignificant (Yin 2018). 
Therefore, there is a strong argument for the conscious selection of cases; although this cannot 
completely account for the natural unreliability of generalization in small-N qualitative study, it can 
allow researchers to choose cases that will allow some significant exploration of social phenomena 
(Yin 2018).  
Seawright and Gerring describe seven methods of case selection: typical, diverse, extreme, 
deviant, influential, most similar, and most different (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The most-similar 
case method requires a selection of at least two cases that are similar in many ways but different in 
the outcome of a particular variable (i.e., diverging regulatory paths). This method was chosen to 
enhance the representativeness of cases; while the small number of cases does mean that the 
distribution of cases may be distorted, the diversity of outcomes has stronger claims to 
representativeness, and therefore generalization, than most other small-N case selection method 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). 
The cases selected for analysis in this thesis are the Northern Gateway Pipeline in Canada and 
the Keystone XL pipeline in the United States, both of which have been rejected after reaching the 
end of the regulatory process. These countries easily lend themselves to the most-similar case method 
for several reasons: they are both federal countries; they both have concentrated areas of oil 
production; they both are significant oil producers; and they have sub-national regions that receive a 
significant share of their GDP from the oil sector. Additionally, they have both been home to pipeline 
opposition movements in the last 15 years: most notably, to the Keystone XL and Dakota Access 
pipelines in the US, and the Energy East and Trans Mountain Expansion in Canada. This thesis is not 
focused on the dynamics of these social movements, but their existence may imply a shift in the 
public interest which no longer aligns with regulatory policy. Conversely, and crucially for the most-
similar comparative method, the United States and Canada appear to have diverged recently when it 
comes to outcomes of pipeline regulation; large American pipeline projects have been almost all 
approved since 2006 (KXL an exception but may be signaling a turn in the United States), whereas no 
large Canadian project have made it through the regulatory approval stage except the Keystone 




This project will examine the efficacy of pipeline governance by carrying out a comparison of 
contemporary regulatory mechanisms in the United States and Canada. Both pipeline cases selected 
are large, technically complex, and sparked national (and international) debates regarding social and 
environmental risks. As such, they act as microcosms of contemporary national pipeline governance 
in Canada and the United States. 
This project makes use of qualitative content analysis to establish the characteristics of 
contemporary pipeline regulation, and the perceived gaps in that governance (Bowen 2009). The 
priorities of regulatory agencies can be identified via an analysis of relevant legislation and official 
mandates, and industry compliance with these rules and priorities is established through an analysis of 
documents submitted to these agencies. To complete the picture of pipeline regulation, and identify 
the gaps in regulatory governance, a facsimile of the public interest that is not being represented 
through this government-industry relationship is required. Both the Northern Gateway and 
Keystone XL regulatory processes include an opportunity for public comments, with very few 
restrictions on submission. These comments provide this facsimile because this is the only 
opportunity for persons/organizations not involved in the regulatory hearing process to voice their 
concerns. Public comments are not a perfect sample of public opinion; the submission process will 
inherently attract people with strong opinions rather than moderate, generally opposed rather than in 
favour, and civil society groups may be over-represented due to information campaigns. Secondly, 
there is a clear lack of knowledge which hinders the utility of these comments; many commenters 
identify issues which are explicitly addressed to some degree within compliance documents submitted 
by individual companies. Nevertheless, these comments represent perceived gaps in the regulatory 
process, because there are clear trends and issues that are consistently referenced. If these issues were 
being widely addressed within existing regulatory mechanisms, they likely would not be the subject 
of public comment en masse.   
The data for this project comes from two sources: the public comments and compliance 
documents produced for both pipelines, the Northern Gateway and Keystone XL. Public comments 
serve an essential purpose; both because public access and comment periods are a component of the 
regulatory process itself, and because these comments define the universe of opposition to pipeline 
projects. In addition to selecting and analyzing public comments, the regulatory application 
documents from both projects were also analyzed. These documents are prepared by either the firm 
or, in the case of Keystone XL, by the relevant government agency. They cover everything from 
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pipeline schematics to market forecasts, and these compliance documents were also analyzed for 
discussion of relevant topics. These compliance documents indicate how the state and market are 
defining the boundaries of regulation, as the private sector submits these documents, and the state 
accepts them or requests more detail.  
The mandates of regulatory agencies are relatively clear in their establishing legislation and 
subsequent amendments. In Canada, the National Energy Board Act of 1985 and Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act of 2012 are most relevant for the Northern Gateway case (as this 
pipeline was abandoned before the Canada Energy Regulator Act of 2019). In the United States, 
while there is no central regulatory agency governing oil pipelines, the public interest is theoretically 
addressed through federal and state level agencies aimed at environmental protection and public 
health.   
In gathering the public comment data, 750 comments were each randomly selected out of 
5000 for Northern Gateway and over 10,000 for Keystone XL. These comments were downloaded off 
of the NEB document depository for Northern Gateway and regulations.gov (the American regulatory 
document depository) for Keystone XL. These comments were coded according to the nature of 
opposition (or support) in each submission. Before coding, a tentative list of codes was generated, 
based on media coverage, informational campaigns from firms and activist groups, and the 
organizational structure of the project proposal documents. This list was refined in early stages of 
coding as trends began to emerge, and the full list can be found in Appendices A & B. The three 
empirical chapters focus on climate change, energy security, and the public interest, and each of these 
topics was assigned a series of codes, the definitions of which are elaborated upon in Chapters II, III, 
and IV. Additional codes which indirectly mentioned these problems were also analyzed. 
A small number (less than 50) of comments in each case were rejected from the analysis, largely 
because of legibility (some comments were hand-written and scanned), issues with attached 
documents, or lack of explanation (some comments simply stated opposition/support with no 
justification). Inductive thematic saturation was reached fairly early in the process, with no new codes 
generated after approximately 100 comments analyzed (Saunders et al. 2018). Significant additional 
coding (to 750 in each case) was done to reach data saturation, where patterns were consistently 
replicated and a clear picture of the nature of these comments, and so the perceived gaps in regulatory 
governance, were revealed.  
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1.5 Plan of the Thesis 
This dissertation assesses three aspects of oil pipeline regulation: the public interest, climate change, 
and energy security. All three of these variables represent a contemporary challenge for regulatory 
institutions and regulatory governance.  While this project aims to make contributions to several areas 
of scholarship, critical theories of the IPE of energy, energy security, and regulatory capitalism 
underline all three of these aspects. This thesis utilizes critical perspectives that propose that 
increasingly close state-market relationships have resulted in in an entrenchment and reproduction of 
global capitalism that is underpinned by state power. Essentially, the state as an institution has 
increasingly equated the success of global markets with social, environmental, and cultural well-
being. Zeroing in on the oil sector in particular, the scale of capital accumulation that has 
characterized twentieth century economic growth is made possible by access to, and dependence on, 
abundant and affordable fossil fuels like oil.  
Climate change is an issue that has increased in salience over the last several decades but has 
not been well integrated into the regulation of oil pipelines. Climate change has broad, diffuse, global 
impacts, and the continued extraction and consumption of fossil fuels exacerbates these impacts; 
while pipelines themselves are not emissions-intensive to construct and operate, continued investment 
in these projects shows a long-term commitment to fossil fuel extraction, undermining climate action 
globally. Secondly, consistent access to affordable energy has long been the foundation of energy 
security, but our conceptions of ‘security’ have evolved in recent years—it is not necessarily more 
‘secure’ to continue reliance on forms of energy that have widespread socio-environmental effects as 
opposed to diversifying supply with alternative energy sources. Lastly, in terms of the public interest, 
while the universe of interests regarding large, potentially destructive projects like pipelines has 
expanded, the capacity of regulators to account for these interests has not. While significant attention 
has been paid to socio-environmental assessment in regulatory processes since the 1970s, the risks of 
these pipelines are perceived to be borne by dispersed groups and communities while the benefits are 
more concentrated for a small number of firms and associated shareholders. 
Ultimately, pipeline regulators originated as market-focused rules enforcers that were 
beholden largely to industry and the relevant government department.  There has been an attempt to 
equip these institutions with the tools to address a broader set of issues, mainly focused on public 
safety and environmental protection. But the fundamental structures of these institutions are built to 
encourage oil development in support of high levels of economic growth, and under these 
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circumstances cannot appropriately evaluate complex contemporary issues like climate change and 
energy security which have significant but diffuse impacts on a wide variety of stakeholders. 
This introductory chapter has provided context on the oil industry in Canada and the United 
States and the individual regulatory processes for the Northern Gateway and Keystone XL pipelines 
and elaborated on the methods and literatures utilized in this project (Chapter I). The thesis then 
proceeds with three individual papers, each to address one contested variable taken from the empirical 
results (public comment data and socio-environmental assessment documents). 
 This thesis is presented by manuscript, where each empirical chapter (II, III, and IV) acts as an 
individual paper. As a result, there is some repetition of methods and literature in each paper. These 
three papers connect and interact with each other—through the analytical focus on regulatory 
mechanisms, the similarities in research method, and the overarching research question. The ultimate 
question this project is asking is how national regulatory mechanisms are interpreting complex, cross-
jurisdictional issues, and whether those interpretations are useful as governments decide whether to 
build these long-lasting, expensive, and contentious pieces of infrastructure. Each of these empirical 
chapters focuses on a different issue, and incorporates different theories, but the entirety of this 
dissertation is guided by this overarching inquiry.  
In the first empirical chapter, I discuss the characterization of climate change in pipeline 
governance, examining how this issue is represented via a lens of a critical IPE of energy and 
regulatory capitalism (RQ1, Chapter II). The second empirical chapter focuses on the issue of energy 
security in pipeline regulation, using the “Four A’s” framework and critical political economy to 
propose that current conceptions of energy security are too narrow (RQ2, Chapter III). The final 
empirical chapter focuses on how the concept of the public interest has evolved and expanded in the 
last several decades, and how this has affected the efficacy of pipeline regulation, via a theoretical 
lens of regulatory capitalism and critical political economy (RQ3, Chapter IV). Finally, the 
concluding chapter (Chapter V) will propose that while all of these empirical papers focus on a 
specific issue in pipeline regulation, and draw from some different bodies of scholarship to frame 
those issues, all three empirical chapters find pipeline regulatory mechanisms in Canada and the 
United States to be unable to properly account for complex, cross-jurisdictional challenges with 
diffuse, long-term socio-environmental effects. Pipeline regulators originated as market-focused rules 
enforcers that were beholden largely to industry and the relevant government department. While there 
has been an attempt to equip these institutions with the tools to address a broader set of issues, mainly 
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focused on public safety and environmental protection, the fundamental structures of these 
institutions have not appropriately evaluated complex contemporary issues like climate change and 






Utilizing pipeline regulation to manage the diffuse risks of climate 
change 
Climate change is increasingly central in discussions of energy development in Canada 
and the United States, including in the regulation of oil pipelines. But broad climate 
impacts are not yet embedded into contemporary regulatory processes in either Canada or 
the United States, and are considered on a case-by-case basis. In the United States, 
executive-level partisanship steers the inclusion of climate change into national interest 
determinations for cross-border pipelines, indicating a lack of regulatory continuity which 
narrows or expands the scope of regulation depending on who is sitting in the White 
House. Conversely, there is a sluggishness that characterizes the Canadian case, which 
has much more standardized regulatory procedures for interprovincial/international 
pipelines but rarely updates its guidance documents or regulatory requirements for 
climate change. This paper utilized critical theories from the IPE of energy to propose that 
regulators, which operate at the centre of the state-market-civil society nexus, are political 
organizations with political aims, as opposed to independent institutions with 
administrative functions within the state. These institutions have significant impacts on 
trajectories of energy development, signifying a need to assess climate change more fully 
in deliberations of pipeline projects.  
2.1 Introduction  
Climate change is a divisive and dissonant issue for civil society and firms in pipeline regulation. This 
is reflected in regulator mandates in both Canada and the United States, both of which have not 
standardized the inclusion of upstream and downstream climate impacts in the assessment of 
pipelines.6 The new Canada Energy Regulator (which superseded the National Energy Board in 
2019)also has a reference to climate change under its section on cumulative effects but will not 
generally consider downstream climate impacts. The argument against including climate change in 
regulatory considerations is that it is beyond the capacity and jurisdiction of the regulators to make 
 
6 There have been project-specific exceptions; for instance, the NEB ruled after a legal challenge that upstream 




decisions based on the climate impacts produced by the end-of-pipe consumption of oil running 
through the pipeline. Rather, only the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the construction and 
operation of the pipeline itself should be considered, and these are negligible (Natural Resources 
Canada 2016d).  
However, as Canada and the United States grapple with balancing climate change and energy 
development, it is becoming increasingly clear that energy systems are deeply locked into carbon-
intensive development paths, and pure demand-side climate policies are likely insufficient to achieve 
international climate goals (Unruh 2002; Erickson et al. 2015). Thus, the rationale for including 
climate impacts more broadly (ie. the end-of-pipe emissions for oil moving through the pipeline) is 
that these huge infrastructure projects, meant to carry millions of barrels of oil for decades, do not 
operate in a vacuum. This is largely the nature of the climate change-related opposition from the 
general public and civil society groups, with opponents pointing out the dissonance between 
committing to further oil extraction via these pipelines, while ostensibly pursuing international and 
domestic climate goals (Axsen 2014; Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015).  
This dissonance is reflected in much of the literature on the role of energy governance, in 
terms of mitigating the effects of carboniferous energy systems on the climate. In this paper, we 
propose that these regulatory institutions, with their emphasis on local impacts and direct effects from 
the pipeline itself, are neither sophisticated enough nor do they have the capacity to address complex, 
cross-border problems.  
This paper will draw from studies in the international political economy (IPE) of energy and 
climate change to propose that the conventional state-centric view of resource regulation is not 
capable of capturing the complex problems these regulators face. This paper will utilize qualitative 
content analysis to examine public comments submitted to two major pipeline projects (Northern 
Gateway and Keystone XL) as well as socio-environmental assessments and records of decision for 
both cases. This paper will draw out themes from both cases to investigate how climate change is 
interpreted by regulators, and explain how this narrow interpretation affects broader energy and 
climate policy decisions. Regulatory mechanisms operate at the intersection of state, market, and civil 
society interactions, and therefore these institutions require a broader toolkit at their disposal to assess 
complex, international problems like climate change. 
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2.2 The Role of Climate in the IPE of Energy 
2.2.1 Integrating Climate into Traditional Approaches 
The tradition of energy studies in international political economy (IPE) is empirically and 
theoretically underdeveloped, given the importance of the energy sector internationally. 
Conventionally, international political economy (IPE) has dealt with the issue of energy by focusing 
largely on oil, through a liberal-versus-realist lens (Kuzemko, Lawrence, and Watson 2019; Keating 
et al. 2012). However, there has been an abundance of work recently addressing the need for a 
broader analysis of energy in IPE, as well as a more developed theoretical treasury. The argument 
persists that there has been too little engagement with energy as a unique commodity and governance 
problem (DiMuzio 2016; Keating et al. 2012; Hancock and Vivoda 2014).   
There are few similarities between 21st century IPE of energy and the work done in the 
1980s/1990s. Earlier IPE scholars did discuss energy—but largely within the context of the 
governance structures/socio-economic events (like the 1973 oil crisis) of the time, and so in many 
ways this initial IPE of energy is out of step with contemporary IPE. Realist IPE tends to consider 
energy in terms of security, prioritizing the continuous supply of affordable oil (Stoddard 2013) or as 
largely indistinguishable from any other commodity (Kirshner 2009). Liberal IPE, which stresses the 
role of the state in maintaining market operations, has tended to address the international aspects of 
energy system management, via a research focus on ‘global energy governance’ (Florini and 
Sovacool 2009; Van de Graaf and Colgan 2016). Critical IPE, like its counterparts, initially tended to 
ignore energy as a specific problem in IPE until scholars like Susan Strange posited that energy 
systems seemed to be uniquely vulnerable to both political and economic forces and therefore 
required a more nuanced application of critical IPE. More recently, the idea of ‘carbon capitalism’, 
which proposes that our state of global capital accumulation was made possible by the rapid 
development of fossil fuels in particular, has centralized energy within critical IPE studies (DiMuzio 
2016; Carroll 2020).  
Despite increasing attention paid to the specificity of energy systems in recent years, 
conventional scholarship on energy in political economy was largely confined to this triumvirate of 
IPE theories, which often defined energy as a case study rather than something unique and dynamic 
(Kuzemko, Lawrence, and Watson 2019). The case for energy as something exceptional in IPE is that 
energy affects state power and market power differently (and more) than other commodities 
(Goldthau and Sitter 2020). Given the centrality of decarbonization at international summits, the 
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controversy of national fossil fuel development, and the now well-studied influence of energy on 
economic and social development (E. Brown and Cloke 2017; DiMuzio 2014), energy does appear to 
have unique influence on the state-market relationship. Contemporary energy systems have become 
so complex and diversified in recent years that an oil-based perspective, drawing from narrow 
realist/liberal theories no longer explains the role of energy in the state-market-community 
relationship, or of those relationships in the production of certain energy systems (DiMuzio 2016; 
Kuzemko, Keating, and Goldthau 2018; Pineault 2018). In particular, the expansion of the universe of 
interests beyond traditional state and market actors, now including stakeholders from across civil 
society, means that we need theories that take a more nuanced view of state-market relationships and 
governance structures (Kuzemko, Lawrence, and Watson 2019). The focus on oil does make sense in 
a historical context—oil has been the dominant energy source globally for decades—but in the face of 
rapid technological advancement and the emergence of new actors in support of decarbonization, we 
need to re-define ‘energy’ as more than ‘oil’ (Kuzemko, Lawrence, and Watson 2019; Keating et al. 
2012).  Global energy systems are sensitive to both state and market forces (and vice versa) and a 
more nuanced application of IPE to these dynamic systems is needed so we can better understand the 
current energy transition and try to mitigate social, political, and environmental impacts from such a 
transition. In fact, in the last decade or so, there has been increasing scholarly attention paid to the 
evolution of global energy markets, decarbonization of energy systems, and the development of 
energy governance both global and domestic (Goldthau and Sitter 2020; Keating et al. 2012; Newell 
2010). Indeed, this paper aims to contribute to this increasingly nuanced view of the IPE of energy 
through a focus on the regulatory mechanisms that govern the climate effects of oil pipelines. 
2.2.2 Using National Regulators to Assess International Impacts 
So what does the regulation of oil pipelines, largely a national affair, have to do with the IPE of 
energy, and why does this regulation need to include systemic assessment of climate change?  
Firstly, while oil pipelines are regulated nationally or sub-nationally in Canada and the United States, 
they have global implications. The two cases selected for comparison here, the Northern Gateway 
pipeline (NGP) and Keystone XL expansion (KXL), are international pipelines with impacts on 
market diversification, environmental degradation, energy security, and further oil development even 
as both Canada and the United States struggle to meet their own commitments on climate change and 
environmental protection (Hoberg 2018; Axsen 2014; MacLean 2015).  Historically, resource 
regulation has been considered to be state-centric, concerned with managing resource flows to the 
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advantage of that state (Rees 1990; Young 1981; 2017b). But there are large international pipelines, 
like those examined in this paper, that inherently defy a state-centric regulatory model because they 
cross an international border or aim to develop international trade ties. Also, the impacts of climate 
change do not respect national borders, again inherently delegitimizing a regulatory model that fails 
to account for global effects. Canadian and American regulators assess the viability of these pipelines, 
but it is not only Canadian and American interests at stake.  
The expansion of resource regulation beyond a narrow, state-centric, administrative role can 
be seen in: the proliferation of non-state actors, especially market-based assessment mechanisms 
(Castree 2008a; MacNeil 2014a); the expansion of responsibility to include environmental protection 
(Gunderson and Holling 2001; Bridge 2000); and new challenges to commodity-centric logics of 
resource development from civil society, Indigenous communities, environmental activists and 
beyond  (Bridge 2001; Leslie and Reimer 1999; Le Billon 2001). In this discussion of integrating 
broad climate impacts into pipeline regulation, this raises the question of assigning climate change to 
a level of sovereignty and territorial authority.  
2.2.3 Centring Pipelines in the Energy-Climate Nexus 
Second, the issue of climate change in IPE is not novel, especially in analyses of decarbonization and 
environmental governance (Falkner 2018; Jakob et al. 2020; Ashford and Hall 2018; Newell 2008). 
The emergence of climate change as a research issue in political economy adds a new dimension to 
the IPE of energy in the 21st century, bringing the need to decarbonize the global economy to the 
forefront of energy research (Bradshaw 2014; Falkner 2018; Benjamin K. Sovacool 2011a). Climate 
change is a central challenge for policymakers, both as climate impacts disrupt political, economic, 
and natural systems, and because the bedrock of global economic activity—fossil fuels—must 
transform if the problem is to be mitigated (Falkner 2018; 2014; Gunningham 2012). And so, energy 
and climate policy research have become intertwined, and issues of climate change must be at the 
forefront of energy policy discussions (Gunningham 2012; Johnsson, Kjärstad, and Rootzén 2019; S. 
Bernstein and Hoffmann 2019).  
Much of the IPE focus on climate and energy has been in analyses of energy security 
(O’Sullivan 2013; Proedrou 2018; Bradshaw 2014) or on market-based tools like carbon taxes or 
emissions trading schemes to reduce GHGs (Meckling and Hepburn 2013; Gunningham 2013; 
Ionescu 2019). These analyses serve to help us understand the possibilities for decarbonization in the 
energy-climate nexus, but we need to better understand the role of infrastructure regulation because 
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these regulators are partially steering national energy development. In order to actively plan for deep 
decarbonization, we need to account for regulators, which can hinder decarbonization and encourage 
oil-dependent development pathways if climate concerns are not well-integrated into these 
institutions’ decision-making processes (Davis, Caldeira, and Matthews 2010; Tong et al. 2019). 
There is attention paid to infrastructure in IPE, although largely in the context of broader analysis 
regarding carbon lock-in and energy transitions (Unruh 2002; L. Baker, Newell, and Phillips 2014; 
Cherp, Jewell, and Goldthau 2011; Newell and Simms 2020). However, the body of empirical work 
on regulatory efficacy is gradually increasing as the role of these governance mechanisms at the 
intersection of the state and market becomes clear (Gunningham 2013; Goldthau 2014; Thacker et al. 
2019).  
The extent to which climate change is at the forefront of pipeline regulation, however, is not 
clear. These governance mechanisms do address climate change, but it is not central to their 
assessment. These institutions can have outsize impacts on energy policy, and therefore climate 
policy, because the decisions they make (or the advice they give) contributes to locking a state into 
medium-term oil development (Unruh 2002; Haley 2011; Erickson et al. 2015). There is pushback 
from activists, communities, and individuals to better integrate climate impacts into the assessment of 
oil pipelines, and these attitudes are mirrored in the public comment data (J. M. Baker and Westman 
2018; Doelle and Sinclair 2019; Domínguez-Gómez 2016).  
Lastly, climate change and pipelines exemplify the need for IPE of energy to expand its 
analytical reach beyond the realist-liberal-critical triumvirate; pipelines are expensive, long-lasting 
infrastructure assets that have socio-environmental impacts far beyond their initial construction and 
operation. The spatial aspects of these projects combined with the segmented territorial authorities 
that regulate them have resulted in regulatory bodies that do not assess the impacts of the pipeline as a 
whole. While pipelines themselves are negligible contributors to climate change, they signal a 
material commitment to future fossil fuel development that will exacerbate climate change, which has 
significant but diffuse impacts globally (Davis, Caldeira, and Matthews 2010; Tong et al. 2019; 
Davis, Peters, and Caldeira 2011). Until recently, pipeline regulators have taken the stance that this 
infrastructure is not responsible for end-of-pipe consumption, but in a global, integrated energy 
market, it is nearly impossible to analytically separate oil from pipelines. These regulatory 
mechanisms have attempted to take an extremely narrow, localized view of oil pipelines; but at this 




There is an opportunity to fill in some of these gaps in the IPE of energy scholarship by 
focusing on pipeline regulation. Pipelines are cross-jurisdictional, long-lasting pieces of infrastructure 
that are governed by a narrow interpretation of environmental impact. These projects encourage 
continued fossil fuel development in the near future, which is at odds with global goals to mitigate 
climate change. In order to properly flesh out these climate-energy links, we need to examine the idea 
of climate governance and how this scholarship links to the IPE of energy, and of oil pipelines.   
2.2.4 Linking Climate and Energy Governance 
While approaches to the study of pipeline and energy governance often have a clearly spatial 
dimension, climate governance scholarship has emerged to reflect the highly decentralized, multi-
actor, and multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon. The two are inextricably linked, however, as “the 
natural and social phenomena of climate change and its governance are both produced by and change 
the ways in which energy systems and (predominantly) capitalist political economies are organized” 
(Newell and Lane 2020).  Even so, a disconnect exists between the scale and objectives of the 
regulatory mechanisms that govern the development of pipelines and the scale at which the impacts of 
the consumption of fossil fuels play out.  Climate change cuts across geographic, political, and 
temporal scales to introduce multiple (and deeply uncertain) risks.  For instance, while the magnitude 
and pace of climate change impacts at the regional scale may be relatively well-established for the 
next 10-20 years, the pace at which greenhouse gas emissions are reduced in the coming decades will 
radically alter the severity of future climate change impacts from 2050 and onwards, and also the 
possibility of reaching tipping points or thresholds (see for instance (Steffen et al. 2015) in the global 
climatic system (after which the pace of change is nearly impossible to predict). Furthermore, 
greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting climate change produce lasting cumulative effects that are 
unevenly distributed across communities. As just one set of stressors among many, climate change 
presents unique challenges for governance. 
International treaty negotiations have dominated the discourse on global climate change 
governance, but the reality of policy development and implementation is increasingly influenced by 
transnational networks (Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley 2009; Busch, Bendlin, and Fenton 2018) , 
subnational strategies (Burch 2010; Fuhr, Hickmann, and Kern 2018) , private sector actors (Burch 
and Di Bella 2021; Westman, McKenzie, and Burch 2020)  and the broader agenda of sustainable 
development (Dale et al. 2020).  As such, climate change is a challenge of multi-level governance 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009) , in which power is unevenly distributed (Di Gregorio et al. 2019) among 
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those who shape (and exist within) the regulatory environment. The long time frames, uncertain 
outcomes, and fluid alliances that characterize climate governance suggest the need for polycentric 
approaches that enhance equity, inclusivity, adaptability (Benjamin K. Sovacool 2011a). 
Regulatory institutions tend to emphasize local and direct impacts, and often have neither the capacity 
nor the mandate to address cross-territorial and downstream issues like climate change.  (Cash et al. 
2006; Young and Gasser 2002). Climate policy and energy policy are disconnected in many cases and 
aren’t being governed by the same processes and that creates some challenges. Regulatory 
mechanisms operate at the intersection of state, market, and civil society interactions, and therefore 
these institutions require a broader toolkit at their disposal to assess complex, international problems 
like climate change. 
2.2.5 Integrating the Environment into Pipeline Regulation in Canada and the U.S.  
In both Canada and the United States, regulatory mechanisms in the energy sector were not designed 
to address climate change, environmental degradation, or sustainable development. The NEB was 
created in 1959, and it initial mandates included the setting of tolls and tariffs. In the American 
context, the State Department has been responsible for administering the regulatory process for 
international pipelines since 2004, as per Executive Order 13337 during the George W. Bush 
administration.  Relevant state authorities were developed as the transportation of oil became a more 
pressing concern in that region (McBeath 2016).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a sea change in terms of regulatory responsibilities, and 
environmental issues quickly became some of the most politically sensitive and salient within energy 
regulators. New departments like the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States and 
Environment Canada, both established in 1970, advocated heavily for the need to systematically 
assess environmental impacts within the regulatory process. These agencies within both federal 
governments began to push for new assessment protocols and broader inclusion of environmental 
impacts in pipeline decisions, although in the United States this was coordinated much more at the 
state level than federal (VanNijnatten and Boardman 2002) . Although the focus was initially on 
direct impacts to local ecosystems, water sources, and endangered species, broader issues of 
sustainable development and climate change in particular, have increasingly been part of the 
regulatory conversation. Traditional environmental regulation focuses on utilizing best available 




Both Canada and the United States have committed to broad sustainable development 
practices since the early 2000s. These practices have more recently been operationalized through the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and involves balancing “three core elements: 
economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are interconnected 
and all are crucial for the well-being of individuals and societies in order to pursue development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (United Nations 2020). 
For energy regulation in the 21st century, sustainable development means that economic 
benefits are balanced with environmental considerations (National Energy Board 2016; Department 
Of State 2015). Additionally, the sustainable development paradigm requires prevention—to ensure 
environmental damage does not happen in the first place—as opposed to conventional reactive 
measures like emergency response and accident liabilities. This emphasis on post-incident action 
characterizes much of the early environmental mandates; reactive and punitive rules are relatively 
easy to set and administer, whereas proactive regulations that are meant to mitigate climate change 
and encourage sustainable development are much harder to quantify and require cooperation with a 
much wider set of stakeholders.  
So there is a clear ambition to balance economy and environment in oil pipeline regulation, 
and climate change is an integral variable on the environmental side of the equation. And climate 
change has been integrated to some extent into regulatory processes in both Canada and the United 
States since the early 2000s. But what is not clear is how effectively these mechanisms are assessing 
the impacts of climate change, whether they are assessing climate change to the extent that citizens 
request, and how climate change fits in the hierarchy of decision-making (ie. how many GHGs from a 
single pipeline is enough to reject a project?). These issues are clearly still contested; almost every 
new large pipeline project since 2009 has been met with significant public outcry. This paper aims to 
define the gap between public opposition and regulatory decision-making, by analyzing public 
comments and compliance documents submitted for two such pipelines.  
2.3 Methods 
This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the climate assessments of Northern Gateway (NGP) 
and Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline projects, both of which were proposed to carry crude oil from 
Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands. Enbridge, Inc. (Enbridge) proposed the twin NGP pipelines to carry 




Figure 6: Route of Proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline (Enbridge 2010) 
The KXL project, proposed by TransCanada Keystone Pipeline Limited (TransCanada) is an 
expansion of the current Keystone pipeline system (with a capacity of 590,000 bpd), and aims to 
carry 830,000 bpd to Steele City, Nebraska. KXL is actually the fourth phase of the larger Keystone 
system, which consists of the following segments: 
 
Figure 7: Keystone Pipeline System with proposed KXL extension route (Source: TC Energy) 
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 These pipelines are comparable for several reasons:  
• they are both large pipelines which were developed in the mid-2000s;  
• they are subject to federal regulation as opposed to subnational, which is much more 
diverse and piecemeal in both Canada and the United States;  
• they have both been subject to significant controversy and opposition from landowners, 
environmental activists, and Indigenous communities (although this contestation is not 
the subject of this analysis); and they were both cancelled. 
These pipelines represent the contemporary challenges that pipeline regulators face, and they provide 
ample fodder for comparing Canadian and American regulatory governance with regards to climate 
change and oil pipelines. When these projects were initially proposed, climate change was gaining 
salience politically, but energy regulators had not explicitly grappled with the impacts that this 
phenomenon would have on their own processes.  
This paper aims to understand how climate change is characterized and interpreted in 
regulatory processes, and both the NGP and KXL projects reveal a dissonance between the capacity 
of these regulatory institutions, their original mandate, and the expectations from communities, 
activist groups, and industry. This paper makes use of qualitative content analysis to establish the role 
of climate change of contemporary pipeline regulation, and the perceived gaps in that governance 
(Bowen 2009; Neal 2012). The activities of regulatory agencies and industry is identified via relevant 
legislation, official mandates, and compliance documents submitted to regulators. The largest and 
most complex piece of the empirical results come from an analysis of public comment data. 
Regulatory processes in Canada and the United States allow for the submission of public comments 
regarding pipeline projects, which is largely unencumbered by rules or restrictions. 
  For this project, 750 comments were each randomly selected out of 5000 for Northern 
Gateway and over 10,000 for the 2019 round of comments for Keystone XL. These comments were 
downloaded off of the NEB document depository for Northern Gateway and regulations.gov (the 
American regulatory document depository) for Keystone XL. Codes were inductively developed 
according to the nature of opposition or support stated (see a list of relevant codes below). Inductive 
thematic saturation was reached fairly early in the process, with no new codes generated after 
approximately 100 comments analyzed (Saunders et al. 2018). Additional coding was completed to 
reach data saturation, where patterns were consistently replicated and a clear picture of the nature of 
these comments, and so the perceived gaps in regulatory governance were revealed.  
Two codes, one each for climate change and decarbonization, provided most of the insight 
into these trends. For this project, the ‘climate change’ code referred to any mention of anthropogenic 
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climate change, including downstream impacts and end-of-use consumption, as justification for 
rejecting either project. The ‘decarbonization’ code captured comments related to increasing the use 
of renewable energy, a managed decline of fossil fuel extraction, or the general benefits of 
decarbonization (this code often but not always appeared in conjunction with the climate change 
code). To ensure completeness, all other environment-related codes were scanned for 
misidentification and can be seen below. A full list of all codes generated can be found in the 
Appendices.  
Table 2: Environment-specific codes for NGP and KXL public comments 
Code Description Comments References 
ENVIRONMENT General opposition based on environmental impact 208 316 
CLIMATE CHANGE Specific reference to unique aspect of relationship 
between pipelines and climate change (often but not 
always related to decarbonization) 
135 358 
DECARBONIZATION Reference to specific aspect of renewable energies, 
need to decarbonize (often but not always correlated 
to climate change) 
214 316 
ECOSYSTEMS Reference to specific impacts on specific ecosystems 
(ie. Great Bear Rainforest in BC for NGP, Sandhills 
region in Nebraska for KXL) 
188 228 
WILDLIFE Reference to specific wildlife populations 82 101 
 
EXTRACTION Opposition based on issues with fossil fuel extraction, 
rather than pipeline itself (ie. Tailings ponds) 
48 82 
 
  This public comment data represents a facsimile of the public interest that is not represented 
via the regulator-regulated relationship, and is therefore a crucial part of the perception of climate 
change by the public, in whose interest regulators are meant to operate, revealing what is perceived to 
be missing in current governance. This dataset is not a perfect substitute for the public interest; this 
type of submission process tends to attract strong opinions as opposed to moderate, and certain civil 
society groups may be over-represented due to information and submission campaigns. There is also a 
clear lack of project-specific knowledge within the comment data; many commenters identify 
concerns which are explicitly addressed by the firm/regulator, or which are related to other projects. 
However, these comments still reveal perceived gaps in governance, because there are trends and 
issues consistently referenced which likely would not exist if they were being appropriately integrated 
into regulatory processes.  
2.4 Results 
There is evidence to suggest that climate change and decarbonization are not appropriately integrated 
into oil pipeline regulation, or at least are perceived this way by public commenters. A significant 
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proportion of comments asked the regulators to address downstream climate impacts in their appraisal 
of the projects, but this issue was either assessed extremely narrowly (focusing on direct GHG 
emissions from pipeline construction) or that climate change was not uniformly or consistently 
assessed. (as in the KXL case)the KXL case, 27% of comments explicitly mentioned climate change 
as a primary reason for cancelling the project, compared to 18% of NGP comments. Additionally, 
13% of KXL comments and 27% of NGP comments mentioned the need to decarbonize and invest in 
alternative energies, although there was significant overlap between the two issues. It is also worth 
noting that there were significant campaigns from environmental activist organizations like 350.org, 
Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club to submit form letters to these public submission windows en masse, 
and so wording in several of these comments is similar. However, these form letters are still worth 
examining in this context for two reasons: first, many commenters edited these letters to emphasize 
their own priorities, by removing text or adding additional context, so there is still an effort to engage 
despite the “copy and paste” nature of these form letter comments. Secondly, form letter submissions 
are often dismissed outright by regulatory agencies because they do not demonstrate direct impact 
from the project, and so there is a significant number of comments that are given little consideration 
despite real concerns about the intersection of fossil fuel development and climate change.    
There are three key themes from the public comment data on climate change: that the construction of 
a new pipeline is antithetical to a managed decline of fossil fuels in order to meet international 
climate targets; that resources should be invested in the development of renewable energies instead of 
fossil fuels, or fossil fuel-adjacent projects like pipelines; and that oil from the Athabasca oil sands is 
particularly carbon-intensive and therefore pipelines meant for its transport should not be constructed.  
2.4.1 Managed Decline of Fossil Fuels 
First, there is a clear trend that opposes both the NGP and KXL projects because the 
commitment to building pipelines that are expected to be in service for decades and add significant 
capacity for oil extraction demonstrates a continued dependence on fossil fuels. In the KXL case, 
comments bring up that “…the commitment to billions of dollars in capital to a pipeline for 
conveying Canadian tar sands for the next 30-50 years would foreclose the possibility of the US 
substantially shifting away from hydrocarbons in time to leave the atmosphere in a habitable 
condition for our children” (KXL 1.1). There is continuous reference to the IPCC and other scientific 
climate assessments, citing reports that suggest a need for a managed decline of fossil fuels;  
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“due to the increase in global temperature caused by human greenhouse gas pollution, 
it is imperative that NO new infrastructure leading to fossil fuel burning should be 
constructed. No projection of the continuing rise in global temperature is considered in 
the SEIS….according to the United Nations Committee on Climate Change, we must 
limit average global temperatures to 2 degrees C to avoid societal turmoil/collapse. 
This requires a downturn in the CO2 emissions curve, which is still climbing. The NO 
ACTION alternative - not building the pipeline - is an essential part of this limitation on 
CO2 emissions.” (KXL 1.2).  
Finally, there is a clear link made in these comments between the relatively small direct GHG 
emissions attributable to the operation of the pipeline itself and the climate implications of the 
broader fossil fuel industry, “human survival depends on keeping the Canadian tar sands in the 
ground, and preventing Keystone from connecting to those tar sands is a necessary element of that” 
(KXL 1.3).  
This theme is repeated in NGP, with explicit mentions of a managed decline of fossil fuels; 
“the best long term solution to human-caused global warning is to keep hydrocarbons in the ground, 
and, in particular, not to encourage the large populations of the world to repeat the western nation's 
mistakes in respect to hydrocarbon usage” (NGP 1.1). Canada’s international reputation as a climate 
laggard is brought up, “at a time when other developed countries are finding ways to reduce their 
fossil fuel dependency, Canada continues to expand its production along with our ecological 
footprint. We’re marching in the wrong direction” (NGP 1.2). 
And like in the KXL comment data, the commitment to oil development that NGP would signal 
is referenced: “…for Enbridge to recover construction costs and make a healthy profit, they will need 
to operate the pipeline for at least 25 years, which would be a suicidal commitment to new 
infrastructure supporting dependence on fossil fuels” (NGP 1.3). Connections are made between oil 
sands extraction, the pipeline itself, and the downstream consumption of those oil sands resources; 
“the present tar sands contains almost half the amount of carbon to potentially reach that 2 degree 
ceiling and within the next 25 years Enbridge intends to TRIPLE tar sands production” (NGP 1.4). 
Throughout the KXL and NGP public comment data, the climate-related opposition proposes a need 
to look at the entire life-cycle of this project and others like it, and consider the global as well as 
national and local implications. These comments suggest that there is a perception from the public 
that these regulatory forums are an appropriate forum for broader climate impacts to be addressed, 
and that current regulations are not assessing climate change to the extent that they should. 
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2.4.2 Investing in Renewables 
Second, there is a theme of public comments expressing that resources should be invested in the 
development of renewable energies in order to combat climate change, as opposed to fossil fuel 
infrastructure projects like pipelines. In the KXL data, 13% of commenters referenced 
decarbonization in support of climate change mitigation as a reason to deny the pipeline, pointing out 
that “in order to slow the buildup of greenhouse gases…energy policies that favor sources other than 
fossil fuels must be promoted, rather than continuing with the easiest approach for meeting our 
country's energy needs” (KXL 1.4). Many of these commenters proposed that the approval process 
for this pipeline acts as a microcosm for fossil fuel dependency, and that its rejection could set a 
precedent going forward.  
There are similar calls for decarbonization in the NGP case, with 27% of commenters—more 
than the 18% that directly referenced climate change—stating that the project “represents a 
misallocation of resources at a time when Canada should be shifting its focus away from fossil fuels 
to the development and support of renewable energy.” (NGP 1.5). Additionally, there was a desire 
that resources that would be committed to pipeline project should be invested in renewable energy 
development; “economically we understand that the tar sands create thousands of jobs and pump 
money into the economy, but lets start diverting that money into Renewable and safe energy.” (NGP 
1.6). In both cases, there was some acknowledgement amongst commenters that the oil industry 
provided economic benefit, but that decarbonization initiatives had to include the industry and 
therefore had to include pipelines. This perspective was more common amongst comments that 
referenced decarbonization than those that only referenced climate change.  
This desire for a diversion of resources reveals a dissonance in what these regulators do 
versus what some people think they do; regulators have no capacity to explicitly direct private sector 
investment. If Enbridge or TransCanada cannot get their pipelines approved, the NEB/State 
Department does not have the authority to force these firms to construct wind farms instead. Canada 
and the United States are both outliers in the sense that they do not currently operate state-owned 
energy companies; most oil-producing states do have national oil companies (NOCs) and so can have 
more of a direct impact on specific energy projects. For instance, Denmark recently directed their 
NOC to develop a large offshore wind farm, in conjunction with a legislative wind-down of fossil fuel 
extraction licenses (Reguly 2019). Neither Canada nor the United States have NOCs, although state, 
provincial, and federal governments have made public investments into certain energy projects. In 
Canada, the federal government purchased the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline, now under 
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construction, and the Albertan government purchased a stake in the KXL project, which was 
abandoned by TransCanada in June 2021.   
2.4.3 Carbon Intensity 
Lastly, while many commenters used climate change as a justification to reject both of these pipeline 
applications in the sense that no emissions are good emissions, some commenters focused on the 
carbon intensity of the Athabasca oil sands in particular, where both KXL and NGP would originate. 
In the KXL case, comments pointed out the ‘dirtiness’ of Canadian oil sands, “tar sands ranks near 
the very worst, being far more carbon-intensive than even conventional petroleum. Tar sands are a 
catastrophe that the US must not facilitate, whatever the route that TransCanada tries to weave 
through the American permitting process.” (KXL 1.5). KXL comments also pointed out that the 
multiple EISs produced for the regulatory process did not account for the energy intensity of oil sands 
extraction, “the draft SEIS did NOT consider the additional carbon-based energy intensity effect of 
extracting, transporting, and refining the material from Alberta oilsands, which is the most energy 
intensive form of oil available (KXL 1.6). This conclusion is correct, with some caveats: Canadian oil 
sands are some of the most energy-intensive to extract in the world, and despite industry’s best efforts 
to reduce extraction-related GHGs emissions remain high (and are likely higher than estimated) 
(Liggio et al. 2019). However, when we look to oil imports from other countries that would have 
higher transportation/refining emissions, the picture becomes muddier (Jing et al. 2020; Toombe 
2016).  
The emissions intensity of the Athabasca oil sands is cited in the NGP comments as well, 
stating that “production and consumption of oil from the Oil Sands consumes more energy and water 
and produces more greenhouse gasses than any other source of energy” (NGP 1.7). However, there is 
an added facet to the NGP comments regarding this issue. In the case of KXL, oil would be shipped 
to refineries in Texas and on the Gulf Coast, which most comments either do not address or 
acknowledge would be a benefit to the United States in terms of monetary value added and 
employment. However, in the NGP comments on climate change, there is a small number of 
commenters expressing reservations regarding the stringency of refining and consumption regulations 
in China, which is assumed as the final destination for oil traversing the NGP, stating that GHGs are a 
concern not only because of the energy-intensity of upstream oil sands extraction, but  “especially so 
if the bitumen is refined in China, where emission controls during the refinement process are less 
stringent than in Canada.” (NGP 1.8). While Enbridge did emphasize increased access to Asian 
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markets in their initial proposal for NGP, and China would have been a significant trade partner due 
to increasing oil demand, NGP was meant to open up trade routes all over Northeast Asia, including 
Japan and South Korea initially and eventually expanding to the Philippines, Thailand, India, etc., all 
of which have varying levels of environmental regulation. However, only China would initially have 
the capacity to refine raw dilbit (Lemphers and Gilchrist 2011a). 
It is also worth noting that Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced in 2008 that his 
government would not export raw bitumen to countries without equivalent emissions targets; 
however, in 2009, China had at the very least announced a target to reduce carbon intensity by 40% 
from 2005 levels by 2020 (although policy did not support this goal), and had also ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol which the Harper regime had pulled out of in 2011 (Conrad 2012).  
These public comments tell us that those who opposed the KXL and NGP pipelines on 
climate grounds did so for three main reasons: the need to encourage a managed decline of fossil fuel 
extraction, invest in renewables rather than fossil fuel projects, and the high carbon intensity of 
Athabasca oil sands extraction. The next piece of the puzzle that needs to be addressed is the 
regulators; did these regulators address these issues, and if so, to what extent? The next section 
examines pieces of the socio-environmental assessments from both KXL and NGP to answer this 
question.  
2.5 The Regulators 
The evidence from public comment data reveals a perception that climate change as an issue is not 
being appropriately addressed in the regulation of these pipelines, but that it should be. However, the 
regulatory processes form both NGP and KXL do explicitly address climate change, although only at 
a superficial level. For the most part, regulators have required a very narrow and specific type of 
climate assessment that focuses on direct project GHG emissions, and industry has accepted this type 
of assessment. 
We can extract the regulator and industry perspectives on climate change by looking at how 
firms address climate change in the compliance documents they submit to regulatory institutions, and 
the guidelines that those institutions publish. For the NGP process, climate change is addressed by the 
NEB, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA), and Enbridge.  
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2.5.1 Northern Gateway 
The primary guiding document for climate change considerations in large industrial projects until 
2012 was published in 2003 by the CEAA: Incorporating Climate Change Considerations in 
Environmental Assessment: A General Guide for Practitioners. This document provided guidance 
under the CEAA Act 1992, and was retained when the CEAA was amended in 2012. Since most of 
the environmental assessments for NGP were completed prior to 2012, this was the guiding 
regulatory document with regards to climate change. Incorporating Climate Change Considerations 
was meant to encourage less emissions-intensive ways to construct and operate projects (across the 
industrial spectrum) as well as assist operators with mitigating climate risks on these projects (CEAA 
2003). This document emphasizes that jurisdictional policies should be the foundation of 
environmental assessments of climate change; for instance, interprovincial projects should adhere to 
the Climate Change Plan for Canada (superseded by the Turning the Corner Plan of 2007, proposed 
by the Harper government, and the 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate 
Change proposed by the Trudeau government) or the relevant provincial plan if the project operates 
under provincial authority. Incorporating Climate Change emphasizes a project-specific accounting 
of direct GHGs (although indirect GHGs are mentioned, they are far more difficult to 
quantify)(CEAA 2003). In terms of assessing how a project may affect climate change, the CEAA 
suggested completing (CEAA 2003): 
1. Preliminary scoping for GHG impacts 
2. Identifying GHG considerations: this includes project specifications, industry profiles 
and best practices, and identification of jurisdictional authorities.  
3. Assessing direct (project-specific) and indirect (project-adjacent) GHG emissions, with 
attention paid to impacts on carbon sinks 
4. Creating GHG management plans, if required 
5. Monitoring and adaptation as the project moves through its life cycle. 
While the NEB largely took its climate change-related guidelines from the CEAA, the regulator 
itself did also weigh in on the issue. A lack of coherence and certainty on climate change plagued the 
NEB as the issue became more politically salient. Until the regulator was superseded by the CER in 
2019, the general policy mandate was that the scope of climate change was narrow and would only 
require an accounting of construction and operation related GHGs (CEAA 2003) . This policy was 
included in an equivalency agreement between the NEB and the Environmental Assessment Office of 
British Columbia regarding the Trans Mountain Expansion proposal, the central tenet of which was 
that the NEB and Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) of British Columbia ruled that multiple 
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environmental assessments need not be developed in order to avoid duplication (NEB and EAO 
2010). This agreement stated that only GHG emissions of the construction/operation of the pipeline 
itself would be considered, which constituted approximately 1% of total emissions associated with the 
pipeline and the oil moving through it. GHGs associated with extraction in Alberta (upstream 
emissions) and end-use consumption in Asia and the United States (downstream emissions) would 
not be considered (West Coast Environmental Law 2012). After a legal challenge, the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia ruled that a portion of the NEB/EAO agreement was invalid and that a further 
environmental assessment would need to be conducted to develop an Environmental Assessment 
Certificate (Coastal First Nations v. British Columbia (Environment), 2016 BCSC 34 2016). The 
NEB’s approach to climate change was largely patchwork and on a case-by-case basis, with the 
CEAA guidelines providing an extremely narrow definition of climate impacts7. The CER and Impact 
Assessment Agency of Canada (IAAC) have since replaced the NEB and CEAA, but it is worth 
noting that climate change is still fairly narrowly assessed, with a focus on project-specific and 
upstream emissions.  
From the application for NGP submitted to the NEB, climate change is largely addressed in 
section 4.5, Volume 6 of the Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment (ESA), regarding the 
contribution of the project to Canadian GHGs. Enbridge acknowledges the negative impacts of 
climate change and the contribution of fossil fuels, stating that “climate is a VEC because of the 
importance of climate change as a national and international issue. The Project will result in an 
increase in GHG emissions, thereby contributing to provincial and national GHG emission totals.” 
(Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines 2010a, sec. 4.5). However, Enbridge identifies only a small 
number of project-related activities considered ‘significant’ to the issue of climate change. The 
primary GHG activities Enbridge identifies is the berthing of tanker ships at the Kitimat marine 
terminal, and the infrastructure operations associated with this tanker activity. The construction, 
operation, and decommissioning of the pipeline itself are considered insignificant due to the minor 
GHGs that this type of activity creates. No mention is made of end-of-pipe consumption or broader 
implications of long-term dependence on fossil fuels.  Enbridge emphasizes that they follow the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency’s (CEAA) guidelines from 2003 with regards to 
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assessing the climate impacts of their project by following a phase-by-phase calculation of GHGs 
produced directly by the project (CEAA 2003; Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines 2010a, sec. 4.5).   
In Volume 5 of the application, which documents Indigenous consultation and outstanding issues, 
Enbridge responds to concerns regarding climate change and Canada’s long-term energy strategies by 
re-iterating that “Canada’s policies relating to the national energy strategy, global warming and 
climate change are beyond the scope of the Application” and that “it is anticipated that the Project 
will not result in any substantive interaction with the atmospheric environment (climate) that will 
result in discernible changes to regional, national or global climate patterns” (Enbridge Northern 
Gateway Pipelines 2010b, M–4; O-5).   
2.5.2 Keystone XL 
For the KXL process, climate change is addressed by the EPA and by TransCanada in the initial 2014 
EIS and in the 2019 EIS update after re-application. The EPA, in its submission for the 2014 EIS, 
worked with the State Department to develop the environmental analysis of KXL. The EPA also 
submitted an additional comment which specifically addressed the determination of the national 
interest with regards to climate change. There are two important points from this addendum; first, that 
based on market projections from early 2014, KXL would have a negligible impact on GHGs because 
due to relatively high oil prices, Albertan crude would find another way to market likely via rail 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2015) . However, after the EIS was submitted in 2014, the price of 
oil fell significantly, to approximately $50/barrel (from $100 in early 2014), emphasizing that the 
volatility of oil markets could render any conclusion from the EIS as uncertain (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2015).   
The EPA also acknowledges the broader climate impacts of KXL, stating that  
“a decision that the Project serves the national interest would need to find a way to 
resolve the one fact that seems most clear and compelling: oil sands crude is 
substantially more carbon intensive than reference crudes and over its lifetime, this 
Project could end up significantly contributing to carbon pollution. So while no one 
can predict with certainty what the global price of oil will be, whether oil sands 
development will be more economic in future years than it appears today, or 
whether other pipelines for oil sands crude will be built, this one thing is certain: 
approving this Project ties the US to a significantly more carbon intensive oil for the 
next 50 plus years” (Environmental Protection Agency 2015) 
This is fairly unequivocal and addresses many of the issues from within the public comment 
data. However, this is one comment, from one agency, which is not representative of the 
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Final EIS. The State Department makes the final determination of national interest, and then 
the President chooses to approve or reject that determination. But it is clear that American 
regulatory processes are not unaware of the broader climate impacts of projects like KXL, 
even if they are not entrenched in compliance guidelines. President Joe Biden cancelled the 
KXL permit in January 2021 largely due to the climate implications of the pipeline, 
perceived or otherwise (McKibben 2021). 
In the Supplemental EIS completed in 2014, TransCanada addresses climate change in 
several contexts, albeit briefly. In Volume 1, Section 2.2 (Description of Alternatives), TransCanada 
discusses the proposition of the No Action Alternative with regards to climate change, arguing that 
even if American demand for oil were to shrink, global demand would still justify the Project (State 
Department 2014a, 2.2-40). Additionally, TransCanada points out projections from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) that suggest global oil demand is projected to increase until at least 2035, 
barring significant new policy barriers and therefore it is unlikely that demand would decrease 
enough to justify the No Action Alternative (State Department 2014a, 2.2-41). 
In Volume 3, Section 4.14, TransCanada acknowledges the anthropogenic nature of climate 
change, citing the IPCC in this statement (State Department 2014b, 4.14-2). TransCanada then states 
that “the amount to which these effects are attributable to any single man-made project is very small; 
however, given their magnitude when combined, these effects warrant discussion” (State Department 
2014b, 4.14-3). TransCanada acknowledges the potential GHGs associated not only with project-
specific activities, but also with end-product refining and consumption. They estimate that the annual 
lifecycle emissions associated with 830,000 bpd through the pipeline would contribute 147-168 
MMTCO2e (State Department 2014b, 4.14-5). TransCanada then emphasizes that this calculation 
assumes a significant increase in oil sands extraction in Alberta due to the approval of the project, 
which is unlikely.  
TransCanada concludes in both Volume 3 and Volume 1, Section 1.4 (Market Analysis) that 
“approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed Project, is unlikely 
to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands, or the continued demand for heavy crude 
oil at refineries in the United States (based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport 
costs, and supply-demand scenarios)” (State Department 2014b; 2014a, 1.4-1). TransCanada states 
that they are compliant with the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that defined GHGs as air pollutants 
under the Clean Air Act (and therefore under the auspices of the EPA) and the subsequent 2009 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) and which collects data on downstream and upstream 
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emissions sources (State Department 2014b, 4.14-7).  Under the GHGRP, firms are required to collect 
emissions data and submit it to the EPA, but crude oil transportation lines are exempt from this 
reporting requirement and so TransCanada will not collect this data.   
Finally, in section 4.14, TransCanada discusses the impacts of climate change, like increased 
variability in precipitation, could have on the operation of the pipeline itself. Additionally, 
TransCanada discusses the Low Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS) implemented in California, British 
Columbia, the European Union, and under development in 11 other states, warning that these LCFS 
policies could prompt emissions leakage as GHG-intensive crude oil will simply be routed through 
other markets with less stringent regulations, resulting in no net decrease in GHGs globally, and 
potentially a slight increase (State Department 2014b, sec. 4.14). 
In the updated EIS submitted in 2019, minor changes were made to TransCanada’s climate 
change methodology. TransCanada cites updated IEA projections which project that global energy 
demand is likely to slow after 2025, but that fossil fuels will continue to fulfill the majority of global 
demand until at least 2040. TransCanada also cite McGlade & Eakins seminal 2015 work which 
proposes that one third of current oil reserves should remain un-extracted from 2010-2050 (McGlade 
and Ekins 2015) and dedicates a whole section of this EIS to explaining GHG emissions trends and 
climate projections (State Department 2019, sec. 3.10). TransCanada admits a ‘significant’ 
cumulative effect with regards to climate change due to the indirect lifecycle emissions of the pipeline 
products but they continue to emphasize the project’s limited direct contribution to GHGs and their 
own compliance with EPA requirements (State Department 2019, S-18). TransCanada concludes that 
KXL would lead to an incremental increase in GHGs. These increases depend on how much of 
currently produced crude oil is displaced, and the carbon-intensity of displaced crude, but range from 
33-178 MMTCO2e annually (State Department 2019, sec. 7.20).  
2.6 How wide is the gap? Regulators, commenters, and Broader public opinion 
The public comment data reveals that in the set of people and organizations that submitted comments 
during the NGP and KXL 2019 processes, there is a significant amount of attention paid to climate 
change and the responsibilities of regulators to include broad climate assessments in their appraisal of 
pipeline projects. However, while the data reveals a vocal minority within the public commenters, this 
attention to climate change is not necessarily mirrored in the wider public opinion. In fact, while 
about 10% of comments in both cases were supportive of the projects, there is a significant amount of 
‘silent support’ beyond those who commented in the regulatory process. In 2016, 30% of Canadians 
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generally supported Northern Gateway and another 28% (so 58% in total) supported the project if 
Enbridge satisfied 209 conditions set out by the NEB (Anderson and Coletto 2016).  In 2017, during 
the initial stages of TransCanada’s re-application during the Trump administration, 42% of 
Americans supported the project (which substantially decreased from 2013, when the project was first 
announced; then, 66% of Americans supported the project) (Suls 2017).  
So these pipelines were both at least passively supported by a large segment of the general 
public. But these public comments still reveal a gap between regulator and the public interest, because 
these comments are consistently pointing out the same issues that regulators do not address. 
Additionally, the process of submitting a comment, even if much of the text is taken from activist 
letter-writing campaigns, is much more active than answering a poll and demonstrates an active 
interest in the project and the regulatory process. The issues that these comments bring up are also 
clearly on the radar of firms and regulators, since both address climate change to some extent during 
the regulatory process.  
Ultimately, though, both regulators (and the governments behind them) are not asking 
pipeline firms to be broad in their assessment of climate change. They explicitly acknowledge the 
anthropogenic and damaging nature of climate change, but they are not required to account for it in 
compliance procedures. And nowhere in this process is end-of pipe consumption assessed. In some 
specific projects like the Trans Mountain Expansion project in Canada, the federal government 
instructed the CER to include upstream extraction GHGs, but not downstream, in their assessment 
after a legal challenge. But the standard regulatory processes in both Canada and the United States 
simply do not require a broad assessment of climate impacts, and firms are unlikely to offer this 
assessment up without legislative coercion.  
2.7 Discussion: Defining Risks to Climate, Communities, and Economies 
The public comment data analyzed, in conjunction with compliance documents submitted to 
regulators, reveals several gaps (or perceived by public commenters) between regulation and the 
public interest with regards to climate change. First, broader climate impacts are not yet embedded 
into contemporary regulatory processes in either Canada or the United States, and are currently 
considered on a case-by-case basis. In Canada, the NEB underwent a series of reforms and became 
the Canada Energy Regulator in 2019; as of September 2021, downstream GHG emissions and 
climate impacts are not included in project assessments. Generally, localized environmental impacts 
like ecosystem degradation, endangered species, or project-specific GHG emissions are assessed in 
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both cases as part of the EIS. Cumulative, diffuse, cross-territorial climate impacts tend to be assessed 
as part of the national interest determination, if they are assessed at all. On the one hand, the fact that 
KXL in particular did address these impacts, as well as changes happening in the Canadian processes 
to include upstream emissions in the assessment of some projects, speaks to the increasing salience of 
climate change both politically and economically.  Since 2010, there has been increasing attention 
paid to cumulative climate impacts in assessments of energy projects in both Canada and the United 
States. NGP and KXL represent a kind of turning point in both countries, as NGP was the last large 
pipeline project that did not include global climate change in the national interest determination for 
Canada, whereas KXL was the first large infrastructure project to include climate change. Climate 
change was not the driving force behind the rejection of NGP, whereas it certainly was in the case of 
KXL (in both 2015 and 2021). This harkens back to the IPE of energy scholarship which suggests the 
need to acknowledge the material limitations of current regulatory structures. To properly assess 
climate change, we need to include downstream emissions that are not consumed in Canada. These 
types of emissions are difficult to track once they leave our shores. They are also extremely difficult 
to balance against the direct economic benefit that exporting fossil fuels brings to Canadians 
generally and Albertans in particular (A. V. Carter 2018).  
Second, there are procedural differences between the piecemeal nature of American 
interstate/international regulation compared to the standardized nature of Canadian interprovincial 
regulation. On the one hand, the extremely centralized nature of the KXL process, an anomaly in 
American pipeline regulation, allowed Presidents Obama and Biden to react to the changing tides of 
public opinion and activism and cancel the project on climate grounds. On the other hand, these same 
governance features allowed President Trump to reinvigorate the project. Executive-level partisanship 
steers the inclusion of climate change into national interest determinations for cross-border pipelines, 
indicating a lack of regulatory continuity which narrows or expands the scope of regulation 
depending on who is sitting in the White House. And the case here is distinctive in its global nature; 
most oil pipelines in the United States undergo far less scrutiny, depending on the states they cross. 8 
Conversely, there is a sluggishness that characterizes the Canadian case, which has much 
more standardized regulatory procedures for interprovincial/international pipelines. Enbridge was 
 
8 The State Department ruled that Enbridge’s Line 3 pipeline, expected to be in service by November 2021 after 
overcoming  legal challenges, did not require a new presidential permit/environmental review because the project 
proposed a replacement of existing pipe rather than a new build.  
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relying on guidance documents from 2003 for the NGP process, which stretched into 2016. The 
scientific understanding of climate change has increased considerably from 2000, but Canadian 
regulators were slow to update their compliance guidelines. The supersession of the NEB with the 
CER came at the end of years of frustration from both industry and civil society regarding a lack of 
clarity within regulatory mechanisms; some pipeline projects were required to account for certain 
climate impacts, others were not, and the courts frequently made the decision (see the Trans Mountain 
Expansion, Energy East, and Line 3 projects in addition to NGP).  
However, despite the fragmentation of American pipeline regulation, and the slightly more 
centralized Canadian experience, the NGP and KXL cases in particular reveal the importance of 
executive power in these contemporary regulatory processes. KXL was cancelled by Presidents 
Obama and Biden and revitalized by Trump. NGP was overturned by the Supreme Court and then 
effectively cancelled by Trudeau after a series of legal challenges, particularly regarding the new 
marine terminal proposal, proved too controversial. These cases may represent a turning point in both 
countries. In Canada, the federal government has purchased the Trans Mountain expansion pipeline, 
indicating a commitment to fossil fuel extraction in the long term, despite its former owner Kinder 
Morgan backing out of the project due largely to regulatory uncertainties. In KXL, we see that 
regulatory process is largely at the whims of the executive; in the updated ESA delivered to Trump, 
the language on climate change from the EPA was relatively strong. Trump still ultimately approved 
the project. When Biden cancelled KXL in January 2021, the (admittedly uncertain) market forecasts 
for oil demand still existed, but under a Democrat president that ran on a strong climate platform, 
cancellation was all but inevitable (McKibben 2021). Ultimately, in the last several decades 
regulators have been acting more like advisory councils than independent governance mechanisms 
with decision-making capabilities, making their outputs even more political. As discussed in the IPE 
of energy section earlier, there is a need to overhaul these regulators with more capacity to deal with 
broad and complex problems; to be able to assess projects beyond the territorial scope of federal/sub-
national sovereignty; and to be able to introduce a normative mandate towards sustainable 
development. 
Lastly, there is the question of balancing the harms and benefits of these pipelines with 
regards to climate change, as both Canada and the United States struggle with balancing impulses to 
continue privileging oil development at (almost) any cost and the increasing outcry from civil society 
both domestic and global to reckon with the socio-environmental impacts of a carbon-dependent 
society. Market-based concerns are still paramount during national interest determinations; as seen 
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above, anxieties regarding climate change are often couched in discussions of oil prices and demand 
forecasts. Climate impacts are rarely disentangled from global market forces. At first glance, the rise 
of environmental regulation since the 1970s seems to indicate a turn away from market supremacy 
and the ‘neoliberalization of nature’ (Bakker and Bridge 2007; Castree 2008a). However, we see in 
the dissonance between public comments and regulatory requirements that while there has been a 
broadening of regulatory capacity, these are still economic regulators that were created to encourage 
resource development. This holds despite the cancellation of both projects; while climate anxieties 
certainly played a large role, in the case of KXL in particular, market demands will be largely met by 
current infrastructure assets, and others (like Enbridge’s Line 3) are still in the works. The 
commercial justification is much less certain when other pipelines are ready to meet demand 
(depending on certain climate policy outcomes domestically and globally). 
In the NGP and KXL cases, we can see this climate-state-market tension play out as 
commenters proposed that if the risks of these projects were interpreted more broadly, they no longer 
outweighed the economic benefits. In the NGP case, within the comment data there was a clear sense 
that the environment and climate is a resource in its own right and should be protected to the same 
extent that oil is developed. Additionally, there was a clear resistance to the unequal distribution of 
benefits (largely to Enbridge, its shareholders, and some communities along the pipeline route) and 
risks (globally, in terms of climate change). From the regulator side, both American and Canadian 
institutions are operating from a classically liberal perspective, where states ensure the orderly 
operation of markets. But contemporary IPE of energy scholars, as suggested earlier in this paper, 
propose that we need a more holistic and less oil-centric view of energy, even when we are talking 
about oil (and the pipelines that carry it). And the trends in public comments echo that sentiment.  
Ultimately, it is no longer clear that the benefits of oil development outweigh the risks of climate 
change for many people, but regulators have thus far avoided reforming their scope to include a 
climate-forward interpretation of their mandate 
2.8 Conclusion 
This paper utilized critical theories from the IPE of energy to propose that regulators, which operate 
at the centre of the state-market-civil society nexus, are political organizations with political aims, as 
opposed to independent institutions with administrative functions within the state. Pipeline regulators 
in Canada and the United States assess climate change in extremely narrow and site-specific contexts, 
despite the evidence that climate change is a global problem with diffuse and significant impacts.  
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This dissonance between regulatory practice and the public interest which these mechanisms are 
meant to represent can be seen in an analysis of public comments submitted for both the NGP and 
KXL cases. Both sets of comments revealed concerns regarding the need to reduce fossil fuel 
dependence now in order to mitigate climate change, the need to invest in renewable energies, and 
that the particular oil marked for transport through these pipelines is especially carbon intensive. 
None of these issues are clearly addressed through regulatory compliance guidelines. In both cases, it 
has come down to the federal executive to decide on the fate of these pipelines, which introduces 
uncertainty into the regulatory process. The Obama and Biden administrations cancelled KXL due 
largely to climate concerns, which suggest a shift in (parts) of the American drive for carbon-based 
energy independence and an acknowledgement of broader climate impacts. However, the 
revitalization of the project by President Trump suggests that these climate concerns are not 
embedded in regulatory institutions but are rather at the whims of the President. In Canada, the 
Trudeau administration cancelled the NGP—and promptly purchased the Trans Mountain expansion 
pipeline to ensure that demand for Albertan oil would be met. There is a lack of regulatory certainty 
and continuity to assessing climate change in both Canada and the United States which renders these 
institutions incapable of assessing complex global problems like climate change.   
These pipeline regulators were originally based on a very oil-centric view of the IPE of 
energy, concerned with encouraging oil development, but we are seeing attention paid to climate 
change within these organizations now. Pipeline regulation is a matter of national jurisdictions, but it 
has impacts on, and is influenced by, global events. The segmented nature of pipeline sovereignty and 
jurisdiction in Canada and the United States makes it easier for pipeline projects to ‘pass’ 
environmental assessment because if regulation is narrow and localized enough, there are rarely 
problems big enough to justify rejecting the project outright. This is played out in climate 
assessments, where only GHGs directly produced by the operation and construction of the project 
were considered in the NGP and KXL cases, despite the fact that both the Prime Minister and two 
Presidents acknowledged the broader climate impacts of the pipelines.  
Conventional regulation emphasizes rule-setting and monitoring in a way that measures direct 
impact on a concentrated group of stakeholders, and the prospect of explicit policy planning is rarely 
part of regulatory institutions—although certain socio-economic goals may be pursued, they are often 
a result of institutional inertia as opposed to explicit goal-setting (Young 2017a; Doern, Prince, and 
Schultz 2014; McBeath 2016). Institutions need to expand their capacity to respond to these 
increasingly complex problems. The scale and nonlinearity of climate change, as well as the 
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complexity of global energy markets, necessitates regulatory institutions that privilege setting specific 
environmental goals and normative ambitions in order to create a flexible regulatory system that goes 
beyond setting and enforcing a set of rules. This is not an easy balance to achieve and detailing the 
specifics of such goals is complex. Other climate governance mechanisms, like the Paris Agreement 
may serve as a blueprint for a more effective regulatory structure in the energy sector (Young 2017b). 
The Paris Agreement sets specific and measurable goals but allows participants to determine the best 
way to achieve these goals (as opposed to rule-setting without specific policy priorities, which 
characterizes North American energy governance), and pipeline regulators may be able to learn from 
these types of agreements.  
This paper emphasizes the lack of continuity between the energy governance and climate 
governance, which speaks to issues that have been increasingly relevant in the study of the 
international political economy of energy. We know that global energy systems need to be overhauled 
to mitigate the worst impacts of climate change; but the governance institutions that oversee those 
energy systems, like pipeline regulators, rely on a narrow interpretation of impacts and lack a clear 
and inclusive framework with which to assess climate change. These governing institutions are 
complex and often fragmented but tend to support fossil fuel development. In an era where the 
prospect of a managed decline of fossil fuels is increasingly commonplace, these institutions are out 
of step with the realities of the industry they are charged with governing. Climate change is certainly 
a factor in these pipeline decisions; Presidents Obama and Biden cited it as the primary reason for 
rejection, and it was a secondary factor in Prime Minister Trudeau’s cancellation of NGP. However, 
while executive leaders (at least, the Liberal and Democrat leaders) address climate change explicitly 
in their decision-making, the regulatory processes themselves lack a clear and consistent assessment 
framework. The NEB (and CER, for now) generally avoided assessing upstream and downstream 
impacts. In the United States, the pendulum swings between denial of permits based primarily on 
climate grounds and downplaying the concept of climate change entirely. Broader climate change 
needs to be consistently assessed throughout these processes, not simply when it is politically 
advantageous to do so.  
Now that our understanding of the relationship between climate change and regulation is 
fuller and more nuanced, we need further research into institutional design to investigate what a better 
regulatory structure might look like. Additional comparative analysis of fossil fuel producing states 
would contribute to this research, as would investigation of other climate-sensitive sectors like 
agriculture. Lastly, the suggestion to design regulatory mechanisms for sustainable development as 
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opposed to economic growth is likely relevant to climate and energy justice movements seeking to 




Chapter 3  
Cheap, Local, Ethical: Addressing Energy Security Through 
Pipeline Regulation 
Energy, and oil in particular, has long been at the forefront of policymakers’ minds in 
Canada and the United States. Consequently, anxieties regarding energy security have been 
ingratiated into national energy policies, and so energy regulation, for decades. In the United 
States, energy security generally manifests itself as a drive for energy independence and 
continuity of supply internationally; in Canada, this is exhibited in a need to ensure continuity 
of extraction and access to global demand. To complicate matters further, there are public 
concerns regarding energy security. There are significant economic benefits associated with 
the operation of pipelines, and thus the extraction of oil, but there is a perception that these 
benefits are largely concentrated amongst a small group of global industry stakeholders and 
is not dispersed to those who take on the social/environmental risks associated with these 
large and invasive infrastructure projects, both domestically and internationally. The question 
of what is being secured, and whom is at risk from these pipelines, is much more complex than 
a narrow supply-and-demand view of energy security would suggest. This paper will utilize 
the Four A’s framework of energy security to compare the characterization of energy security 
in two cancelled pipeline projects: the Northern Gateway project in Western Canada, and the 
Keystone XL extension to the Gulf Coast. Relying on public comment data and industry 
compliance documents, this paper will investigate the interpretation of energy security in both 
projects and discuss the broader implications for regulatory governance. It will be concluded 
that due to a lack of mandate capacity, these regulatory institutions are characterizing energy 
security too narrowly for the expectations of the public who may desire an assessment of 
broader socio-political issues, or by ruling parties that ultimately make the final decision on 
these pipelines with these broader issues in mind. 
3.1 Introduction 
Canada and the United States have historically been extremely invested in the development of their 
domestic oil industries. In terms of oil, the Canada-U.S. trade relationship is extremely close—in 
2019, 98% of Canadian oil exports are shipped to the United States, and 56% of American oil imports 
came from Canada (Natural Resources Canada 2017b; EIA 2019a). Both countries have entrenched 
energy security at the heart of their energy policies for decades, albeit this has manifested slightly 
differently. The United States has long strived for energy independence—the idea of reducing the 
need to import oil from unstable countries, and ideally of eliminating the need to import oil at all in 
an effort to protect the American economy from price shocks and supply disruptions. Just before the 
1973 oil crisis, 35% of oil consumed in the United States was imported; this peaked in 2005 at 
60%(EIA 2019a; 2021a). While the United States was the top global producer of oil in the 1960’s, 
high levels of consumption rendered the goal of total energy independence out of reach. American oil 
production dropped off in the 1970s/1980s as domestic reserves were drained, and reliance on 
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international imports remained until the mid 2010s, when American oil production skyrocketed due to 
the shale oil boom.  
Conversely, Canada’s abundant oil resources, largely from the Athabasca oil sands in 
Alberta, have kept Canadian oil production high for decades; in 2020, Canada was the fourth-largest 
producer and third-largest exporter of crude oil globally, and has been in the top 10 since the 1960s 
(Natural Resources Canada 2016b). Canada exports a significant amount of crude oil; 3.8 million bpd 
were exported in 2019 (Natural Resources Canada 2017b). Canada also imports some refined crude, 
due to a lack of domestic refining capacity (Government of Canada 2020).  
Energy, and oil in particular, have long been at the forefront of policymakers’ minds in 
Canada and the United States, and so anxieties regarding energy security have been integrated into 
national energy policies and energy regulation for decades. In the United States, energy security 
generally manifests itself as a drive for energy independence and continuity of supply internationally; 
in Canada, this is exhibited in a need to ensure continuity of extraction and access to global demand. 
While these anxieties surrounding continuity of supply and demand are placed under an umbrella of 
‘energy security’, it is more accurate analytically to consider these state-market relationships at a 
‘energy-security-trade’ nexus. Pipeline regulators like the NEB do not engage with security in the 
strictest ‘hard power’ sense, here meaning the use of military/economic might to coerce specific 
outcomes from certain actors (Goldthau and Sitter 2015a). However, the trade relationships facilitated 
by certain pipeline approvals certainly impact the manifestation of security of access and availability.  
To complicate matters further for pipeline regulators, conventional, oil-centric interpretations 
of energy security lack the nuance of the risks and benefits of pipelines. There are significant 
economic benefits associated with the operation of pipelines, and thus the extraction of oil, but there 
is a perception (as will be expanded upon in this paper) that these benefits are largely concentrated 
amongst a small group of global industry stakeholders and is not dispersed to those who take on the 
social/environmental risks associated with these large and invasive infrastructure projects, both 
domestically and internationally (with regards to complex, cross-border issues like climate change 
that are exacerbated by the expansion of the global oil sector). The question of what is being secured, 
and whom is at risk from these pipelines, is much more complex than a narrow supply-and-demand 
view of energy security would suggest. 
This paper will compare the interpretation and characterization of energy security within the 
regulatory processes of two major pipeline projects, one each in Canada and the United States. The 
Northern Gateway pipeline in Canada and Keystone XL project in the United States, both cancelled 
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after years of contestation and controversy, will be examined for their interpretation of energy 
security, and the impacts of that interpretation for fossil fuel development. This paper will utilize a 
theoretical lens of the Four A’s framework of energy security: affordability, availability, accessibility, 
and acceptability, which will be discussed in more detail below (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre 
2007; Benjamin K. Sovacool 2011c). Relying on public comment data submitted during the 
regulatory processes for both projects, the public perception of regulatory legislation will be 
examined. By contextualizing this comment data with industry compliance documents, this paper will 
then investigate the trends in the interpretation of energy security by pipeline regulators, how 
regulatory governance has addressed this issue in these projects, and potential best practices for 
reform. This paper concludes that due to a lack of mandate and capacity, these regulatory institutions 
are not representing issues of contemporary energy security to the extent that is needed, either by the 
public who clamour for an assessment of broader socio-political issues, or by governments that 
ultimately make the final decision on these pipelines with these broader issues in mind.  
3.2 The Four A’s Framework  
The 1973 oil crisis encouraged interest in the connections between energy and national security, 
culminating in scholarly attention on these linkages, but scholarly interest receded in the late 1980s as 
the crisis waned (Miller 1977; Willrich 1976). In the early 2000s, as energy demand began to rise 
sharply in Asia while environmental concerns put pressure on national governments to consider 
widespread decarbonization, interest in energy security was re-invigorated, and the interrogation of 
what energy security means has persisted since (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Cherp and Jewell 
2014). Until the 2010s, energy security scholarship tended to focus on the security of supply and 
demand, focusing on oil and gas, with an analytical focus on states depending on their status as a 
energy importer or exporter (Chester 2010). Since the mid-2000s, energy security has shifted from 
this narrow, conventional conceptualization and has become both more nuanced and more 
interdisciplinary. Factors like climate change, innovation in renewable energy, energy poverty, etc. 
reveal the multidimensional nature of energy security and its connections to social, environmental, 
and political issues (Chester 2010; Benjamin K. Sovacool 2012b). 
Energy security is difficult to conceptualize; certain actors and institutions tend to propose the 
definition that supports their own economic/political/social interests, and there is little consensus in 
the scholarship  (Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brown 2010). However, there are some points of 
convergence. The ‘Four A’s’ approach to energy security proposes that there are four main aspects to 
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energy security: availability (of fossil fuels, unconventional energy sources, and renewable energies); 
accessibility (regarding economic, political, or physical barriers to accessing energy, as well as 
energy poverty); affordability (concerning price volatility and costs of infrastructure); and 
acceptability (largely concerned with the social and environmental impacts of resource extraction and 
consumption, including climate change) (Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brown 2010; Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre 2007; Kruyt et al. 2009). The Four A’s framework has become one of the 
most common for energy security, although it is often adapted to suit the researchers’ needs, and was 
first proposed by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre in 2007(Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Centre 2007). When infrastructure is discussed in energy security literature, it is usually through the 
lens of protecting critical infrastructure from potential interruptions to oil supply in case of extreme 
natural events or deliberate sabotage (Farrell, Zerriffi, and Dowlatabadi 2004; Yusta, Correa, and 
Lacal-Arántegui 2011). However, while the links between climate change and natural disasters are 
increasingly clear, this is only beginning to manifest in the literature as a call to shift away from oil-
centric worldviews in order to better secure this critical infrastructure (Benjamin K. Sovacool 2012a).  
The Four A’s framework has its shortcomings; notably the lack of attention paid to security 
itself. Cherp and Jewell attempt to bring the ‘security’ back into ‘energy security’ by focusing on 
what exactly is being secured, arguing that this is a necessary facet of any discussion of energy 
security (Cherp and Jewell 2014). However, there is much to draw on analytically from the Four A’s 
as there has been increasing attention to the accessibility and acceptability aspects in particular. 
Studies on energy poverty, environmental sustainability, and climate change with regards to energy 
security have abounded since 2010 (Benjamin K. Sovacool et al. 2012; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; 
Ali et al. 2020; Naeem Nawaz and Alvi 2018; Proskuryakova 2018; Shah et al. 2019; Herington and 
Malakar 2016). Ultimately, the Four As framework provides a conceptual starting point for 
discussions regarding energy security, although critics are correct in that we need to consider the 
perspective and direction of what is being secured, and for whom, in order to properly integrate 
challenges of sustainability and equity into questions of energy security.  In the next section, I discuss 
pipelines as the method of securing security of oil supply and demand in Canada and the United 
States. Regulators in both countries have tended to prioritize securing affordable oil resources, 
continuous access to stable trade partners, and energy self-sufficiency at the expense of broader 
sustainability issues and risks related to fossil fuel development. 
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3.3 Energy Security in Pipeline Regulation: Accessibility and Availability 
3.3.1 Canada 
Pipeline regulation in Canada was born out of a political, economic, and physical landscape which 
privileged the extraction of oil resources, but the spatial realities of these resources necessitated 
certain issues with transport and export (Doern and Gattinger 2003; Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014). 
Regulatory mechanisms like the NEB were largely built to manage the economic aspects of this 
extraction and transportation, but growing pressure from environmental and consumer safety groups, 
both within and without government, has led to a much larger mandate.  
One issue that consistently arises in discussions of Canadian energy security is the role of the 
American market. The Canadian oil sector has historically been dependent on American demand, and 
so “Canadian energy decisions are almost always simultaneously American decisions” (Doern and 
Gattinger 2003, 23). Not only does the United States represent essentially the only export destination 
for Canadian oil, but American regulators play an outsize role in the domestic oil sector; more than 
40% of oil and gas destined for Canada moves through the United States, meaning that American 
regulators can influence domestic energy availability and accessibility (Doern and Gattinger 2003).9 
Additionally, Canadian territorial authority plays a role in energy policy and regulation; provinces 
typically administer the leases for fossil fuel extraction and mining, since provincial governments 
retain ownership of below-ground resources (as opposed to landowners, who retain rights to above-
ground resources) (Pearse 1988). Federal authority comes into play when these extracted resources 
need to be transported, as the federal government has authority over interprovincial (and 
international) trade as well as powers of taxation (Dijkstra and Fredriksson 2010; Pearse 1988; Doern, 
Prince, and Schultz 2014). Additionally, any pipeline that crosses a provincial or national border is 
automatically under the authority of the NEB and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA); conversely, any pipeline that exists wholly within one province is subject to provincial 
authority only(J. M. Baker and Westman 2018; Canada 2016). This ultimately means that the state of 
energy policy and development generally, and of regulation in particular, is always precariously 
 
9 We can see this playing out in 2021, as opposition against Enbridge’s Line 5 pipeline in Michigan threatens to cut fuel sources for 
consumers by more than 50% in Ontario and Québec. This would result in an increase in truck/rail/marine transportation, 
although price increases across the provinces are likely in the short-term. Despite the fact that this pipeline originates and 
concludes in Canada, its route leaves it at the mercy of American state governments.  
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balanced between provincial, federal, and American interests, all of which are working towards 
securing cheap, continuous energy supplies.  
3.3.2 United States  
Since the 1973 oil crisis, the United States has sporadically pursued energy security, albeit a very 
narrow definition. In response to this crisis—along with a bevy of other statutes aimed at dealing with 
the oil shortage—President Richard Nixon announced Project Independence, the goal of which was to 
develop domestic energy sources and ultimately eliminate the need for global energy imports (von 
Hippel et al. 2011a). This goal was never achieved. President Jimmy Carter signed the Energy 
Security Act in 1980, which proposed a reduction in overall domestic energy consumption, increased 
reliance on both coal and renewable energies, and higher taxes on gasoline(J. Carter 1980). In 
addition, President Carter also created the Department of Energy in 1977, which is currently “tasked 
with maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and reducing the threat of nuclear 
proliferation, overseeing the United States’ energy supply, carrying out the environmental clean-up 
from the Cold War nuclear mission, and the 17 National Laboratories” (Department of Energy 2021). 
Important to note here is the lack of regulatory capacity; neither extraction projects nor pipelines are 
managed by the Department of Energy. Rather, oil pipelines in the United States are regulated via a 
number of overlapping departments and agencies at the state and federal level. For the purposes of 
this analysis, which focuses on the Keystone XL pipeline project, the State Department is responsible 
for coordinating international pipeline regulation as per Executive Order 13337, signed by President 
George W. Bush (Bureau of Energy Resources 2020). Like in the Canadian case, territorial 
jurisdiction plays a huge role in pipeline regulation in the United States; while extraction sites (largely 
concentrated in California, Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota, and New Mexico) 
are governed by state regulation, interstate regulation of oil pipelines generally requires each state 
authority to review the segment within its borders, and for overarching federal authorities like the 
EPA or the ACE to assess the specific portions of the pipeline under their jurisdiction (McBeath 
2016). This results in a much more fragmented regulatory authority than the Canadian system.  
In terms of energy security, the United States has long been concerned with reducing its 
reliance on global oil sources, and in encouraging trade with close allies like Canada in the absence of 
total energy independence. 48% of American oil imports came from Canada in 2019 (EIA 2019a). 
Due to the destination and direction of crude oil transport, Canadian regulators do not have same 
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influence on the American oil sector that American regulators have in Canada. However, Canadian 
pipeline companies own and operate several of the major interstate oil pipelines in the United States.  
Canadian and American pipeline regulators are ultimately concerned with securing continuous 
supplies of oil, although this manifests for slightly different reasons. American energy security is 
largely concerned with energy independence, whatever form that may take, whereas Canadian energy 
security is about creating new and maintaining current trade relationships to ensure demand for 
Canadian oil. However, while both countries address environmental impacts in their pipeline 
regulatory processes, neither integrates environmental concerns into these energy security 
imperatives. As the public comment data and compliance documents will show, there is a call for an 
expanded conception of energy security in both countries, that includes environmental sustainability 
as well as prioritizing domestic energy demand.   
 
Figure 8: Existing/Proposed Oil Pipelines Originating in Alberta (IHS Markit/Inside Climate News) 
3.4 Methods  
This paper will compare the interpretation and characterization of energy security within the 
regulatory processes of two major pipeline projects, one each in Canada and the United States. The 
Northern Gateway pipeline (NGP), proposed by Enbridge in 2009 and eventually rejected in 2016, 
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would have run from the Athabasca oil sands in Bruderheim, Alberta, to a new marine terminal in 
Kitimat, British Columbia, where crude oil would have shipped largely to Asian markets via tankers. 
The Keystone XL project (KXL), proposed by TransCanada (now TC Energy) in 2008, was rejected 
by the Obama administration in 2015, re-invigorated by the Trump administration in 2017, and then 
cancelled again by President Joe Biden in January 2021. KXL proposed to run from its origin in 
Hardisty, Alberta through Nebraska to refineries in Houston and Port Arthur, Texas. Although this 
pipeline does originate in Canada and therefore a short segment of the pipeline is subject to Canadian 
regulatory authority, the focus here will be on the American segment.  
A comparative analysis of public comments and regulatory documents for two pipeline 
projects will constitute the basis for this paper. NGP and KXL are comparable as both are large, 
controversial projects, rejected after lengthy, controversial regulatory processes. The difference—
Canadian versus American regulation—represents the point of comparison and will allow for an 
examination of energy security within pipeline regulatory governance. Comparative analysis is 
appropriate for this type of research question, which focusses on understanding complex, context-
specific interactions (Furlong and Marsh 2010; Yin 2018) 
The data comes from public comments submitted to the NGP process in 2012-2015, and the 
second KXL process in 2017-2019. Both Canadian and American regulators offer an opportunity for 
anyone to submit a comment in support of or in opposition to pipeline proposals, although the 
influence of those comments is limited (Government of Canada 2021; Bureau of Energy Resources 
2020). Only a small number of accepted intervenors (often landowners along the route, Indigenous 
communities, or other organizations that can prove direct impact) officially participate in the 
assessment process. However, these comments can help us understand the nature of public opposition 
or support of a project, and in particular reveal the dissonance between how regulators think about 
energy security as opposed to how the public thinks about energy security.  
Given the nature of the data for this project—public comments that focus on individual and 
collective perceptions of the risks/benefits associated with pipeline operations—it is necessary to 
acknowledge the literature surrounding the perception of contemporary risks. The risks that these 
comments address—not just climate change and energy security but also the potential for catastrophic 
spills, the top-down nature of consultation with Indigenous groups and communities, the long-term 
exposure of water supplies, the vulnerability of sensitive ecosystems along pipeline routes—are long-
term, geographically diffuse, and increasingly unavoidable. However, this literature on risk 
perception tends to focus on individual and collective discourse-making rather than political 
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institutions (Beck 1992). This project is ultimately concerned not with the dynamics of risk 
perception, but with how regulatory institutions respond to those perceptions as they evolve (Sjöberg 
1999). The focus here is on institutional interpretation of these complex socio-environmental risks, 
not on the collective construction of those risks; hence the use of the energy security theory, which 
has more applicability to institutional dynamics (Goldthau and Sitter 2015a; E. Moe and Midford 
2014).  Additionally, the subject of analysis here are the regulatory processes themselves, of which 
public comments are a crucial component; while these comments may, in a future project, have some 
insights for the nature of risk construction, they also represent the only opportunity for individual, 
non-affiliated citizens to participate in these regulatory processes. 
For this project, 750 comments were each randomly selected out of 5000 for Northern 
Gateway and over 10,000 for the 2017-2019 round of comments for Keystone XL. These comments 
were downloaded off of the NEB document depository for Northern Gateway and regulations.gov 
(the American regulatory document depository) for Keystone XL. Codes were inductively developed 
according to the nature of opposition or support stated (a full list of codes can be found in Appendix 
B). Inductive thematic saturation was reached fairly early in the process, with no new codes generated 
after approximately 100 comments analyzed (Saunders et al. 2018). Additional coding was completed 
to reach data saturation, where patterns were consistently replicated and a clear picture of the nature 
of these comments, and so the perceived gaps in regulatory governance were revealed.  
This paper was concerned with codes that addressed the Four A’s of energy security, and the 
most relevant were three codes: ‘international relations’, ‘commercial justification’, and ‘necessity’. 
The ‘international relations’ code focused on the relationship between domestic risk and international 
beneficiaries; concerning the accessibility or acceptability aspects of the Four A’s. For instance, KXL 
commenters were often concerned about the risks they would take on so that Canadian shareholders 
or Chinese consumers would benefit, or NGP comments discussed the risks to British Columbians 
where Albertan firms or Chinese and American consumers would benefit. The ‘commercial 
justification’ and ‘necessity’ codes were also used, as they contained discussions of the availability 
and affordability aspects of energy security. Here, the focus was on concerns about the potential 
increase of fuel prices if these projects were approved (affordability), and the need for more 
international pipelines instead of increased domestic production (availability). In addition to these 
three codes, others related to trade, other sectors, and general economic conditions were scanned to 
ensure completeness and address any misidentification in the initial coding. The codes analyzed in the 
paper can be seen in Table 3 below, with a full list available in the Appendices.  
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Table 3: Codes related to Four A's of Energy Security for NGP and KXL public 
comments 
Name Description Comments References 
ECONOMICS Discussion of revenues/trade/employment as 




Economic benefits generated from pipeline, and 
desire for domestic production (includes 
refining capacity for NGP) 
29 42 
GOVERNMENT Reference to issues with current government as 





Reference to international socio-economic 
trends and relationships; often cited with 
regards to risk/benefit (ie. Canada benefits from 
KXL, but USA takes on risk) 
108 195 
NECESSITY Reference to broad oil supply/demand forecasts, 
capacity of other pipelines 
76 90 
 
These comments are not a perfect facsimile of the public interest; they weigh heavily towards 
opposition of both projects, there is often a clear lack of understanding of the projects themselves as 
well as regulatory processes generally, and activist groups tend to be over-represented due to project-
specific information campaigns. These public comment periods are the only opportunity for anyone to 
be involved in the regulatory process; otherwise, it is usually government departments and 
municipalities or landowners directly along the pipeline route that have some other method of 
participation. But these comments are heavily skewed towards opposition; only about 10% of 
comments in both project expressed support, but broader polls of the general public suggest a large 
amount of passive support. In 2016, 58% of Canadians supported Northern Gateway if all conditions 
set out by the NEB were satisfied, and 66% of Americans supported KXL under some condition in 
2014 (which decreased to 42% in 2017) (Suls 2017; Anderson and Coletto 2016). Indeed, public 
comment data can produce stronger opinion than polls/surveys, which tend to show more public 
ambivalence (G. Brown and Eckold 2020). However, public comments are more accessible for most 
citizens than public meetings or hearings, which usually must be attended in person, therefore 
allowing for a broader universe of respondents (Rasch 2019). 
Despite the obvious bias in the public comments, this data is still useful to identify the nature 
of the opposition, which defines the gap between institutional mandate and public expectation. 
Additionally, both these cases had huge numbers of comments submitted—over 2 million for all 
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phases of KXL and over 8000 for NGP10— and several trends emerged, indicating a set of collective 
issues with energy security. Lastly, this paper is concerned with examining the nature of the 
opposition to these projects in order to define the boundaries of the governance gap for regulators, for 
which this dataset is very useful.  
So while these comments do not represent the whole universe of public opinion on energy 
security, but a very specific subset of opposition, they can still help us understand the governance 
gaps in terms of how contemporary energy security issues are interpreted by regulators.  20% percent 
of Northern Gateway commenters and 13% percent of Keystone XL commenters opposed the project 
because they felt the economic benefits of the fossil fuel extraction these pipelines would facilitate 
would ultimately land in other countries or that the energy policies being pursued were not for their 
benefit. For the Northern Gateway pipeline, comments largely addressed the ultimate destination of 
China and other Asian markets for Canadian oil and were concerned that domestic energy security 
was being abandoned in favour of market diversification. Commenters questioned the necessity of 
shipping unrefined oil overseas as opposed to refining and consuming oil domestically. Conversely, 
in the case of Keystone XL, American commenters felt that Canada would reap most of the benefits 
of the pipeline, as it would increase market access for the Canadian oil sector, while landowners and 
communities along the route would pay the socio-environmental price.  
3.5 Results  
There are three key themes that emerge from the public comment data with regards to energy 
security, although they manifest differently across the cases. Concerns regarding continuous supplies 
of energy for domestic consumption were raised in both cases, relating to the ‘availability’ and 
‘affordability’ aspects of energy security. Both cases raised concerns regarding the continued 
dependence on fossil fuels, proposing that increased investment in renewable energy would increase 
national energy security and reduce dependence on a traditionally volatile global industry. Lastly, 
comments raised issues about the nature of trade relationships that were being pursued as a result of 
these pipelines; in NGP, commenters raised the issue of human rights abuses and lack of 
 
10 For context, Enbridge’s Alberta Clipper expansion in Minnesota (meant to upgrade the 
pipeline to 800,000 bpd capacity) proposed in 2016/2017 received 90,000 comments; the 




environmental protection in China, whereas in the KXL case comments were concerned with the 
perceived destination of both Saudi Arabia and China. Ultimately, comments concerned with energy 
security were largely protectionist in nature, with the idea that if this oil was to be developed, it 
should be produced by and for Canadians and Americans, respectively.  
3.5.1 Expanding Availability: Energy Independence 
A common theme in the comment data for both cases addressed the ‘availability’ and ‘affordability’ 
aspects of energy security, as commenters were concerned with ensuring a continuous and affordable 
supply of energy, ideally produced and refined domestically. In the KXL case, this lines up well with 
the American pursuit of energy independence as touted by various administrations (Tidwell and 
Smith 2015; J. Carter 1980; Matthew Huber 2013). However, while there has been rhetoric 
surrounding a ‘true energy independence’ in the United States for decades, import/export data 
suggests that this goal is unreasonable. The United States has always been a net importer of crude oil, 
although recent discoveries in the Permian Basin have increased its domestic production; 2019 
petroleum imports were the lowest since 1954 (Gaswirth et al. 2018; EIA 2019a). In 2019, the U.S. 
produced about 19.25 MMb/d of petroleum and consumed about 20.46 MMb/d; imports totaled 9.10 
MMb/d, 6.8 MMb/d of which were crude oil (EIA 2019a). In addition to consuming these imports, 
some imported crude oil was refined in the United States and then exported. The United States is the 
world’s largest consumer of oil, and simply does not have the domestic resources to meet demand.  
However, the comment data focuses on the perception that Americans would not reap the 
benefits of oil shipped through KXL, while taking on the burden of socio-environmental risk. The 
benefit to Canada, and Canadian companies, is frequently touted as a reason to reject the pipeline, 
since “this is not even oil for the domestic market, a foreign company is using the US and exploiting 
us by piping the dirtiest crude through our country, to be refined and shipped off to the global market” 
(KXL 2.1). Additionally, the KXL comments propose that the risk to Americans is not balanced by 
benefits, stating that “it should be more obvious that the risk associated with this pipeline is even 
more pointless given the fact that the oil will be exported from a foreign market to other foreign 
markets. In no way is this pipeline in the interest of the people, but rather oil executives and the 
politicians that profit them” (KXL 2.2). Additionally, some comments specifically cite the “national 
security concerns with importing more foreign oil”, despite the gap between American energy supply 
and demand.  
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In the NGP case, concerns regarding domestic availability of oil were focused largely on 
refining capacity. Comments questioned the need to ship unrefined crude oil to the United States and 
Asian markets, only to purchase refined oil to meet domestic demand. Canada has long struggled with 
a lack of domestic refining capacity; in 2019, 15 refineries processed approximately 1.9 Mmb/d 
(Government of Canada 2020). Also in 2019, 19% of refined petroleum consumed in Canada was 
imported, 72% of those imports from the United States (Natural Resources Canada 2020). Petroleum 
refining in Canada is made more complex by the geographical characteristics of the oil and gas 
sector; while five refineries in Alberta make use of their proximity to the Athabasca oil sands to refine 
domestic oil, the nine refineries in Eastern Canada must import crude oil to meet domestic demand 
(although the 2015 reversal of Enbridge’s Line 9 pipeline has increased access to the oil sands for 
these Eastern refineries)(CBC News 2015). Canadian refining capacity does have access to domestic 
crude oil and imports what it cannot access domestically. Additionally, the economic justification for 
additional refining capacity is not clear; consumers generally want unrefined Canadian crude, since 
different markets have different refining needs, and our closest trade partners have their own 
refineries which depend on imports. However, there was significant opposition to NGP from trade 
unions, which cited the lack of jobs associated with shipping unrefined crude oil internationally 
(Wood and Thistlethwaite 2018). The United States, which is Canada’s main customer, has a refining 
capacity of 18 Mmb/day (as of July 2020), largely in Texas, Louisiana, and California (EIA 2021b).  
Despite fairly high domestic refining capacity for Canadian crude oil commenters in the NGP process 
emphasized the need to increase energy independence by keeping Canadian oil in Canada. 
Commenters proposed that “I am not quite sure why another part of our country continues to 
rely on imported oil when we have some within our own country to share. To follow export and 
international terms and conditions and riding on the wave of “the market” is not good enough.” (NGP 
2.1). Others focused on the potential jobs that hypothetical new refineries would bring, “I don't get 
how shipping our oil resources to China helps our Canadian economy. Yes, my home province of 
Alberta will continue to have plenty of jobs, and a growing oil industry but what about the rest of 
Canada. Let’s be analytical - we ship our raw oil and condensate to China, they use it and ship cheap 
products back to us” (NGP 2.2). Finally, commenters emphasized that Canada is already overly 
dependent on crude oil imports, despite the fact that Canada has long been a net oil exporter; “it must 
be noted that Eastern Canada is essentially fueled by unethical oil bought from those sources that we 
seek to shift others from consuming. To me, the development of an east-west pipeline network and 
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upgrading suitable eastern Canadian refineries will have more benefit to Canadians, in terms of 
energy independence, employment and economic development” (NGP 2.3).  
3.5.2 Maintaining Affordability & Reducing Competition  
There is a perception in both cases (which skew heavily towards pipeline opposition rather than 
support) that the construction of the KXL and NGP pipelines would increase fuel prices for 
Americans and Canadians, respectively. Commenters were concerned that while oil producers would 
reap the economic benefits of both pipelines, individual consumers would be burdened with higher 
fuel prices. This reduction in affordability, one of the four central aspects of energy security, played 
out in both sets of comments. In the KXL case, there is definite concern regarding the potential of the 
pipeline to increase fuel prices as there is a perception that “KXL will divert Tar Sands oil now 
supplying Midwest refineries, so it can be sold at higher prices to the Gulf Coast and export markets. 
As a result, consumers in the Midwest could be paying 10 to 20 cents more per gallon for gasoline 
and diesel fuel. These additional costs (estimated to total $24 billion) will suppress other spending 
and will therefore cost jobs” (KXL 2.3). These concerns are paralleled in the NGP case, with 
commenters emphasizing that “the project would also raise gas prices for Canadians as Canadian 
refineries would have to compete with Asian markets. This in turn would cause widespread inflation, 
hurting our economy” (NGP 2.4).  
This perception of increased fuel prices is based on the fact that as both Enbridge and TC 
Energy emphasized in their pipeline proposals, oil prices were expected to increase as a result of these 
pipelines. In fact, this is possible; if Canadian oil had increased exposure to world oil prices (keeping 
in mind that currently, approximately 97% of Canadian oil exports are directed to the United States) 
then oil prices would probably increase, all else being equal. Both NGP and KXL would have 
increased revenue to oil extractors and owners—leading to a subsequent increase in royalties and tax 
revenues, which would be an overall net positive for the Canadian economy. Additionally, in the case 
of NGP in particular, an over-production of oil in the pricing hub of Cushing, Oklahoma resulted in 
the ‘WTI-Brent spread’, where prices for oil in North America were below global prices until 2014, 
when oil prices dropped globally (Millington 2016). In that sense, transporting oil directly to the west 
coast for Asian markets would have allowed for higher oil prices. The effects on fuel prices for 
Americans regarding KXL are murkier; it is still Canadian producers that would reap the benefits of 
increasing exports, but oil prices would still be subject to the pricing hub in Cushing. However, it is 
important to note in both cases that increased oil prices do tend to lead to higher gasoline costs—but 
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only negligibly in most cases. There have been episodes where oil price shocks have significantly 
increased fuel prices (like the 1973 oil crisis), and increases in global oil prices can contribute to 
increased gasoline prices—we saw in 2005 as oil prices increased, European fuel prices increased 
between 16-36% over nine months (European Environment Agency 2018). The burden of these price 
increases is on individuals, while oil producers reap the direct benefits; however, the impact on 
households is generally small, and there are second-order benefits due to increased tax revenues. 
3.5.3 ‘Acceptable’ Trade Partners: Ethical Oil, China, and Saudi Arabia 
A final theme of the public comments focused on the acceptability of trade partners involved in the 
extraction, refining, and consumption of oil sent through the KXL and NGP pipelines. When 
acceptability is discussed in the energy security context, it is often from the perspective of the energy 
sources themselves; focus is on the suitability of continued dependence on fossil fuels in a world 
impacted by global climate change. It is not often discussed in the context of trade partners’ human 
rights records. However, this notion of ‘acceptable’ trade partners comes up frequently in the public 
comment data. In the KXL context, commenters point out the benefits that Canadian oil producers 
will reap while Americans take on the burden of risk, but significant opposition is based on the fact 
that China and Saudi Arabia are potential beneficiaries of the pipeline as well. 
KXL commenters were concerned with the human rights/environmental records of Canada 
and China, where at least a portion of oil from KXL would be consumed, stating that “Canadian tar 
sands are easily one of the dirtiest energy sources on Planet Earth. Does China care? No. As Deng 
Xiaoping used to say, it doesn’t (sic) matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice. 
China’s leaders are so indifferent to environmental concerns” (KXL 2.4), and that “citizens of the 
United States should expect to have access to clean water and a Canadian Pipeline created to cross the 
US to send tar sands to China should not have the right to take that away” (KXL 2.5). KXL was 
meant to bring oil down from Alberta to the Gulf Coast refineries in Texas, including the Port Arthur 
refinery (the largest in the United States). In 2017, Gulf Coast refineries exported almost two thirds of 
incoming products, up from about 38% in 2012 (EIA 2020). The remainder is sold within the United 
States; despite the protests of opposition, the United States would receive some benefit from KXL, if 
benefit is defined as increased accessibility of Canadian crude and crude products. The Gulf Coast 
refineries were the preferred destination for KXL because these large refineries are best equipped to 
refine heavy crude, like that coming from the Athabasca oil sands. So while a portion of the refined 
crude products exported from Gulf Coast refineries would likely have been consumed in China, 
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where environmental regulations are often but not always less stringent than the United States 
(Nyman 2018; Yao and Herrerias 2014), these petroleum products also would have ended up in 
Europe, Canada, and within the United States.  
The second issue in the KXL case in terms of ‘acceptability’ of the KXL pipeline and the 
subsequent processes of refining and exporting relates to the Motiva refinery in Port Arthur, Texas. 
The Motiva refinery, the largest in the United States, began operation in 1903 and has a capacity of 
over 630,000 bpd in 2019. In 1989, Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, purchased a 
50% stake in the refinery, and in 2017 purchased the other 50% to become sole owner. Saudi 
Aramco’s ownership of the United States’ largest refinery is a repeated theme in the KXL comment 
data, as commenters remark that “some may point to the financial benefits of the pipeline. However, 
the money is not even supporting us. Instead, it goes to a refinery in Saudi Arabia, a country notorious 
for human rights violations” (KXL 2.6). The implication of these comments is that a country with a 
history of inadequate social or environmental protections should not benefit from economic 
relationships with the United States.  
Commenters are similarly concerned with the risk/benefit calculation with regards to Saudi 
Arabia, apprehensive that the United States takes on the burden of environmental risks while Saudi 
Arabia, via its ownership of the Motiva refinery, is a beneficiary, “how is it in America's interest to 
transport foreign oil through environmentally sensitive wetlands in North Dakota to an oil refinery 
owned by Saudi Arabia? It may be in Trump's interest because he and Kushner have business 
dealings with the Saudis, but it is not in the national interest” (KXL 2.7). Similar to concerns 
regarding Canada and China, commenters’ issues stem from the fact that on a surface reading, the 
United States takes on the risk of KXL while other countries reap the benefits. However, as discussed 
above, it is more complex than that, as KXL does contribute to American supply of oil. However, it 
should be emphasized that these comments are concerned with Saudi Arabia and China on the basis 
of ‘acceptability’—that these countries are undeserving of the economic benefits of such a pipeline—
are couched in general anti-globalization sentiment. 
The NGP case particularly emphasizes the environmental and human rights records of China. 
While both cases are large pipelines with global implications in terms of trade and exports, the 
comments in the NGP case focus on China. Enbridge proposed that diversifying Canada’s export 
partners with regards to oil and gas was one justification for the project, given that 97% of Canadian 
petroleum exports went to the United States in 2019 (Natural Resources Canada 2020), and that the 
Canadian sector has been extremely dependent on the United States as an export destination for as 
 
 99 
long as Canada has been a net oil producer. The prospect of opening up Asian markets, particularly 
Chinese markets, via a west coast pipeline and marine terminal was touted as a necessity for 
diversifying the Canadian oil and gas market. And in fact, the vast majority of oil shipped through 
NGP would have been shipped to China where it would have been refined and then consumed 
domestically or sold to neighbouring countries like Japan, South Korea, and eventually further afield 
to India and beyond (Lemphers and Gilchrist 2011b). Notably, Chinese state-owned energy company 
Sinopec was part of an international consortium that contributed $100 billion CAD to the project (Tait 
2011). However, while this market diversification was one of the central justifications for determining 
NGP to be in the public interest, Chinese shippers and refineries remained contractually uncommitted 
throughout the process. Additionally, Chinese refining capacity has proven difficult to determine with 
vague and incomplete data, leading to concerns regarding where this oil would be going if NGP 
would be approved, and what the exact economic benefits would be to Canadians.  
The secrecy regarding shipping and refining contracts, as well as Chinese investment in 
Canadian oil sands projects, led to frustration within the NGP public comments. Commenters 
emphasized that “China has one of the worst environmental destruction records in recent history and 
the thought of their oil tankers navigating the narrows in and around the many islands from open 
ocean to the shore at Kitimat is frightening” (NGP 2.5). Additionally, commenters resisted the idea 
that a country with an unacceptable human rights record should benefit from Canadian natural 
resources, proposing that the “Joint Review Panel should also consider Asia as a beneficiary(sic) of 
bitumen supplied by Oil Sands and this Enbridge proposal. China in particular has a terrible human 
rights record” (NGP 2.6).  
In both the KXL and NGP cases, public comment data revealed an emphasis on several facets 
of energy security, both conventional and novel. Commenters in both cases were concerned about 
maintaining the affordability of domestic energy and of pursuing energy independence, both of which 
are fairly classic issues associated with the ‘affordability’ and ‘availability’ aspects of energy 
security. However, while pipelines are often associated with increasing the availability of energy 
(more pipelines=more oil), comments took the opposite road and proposed that fewer pipelines (at 
least, fewer international pipelines) would produce more energy independence. Lastly, comments 
emphasized a fairly novel aspect of ‘acceptability’ in energy security, which tends to focus on the 
acceptability of one energy source over another (ie. fossil fuels vs. renewable energy). But the 
comment data emphasized the acceptability of trade partners, with a desire that energy trade should 
have a more explicit ethical consideration.  
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3.5.4 The Regulators: Determining the National Interest  
In terms of energy security, the regulators themselves—the Joint Review Panel under the auspices of 
the NEB in the NGP case, and a multi-agency effort coordinated by the State Department in the KXL 
case—do require for firms to provide a justification for their proposed projects, both in terms of the 
chosen infrastructure characteristics (the specific routing decisions, placement of tank terminals) as 
well as the project as a whole. This is represented by firms’ submission of alternatives, including ‘no-
action’ alternatives, as well as the regulators final determination of the national interest.  
In the NGP case, Enbridge references energy security in a very conventional and narrow fashion; that 
this pipeline would increase demand for Western Canadian oil producers, focusing on the 
‘availability’ aspect of energy security, while bestowing economic benefit on all Canadians via 
resource revenues and some regionally concentrated employment opportunities. The initial Northern 
Gateway application from 2010 states that “the Project is needed to diversify markets for Canadian oil 
by connecting Canadian oil supply to rapidly growing markets in northeast Asia and elsewhere, which 
are driving increasing global demand for oil. The Project allows Canada to increase the security of its 
markets and add significantly to the benefits that Canadians derive from oil exports” (Northern 
Gateway Pipelines Limited Partnership 2010, 1–3).11  
As discussed above, concerns regarding the affordability aspect of energy security run 
rampant through the public comment data. Fuel prices are not addressed by the regulatory process as 
it is not within its scope, but Enbridge did enlist an external study on the economic benefits of the 
project for all Canadians, which would (ideally) offset any trickle-down effects of increased oil 
prices, stating that “although the net benefits to the Canadian oil industry resulting from the Project 
are very large, total benefits flowing to all Canadians are greater. Wright Mansell Research was 
retained to provide an independent assessment of the benefits of the Project from a Canadian public 
interest perspective. Over a 30-year operating period, Canadian gross domestic product (GDP) would 
increase by $270 billion. Additional labour income would be $48 billion, as a result of an additional 
558,000 person years of employment. Federal and provincial governments could collect an additional 
$81 billion in revenue” (Vol 2, p 1-13). However, while these forecasted monetary gains are indeed 
beneficial for Canadians, it is worth noting that the vast majority of employment opportunities for 
NGP (and in fact, most pipelines) are quite short-term and uncertain. Additionally, the Wright 
 




Mansell report is based on a set of very specific assumptions: that environmental policy does not 
develop to such an extent in the United States that demand for Canadian oil significantly declines; 
that environmental regulation does not develop to such an extent in Canada that Western Canadian oil 
production is forced to decline; that Canadian oil sands production almost triple by 2035, far beyond 
even the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers’ (CAPP) most ambitious forecast at the time 
(Lemphers and Gilchrist 2011b). In terms of environmental policy forecasting, this report is also 
obviously skewed against environmental action, suggesting that “some highly visible and effective 
environmental groups have been very successful in painting the oil sands as an environmental villain, 
particularly in terms of GHG emissions and this appears to be having some effect on U.S. 
policymakers” (Vol 2 Appendix 1-5). 
Contrary to some of the views espoused in the public comments regarding the ethics of 
expanding the oil trade with China, Enbridge emphasized the benefits of market diversification that 
would result from increased access to China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and beyond. A 
conventional and narrow interpretation of the ‘availability’ aspect of energy security focuses on 
consistent demand and supply—for net energy exporters and importers, respectively—which an 
emphasis on oil market diversification aims to improve. Enbridge focused extensively on the potential 
exports to these markets via NGP, proposing that for the four countries listed, “the opportunity for 
Canadian-sourced supply to be approximately 278,700 m3/d (1,750 kbpd). This demonstrates there is 
ample refining capability for processing Canadian crude oil in targeted markets today without 
contemplating refinery conversions or additions that may occur in the future” (Vol 2 sec 1.3). 
Currently, China, Japan (the largest importer of crude oil in Asia), South Korea, and Taiwan are 
mostly supplied by Saudi Arabia, through longer and more constricted shipping routes than NGP (Vol 
2, sec 1.3). Additionally, Enbridge projected increased access to refining areas on the west coast of 
the United States, many of which were already refining Canadian crude oil imported from the Trans 
Mountain pipeline and via tanker (Vol 2 sec 1.3), offering an alternative American destination than 
the Gulf Coast refineries.  
However, while Enbridge touted the benefits of northeast Asian trade relationships in its 
application for NGP, no long-term contracts with any entities based in these countries were made 
public at any point during the regulatory process. The lack of demonstrated demand for NGP, 
combined with an air of secrecy regarding several of Enbridge’s “Funding Participants”—referred to 
simply as a group of Canadian producers and East Asian refiners—feeds into issues of public 
perception. The lack of transparency surrounding NGP’s funding participants, coupled with increased 
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investment into the Canadian oil sands from Chinese firms, fueled concerns regarding China’s 
intentions for Canadian oil—whether it would be refined and sold on the open market, or offered at a 
discount to the domestic Chinese market (Lemphers and Gilchrist 2011b; Lee and Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives 2012). Due to Enbridge’s confidentiality agreements with its Funding 
Participants and a general lack of data regarding Chinese refining capacity, there is little evidence to 
support either viewpoint.  
In the KXL case, the justification for the project in terms of energy security was articulated in 
the several documents from both the initial national interest determination in 2014 and the re-
invigorated process in 2017. In the 2015 Record of Decision (ROD), the State Department 
emphasized that “no statute establishes criteria for this determination”, with regards to the national 
interest, and that “the Secretary has considered a range of factors, including but not limited to foreign 
policy; energy security; environmental, cultural, and economic impacts; and compliance with 
applicable law and policy”(Department Of State 2015, 3).  
Regarding the ‘availability’ variable of energy security, the ROD emphasized that any one 
pipeline project, including KXL, was unlikely to have significant impact on the rate of extraction in 
the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, and acknowledged the uncertainty of forecasting oil 
production and prices. The impact of one project, even one as large as KXL, on general oil 
development trends was negligible and difficult to determine because “the dominant drivers of oil 
sands development remain more global than any single infrastructure project. Oil sands production 
and investment could slow or accelerate depending on oil price trends, regulations, and technological 
developments, but the potential effects of those factors on the industry’s rate of expansion need not be 
conflated with the more limited effects of individual pipelines” (Department Of State 2015, 11). The 
State Department in their determination took a macro view of energy availability, pointing out that 
where one pipeline failed, others would succeed as long as demand exists. Other government 
departments contributed to the determination, and the Department of Energy’s 2015 memorandum is 
the most relevant with regards to energy security. The Department of Energy addressed issues of 
availability directly, stating that “Keystone will not appreciably change the current constraints of the 
US refinery system or the distribution of refined product (which increasingly relies on access to heavy 
crude)” (DOE 2015). Additionally, the DOE emphasized that as long as Canadian oil is extracted, 
even if it is not transported directly to American refineries, American energy security would be stable, 
“the security of the supply side - with a large portion of Canadian crude expected to flow to the US 
either by rail (as it is doing now), by barge, or even from coastal Canadian terminals supplied by 
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Canadian pipelines that then supply US refineries through tanker - are all likely to continue. If Canada 
decides not to move the oil to the US, but rather to export it to the global market through new 
Canadian port facilities, that will result in additional supply in the global system - essentially adding 
to US security, even if more indirectly”(Department of Energy 2015, 4). The Department of Energy is 
referencing the NGP project here, which had not yet been cancelled, as well as the Trans Mountain 
Expansion project. The Department of Energy also extends its comments on energy security beyond 
the conventional issues regarding continuity of supply and demand, and references statements from 
the G-7 groups in 2014 regarding the ‘acceptability’ dimension of energy security, which proposed 
that “reducing greenhouse gas emissions and accelerating the transition to a low carbon economy 
[are] key contributors to enduring energy security” (G7 Rome Energy Ministerial Meeting 2014)  
Further on the question of availability and accessibility, which Enbridge stressed in its regulatory 
application, the KXL national interest determination takes into account significant market 
opportunities. The 2014 ROD stresses the volatility of oil prices, coupled with the relative resiliency 
of Canadian oil production despite this volatility, as a reason to decouple analysis of KXL from the 
North American oil market as a whole (Department Of State 2015). The ROD also points out that 
unless oil prices consistently fall below $20-40 per barrel, existing extraction projects are unlikely to 
shut down, and therefore concurs with the 2014 Supplemental EIS that any one project will have 
negligible effects on the industry as a whole, due to existing pipeline capacities and (admittedly 
uncertain) production forecasts (Department Of State 2015, 11). 
It is worth noting that while several government departments and TC Energy itself prepared 
comments in support of the national interest determination, these comments were not always 
ideologically aligned; the Market Analysis documents emphasized the impact of KXL on industry and 
future oil prices in particular, where the Department of Energy and State Department downplayed 
these impacts. Conversely, in the Market Analysis section prepared by TC Energy, the need for stable 
sources of crude oil for Gulf Coast refiners was identified, stating “there is existing demand by Gulf 
Coast area refiners for stable sources of crude oil….Currently, refiners in the Gulf Coast area 
obtain heavy crude oil primarily via waterborne foreign imports, but the reliability of those 
supplies is uncertain because of declining production and political uncertainty associated with the 
major traditional suppliers, notably Mexico and Venezuela. The additional supply of light crude 
oil from formations like the Bakken is expected to enable domestic refiners to reduce their 
imports of more expensive (light and possibly medium gravity sweet), imported waterborne 
crude oil” (Vol 1.4, 8). Interestingly, TC Energy also references the “acceptability” of trade 
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partners here, although directs its reservations towards Mexico and Venezuela as opposed to 
China or Saudi Arabia.  
The re-application process under the Trump Administration, which culminated in the 2017 
Record of Determination in favour of KXL, utilized almost all of the same documents as the Obama-
era process, with small edits throughout. Most notably for issues of energy security, the 2017 ROD 
added that  
“the [State] Department finds that the proposed Project will meaningfully 
support U.S. energy security by providing additional infrastructure for the 
dependable supply of crude oil. Global energy security is a vital part of U.S. 
national security…. historically, oil has been a major source of U.S. energy 
security concerns due to our relatively high volume of net imports, and oil’s 
economic importance and military uses.  Such concerns are well founded. 
Over the past year, crude oil supply disruptions internationally have 
trended noticeably higher when controlling for Iran’s return to the 
international oil market….Canada has a low likelihood of political unrest, 
resource nationalism, or conflict—above-ground factors that sometimes 
disrupt oil production in other regions….Moreover, as the Canadian 
Government’s conditional approval of the Trans Mountain pipeline 
illustrates, failure to approve new transboundary pipeline infrastructure 
may redirect this source of reliable supply to Asian markets”(State 
Department 2017, 27–28) 
It is worth noting that this document does not provide data for its assertion that the frequency 
of crude oil supply disruptions had increased due to increased production from Iran, which did 
increase oil production from 2015-2018 but not beyond historical fluctuations since 1990 (Trading 
Economics 2020). Lastly, the 2017 ROD significantly reduces engagement with the issue of climate 
change, stating only that approving the project would not undermine American climate change efforts 
domestically or abroad. 
3.6 Discussion: Using Regulators to Support Political Goals   
There are several crucial differences between the American and Canadian cases. First, since cross-
border pipelines are solely executive decisions in the American context, there is no legal requirement 
to line up with NEPA or other legislation, although as a matter of convention these regulations are 
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often consulted. In the Canadian case, all interprovincial and international pipelines are subject to the 
same legislative requirements despite the executive role in ultimately accepting or rejecting the 
recommendation of the NEB. Second, in Canada the firm (or its contractors) prepares the 
Environmental Impact Statements, records of community consultation, and market analysis; in the 
American process several entities (including the firm) prepare contributions, although the State 
Department makes the final decision. It cannot be concluded that government-led impact assessments 
are more or less robust in these cases, but private firms have different interests than governments, 
which have competing internal interests. These competing interests can certainly affect the 
preparation of regulatory documents; for instance, Enbridge emphasized the importance of NGP to 
the wider Canadian oil sector, whereas the State Department explicitly acknowledged that one project 
would not make or break the oil industry. However, this does support the outsize role of Cabinet in 
the American context specifically; not only is the State Department leading the regulatory process, 
but other departments prepare most of the assessments and advice. There is no veneer of procedural 
independence in the United States, while in the Canadian context Cabinet still has veto power, there 
are instances where the NEB provides advice contrary to Cabinet decisions, as in the NGP case which 
the NEB approved subject to hundreds of conditions. In the United States, the production of these 
complex technical socio-environmental assessments is crucial for maintaining transparency and safety 
standards; but these regulatory assessments support the preference and broader political goals of 
Cabinet and the President. By comparison, the Canadian regulators are explicitly accountable to their 
own mandate and process, although Cabinet still maintains veto power.  
  These bureaucratic processes point to another underlying difference between Canada and the 
United States; the role that executive power plays not just in approving or rejecting these projects, but 
in deciding which issues are worthy of in-depth analysis. In both the NGP and KXL cases, executive 
power ultimately made the final decision to reject the pipelines. In the NGP case, Liberal Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed the cancellation of the project after years of judicial challenge at 
both the provincial and federal level. In the case of KXL, also after years of controversy regarding 
Indigenous rights and environmental conservation, Democrat President Barack Obama rejected the 
project; after his election, Republican President Donald Trump approved it; and in January 2021 
Democrat Joe Biden again cancelled the project, primarily citing climate change concerns as reason to 
reject KXL. Despite overtures of regulatory independence, particularly from the NEB, it is clear that 
decisions on these large pipeline projects are ultimately in the hands of the executive, divorcing these 
regulatory decisions from any sense of non-partisanship.  
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This lack of ‘objective’ regulation can be seen in the ways that the ROD from KXL framed 
energy security broadly in 2014 and then 2017; although the documents are almost identical, the 
Republican administration simply dismissed Democrat concerns regarding climate change and 
community consultation and proposed their own version of events that prioritized industrial 
development and strengthening ties with proven allies like Canada. And the fact that these decisions 
are made not by regulators, but by Cabinets, is partially due to the ways that regulators define (or, in 
this case, do not define) controversial issues like energy security. The narrowness of regulator’s 
interpretation of energy security, focused on continuous supplies of affordable oil resources, raises 
questions about the legitimacy and decision-making capabilities of these institutions. If regulators 
cannot satisfactorily account for issues like energy security, then decisions are either overturned (as in 
NGP) or re-assessed (KXL). Neither of these decisions was made solely on grounds of energy 
security, but as one component of a vast network of opposition. We cannot know the outcomes if 
energy security was interpreted more broadly and sustainably, but many of the criticisms of these 
projects may have been dealt with, or the projects themselves cancelled earlier with much less firm 
investment or regulatory volatility.  
There are also clear divisions (and points of agreement) between how the public comments 
submitted for both projects interpret energy security, and how the regulators and governments of the 
time interpret the same issue. In the KXL case, for the Democrats, climate change was the most 
pressing energy security issue, whereas for the Republicans in 2017, ensuring continuity of supply 
from a trusted and stable ally was of the upmost importance. But the public comments from the 
second KXL process indicate that, much like the initial 2014 ROD indicated, climate change as an 
issue of ‘acceptability’ in energy security ultimately renders the project unacceptable. The Democrats 
in 2014 and 2021 agreed with this sentiment; the Republicans in 2017 did not. Interestingly, there is a 
significant point of agreement between the 2017 State Department ROD and the public comments, 
despite the majority of commenters expressing their opposition to the Trump Administration 
generally. In both the public comments and the 2017 ROD, encouraging energy independence and 
affordability were cited as areas of concern. The Republican State Department interpreted these 
concerns to justify approving the project; public comments conversely opposed the project due to a 
perceived lack of benefits for Americans.  
In the NGP case, the divisions between firms, regulators, and public comments are clearer. 
Public comments denounced the building of a pipeline solely for exporting crude oil on the grounds 
of a perceived lack of refining capacity, and like their American counterparts, questioned the benefits 
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for Canadians. Conversely, Enbridge and the NEB emphasized the potential (although uncertain) 
economic and employment benefits that would result from the project, and in particular framed the 
diversification of export partners as a primary reason for approval. Ultimately, the Liberal Trudeau 
government cancelled the project on grounds of negative impacts to Indigenous communities and 
vulnerable ecosystems rather than conventional energy security concerns.  
Lastly, and most novel in discussions of energy security, is the notion of ‘acceptable’ trade 
partners. Neither the United States nor Canada have been particularly circumspect when it comes to 
cultivating trade partners in the oil sector; while sanctions are often applied to individuals (and even 
more rarely, an entire country) in response to human rights abuses, this rarely translates to the 
widescale circumvention of oil exports to a particular state. In energy security scholarship 
specifically, ‘acceptability’ usually refers to the type of energy source that is being 
extracted/consumed, or the inequities inherent in one type of energy extraction vs. another, rather than 
which regime is doing the extracting/consuming.  In particular, there has been significant attention 
paid to the acceptability of continued dependence on fossil fuels in a world increasingly impacted by 
climate change (Bradshaw 2014; Proedrou 2018). Additionally, scholarship on energy poverty—
discussing which groups have access to certain types of energy, which groups would be 
disadvantaged by transitions to alternative energies—propagates the energy security niche (Benjamin 
K. Sovacool 2012b; Ali et al. 2020). However, the public comments from NGP and KXL bring up a 
relatively new aspect to this discussion of acceptability; how do we decide which regimes are 
‘acceptable’ trade partners, and how do we balance a principled approach to trade with other aspects 
of energy security, like affordability or accessibility? These questions are beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it is worth noting that these questions do not disappear with a transition away from fossil 
fuel dependence. The fact that both Canada and the United States have elected to cast a wide net for 
their energy trade partners suggests that for most states, the economic benefit of natural resources 
outweighs the moral pitfalls of pursuing trade relationships with certain regimes. This is not to say 
that the concerns of these public comments, which mostly tout isolationist (and often racially 
charged) adages about the dangers of China and Saudi Arabia should be taken as a blueprint for 
foreign policy, but rather to reveal an under-explored aspect of energy security and to emphasize the 
‘oil development equals energy security’ mindset of most Canadian and American governments for 
the last several decades, regardless of the colour scheme of the executive.  
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3.7 Conclusion  
Relying on the “Four A’s” framework of energy security, with particular attention paid to the aspects 
of ‘availability’ and ‘acceptability’, this paper investigated the interpretation of energy security by oil 
pipeline regulators and the governance gap between these institutions and the public interest they 
claim to represent. Analysis of the public comment data revealed several points of similarity between 
the NGP and KXL cases. Commenters in both cases were concerned about the energy independence 
of their states, with an emphasis in the NGP case on increasing domestic refining capacity (as 
opposed to shipping oil to Asia for refining/selling, as NGP proposed to do), whereas the KXL 
commenters desired an increase in domestic oil extraction, refining, and consumption. These 
comments did simplify or disregard some facts of the global energy marketplace; Canada does refine 
a significant amount of oil (and produces more than domestic demand), and the United States 
produces a lot of oil (although not enough to satisfy domestic demand). Additionally, the goal of 
‘energy independence’ may be at odds with concerns regarding affordability, which were also 
examined in both cases. Finally, and most novel for theories of energy security, both sets of 
comments revealed an unwillingness to allow certain states to receive the benefit of these pipeline 
projects; namely China and Saudi Arabia, whose NOC owns the largest oil refinery in the United 
States. It is worth noting, however, that many of these types of comments proposed reduced trade 
relationships with these countries on the one hand, while touting xenophobic ideologies directed at 
these states on the other; hardly the stuff of ethical trade policy. But ultimately, oil producers want to 
sell to those who will buy. And this particular trend in the comments tells us that people are thinking 
about the consumption of these fossil fuel products in addition to the extraction and transportation, 
which presents a potential new facet of ‘acceptability’ in energy security theory. 
Conversely, regulators addressed these issues of availability and acceptability from a much 
different perspective; in both the NGP and KXL cases, the prospect of market diversification (from 
both a demand and supply perspective) was frequently utilized as justification for the projects, and the 
potential economic benefits were proposed to outweigh any changes in fuel prices that would result 
from the pipelines’ operation.  
So what does this tell us about how regulators are interpreting energy security? Ultimately, 
regulators are (for the most part) emphasizing narrow and conventional interpretations of energy 
security, focused on maintaining continuity of a relatively inexpensive supply of oil. Market forecasts 
submitted to regulators do reckon with the rise of renewable energies but are ultimately dismissed due 
to projections that oil demand will continue to increase globally (mostly in India and China) until at 
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least 2050. The outsize role of Cabinet in the decision-making process means that regulatory advice is 
either in service of (in the United States) or secondary to (in Canada) broader energy security goals. 
The trends identified in the public comment data indicates a desire for energy security to be 
characterized more sustainably and equitably, but this is not paralleled in pipeline regulators nor in 
the regimes that ultimately make the decisions. 
This project has a few limitations to consider, which may be mitigated in future research. 
First, only two pipelines were compared, and so broader conclusions about the changing relationship 
between fossil fuel development and energy security cannot be drawn. However, KXL and NGP were 
two large, controversial pipelines, and the lessons learned here may be replicable in future case 
studies, paving the way for those types of discussions. Second, and has already been discussed, is the 
bias in public comment data against these projects. There is a great deal of utility in these comments, 
and the issues raised in them are important for the way that we assess energy security; but they 
represent one piece of the puzzle, and most Americans and Canadians are not overly concerned about 
the energy security implications of oil pipelines. So, while this opinion data can tell us a lot about the 
perceived governance gaps regarding energy security and pipelines we need to be cautious not to take 
this microcosm of opinion as representative of the whole population. There are several avenues for 
future research beyond additional case studies. An investigation of how these energy security issues 
play out in other contexts like fossil fuel extraction sites and renewable energy developments would 
give more nuance to the increasingly complex ways that scholars, institutions, and citizens conceive 
of energy security.  
There is a disconnect between these regulators, the citizens they represent, and the 
administrations they serve. In the public comment data, we see a much broader set of energy security 
concerns, ranging from climate change, ethical trade, and lack of direct economic benefit for those 
that take on the risks of these pipelines. And in both cases, governments rejected or cancelled these 
projects; in the Canadian case, indicating a regulator that is out of step with its own government, and 
in the American case, emphasizing the ideological and political basis of these international pipeline 
decisions, since they are coordinated by the State Department. In both cases, we see that these 
regulatory institutions suffer from a lack of mandate and lack of capacity, and are largely unwilling or 





In whose Interests? Interpreting the Public Interest in Pipeline 
Regulation  
Oil pipelines have been the subject of intense contestation in the last several decades. 
Regulatory mechanisms that are responsible for assessing the socio-environmental impacts of 
these projects have failed to do so in a manner that satisfies environmental, social, and cultural 
civil society groups who argue that the risks of these projects far outweigh the supposed 
economic benefits. This paper will argue that while the issues that these regulatory mechanisms 
have been asked to address have evolved, the opportunities for public participation and for the 
representation of the public interest have not evolved concurrently or to the same extent.  Two 
case studies, the Northern Gateway pipeline in Canada and the Keystone XL pipeline in the 
United States, will be compared for their interpretation of the public interest. Qualitative 
content analysis will be used to analyse public comments submitted for both projects, as well as 
regulatory compliance documents prepared by the firms/regulators themselves. Regulators rely 
on narrow definitions of their public interest mandate which no longer reflect many of the 
concerns that the public has about the risks of these pipelines. It will be concluded that despite 
significant organizational evolution, these institutions still fail to integrate broad socio-
environmental concerns in any meaningful way, and their advice is ultimately secondary to 
executive decision-making, despite a façade of institutional independence and non-partisanship.  
4.1 Introduction  
Oil pipeline regulators in both Canada and the United States rely on ‘science-based’ regulation to 
identify risks to local communities and assess whether these projects are in the public interest. These 
types of risks are the most obvious, due to their immediate and direct impact (for instance, a pipeline 
rupture near a town’s water supply), however there is a significant portion of the public that is 
opposed to these projects on the grounds of more diffuse and indirect risks. Issues like climate 
change, energy affordability, Indigenous rights, and ecosystem degradation are all increasingly salient 
issues in the public interest, as is shown by consistent contestation via protest and other large activist 
movements in the past decade.  However, the interpretation of these complex, cross-jurisdictional 
issue by pipeline regulators has not evolved in step with the public perception of these risks. This 
paper will use theories of regulatory capitalism and the public interest to investigate how the 
Canadian and American regulatory processes for oil pipelines have characterized the public interest in 
their decision-making processes.  Ultimately, oil pipelines in both countries rely on “science-based” 
regulation to identify risks to local communities, largely to do with spill potential and accident 
response measures (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014; McBeath 2016; Carpenter and Moss 2013). 
These types of risks are the most obvious and direct, but the emphasis on this narrow lens of social 
and environmental impacts disregards detrimental effects which occur beyond the temporal and 
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spatial scope of spills and accidents which occur on the pipeline route, like climate change or broader 
ecosystem degradation. However, there is a significant portion of the public that is opposed to the 
construction and operation of new major oil pipelines, whose concerns are a matter of public record 
but rarely formally addressed in the regulatory process of either country. Energy regulation was 
originally conceived as largely economic in both the United States and Canada. Only since the 
1970s/1980s have concerns regarding the public interest and public participation become the 
motivating factor behind regulation, as civil society groups and individual citizens became 
increasingly concerned with the socio-environmental impacts of these infrastructure projects (Doern, 
Prince, and Schultz 2014; McBeath 2016).  
This paper will argue that while the issues that these regulatory mechanisms have been asked 
to address have evolved, the opportunities for public participation and for the representation of the 
public interest have not evolved concurrently or to the same extent.  Two case studies, the Northern 
Gateway pipeline in Canada and the Keystone XL pipeline in the United States, will be compared for 
their interpretation of the public interest. Qualitative content analysis will be used to analyse public 
comments submitted for both projects, as well as regulatory compliance documents prepared by the 
firms/regulators themselves.  
This paper will begin with an overview of the regulatory processes in the USA and Canada, 
both of which were developed largely to address economic concerns and have now evolved to deal 
with social and environmental issues. It will then move to an in-depth discussion of trends identified 
in public comment data—the nature of these perceived gaps in the regulatory process, if/how they are 
addressed, and how industry (in these cases: Enbridge and TransCanada) have responded. Theories of 
public interest regulation and regulatory capitalism will be used to explain these developments—in 
short, that these mechanisms were not adequately designed to represent the public interest but rather 
to promote oil and gas development, resulting in a state of co-regulation between government and 
industry in pursuit of a specific economic goal, rather than a system of rule-setting and enforcement 
in pursuit of representing the broader (and more nuanced) public interest (Braithwaite 2011; Levi-
Faur 2005; 2013; Carrigan and Coglianese 2011; Levine and Forrence 1990; Pal and Maxwell 2004).  
The paper will proceed with a discussion of public risk perception, public interest regulation, and 
regulatory capitalism in order to set the boundaries of the public interest and mandates of regulatory 
institutions. Then, an overview of the two pipeline regulators in question, the National Energy Board 
(NEB) and State Department, will be given with particular attention to how these institutions have 
been inherently political since their creation. Finally, major trends and themes from the public 
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comment data will be examined, and compared to other facets of the regulatory process in order to 
expose the governance gaps between how these regulators characterize the nature of the public 
interest, and how that characterization fails when applied to increasingly cross-jurisdictional and 
indirect impacts of oil pipelines. It will be concluded that despite significant organizational evolution 
these institutions still fail to interpret their public interest mandate in ways that address many 
significant public concerns, and their advice is ultimately secondary to executive decision-making, 
despite a façade of institutional independence and non-partisanship. 
4.2 Regulating Risk: Public Interest and Public Perception 
4.2.1 Public Perception of Risk 
The public comment data used this for this project focuses on individual and collective perceptions of 
the risks/benefits associated with pipeline operations, so we must situate this data within the literature 
on risk perception despite the analytical focus on institutional dynamics. The analytical focus is on 
regulatory institutions, of which these comments are an integral component. The literature on risk 
construction and perception is less useful for analyzing these institutional processes, although it does 
help contextualize the environment in which these issues are becoming increasingly salient (Hood et 
al. 1999; Sjöberg 1999). Risk perception scholarship tends to focus on the complexities of collective 
risk creation, rather than on political institutions, although public trust of institutions is a factor on 
risk perceptions (E. K. Smith and Mayer 2018). This project is ultimately concerned not with the 
dynamics of risk perception, but with how regulatory institutions respond to those perceptions as they 
evolve. The focus here is on institutional interpretation of these complex socio-environmental risks, 
not on the collective construction of those risks; hence the use of regulatory capitalism which has 
more applicability to institutional dynamics. Additionally, the subject of analysis here are the 
regulatory processes themselves, of which public comments are a crucial component; while these 
comments may, in a future project, have some insights for the nature of risk construction, they also 
represent the only opportunity for individual, non-affiliated citizens to participate in these regulatory 
processes.  
The uncertainty that accompanies many of these new threats, especially a complex problem 
like climate change, has led to a re-conceptualization of security dynamics, away from the ‘state vs. 
human’ security debate and towards ideas of threat prevention and management. Sociologists Ulrich 
Beck and Anthony Giddens suggested the idea of a ‘world risk society’ as a new paradigm for these 
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contemporary security relationships (Beck 1992; Giddens 1999). Ulrich Beck defined the world risk 
society as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernisation itself” (Beck 1999, 146); Beck suggests that this society is characterized by a greater 
number of risks that are unbounded and potentially catastrophic, that can affect regions beyond where 
they originated (Beck 1999). Climate change and energy security fit this description well, particularly 
because Beck defined the risk society partly in response to his own work on ecological disasters. 
Beck stated in 2006 that previous iterations of risk were based on “the scientific utopia of making the 
unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever more controllable; accidents could occur, as long 
as and because they were considered as compensable”, but in our contemporary risk society, this idea 
of compensation “breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention” 
(Beck 2006). Giddens emphasized the shift from natural to technological or manufactured risk, which 
are effects of scientific/technological knowledge and political decision-making (Giddens 1999). This 
“end of nature”, where almost all natural processes are affected by human decision-making, 
represents a turning point in our perception of risk as “we stopped worrying so much about what 
nature could do to us, and we started worrying more about what we have done to nature” (Giddens 
1999). 
This idea of the risk society and the end of nature feeds directly into the issues identified in 
these public comments. As psychologist Paul Slovic noted, the way that individuals perceive risk is 
based on a variety of internal and external forces: the inability to understand probabilistic 
occurrences, biased media reporting, emphasis on personal experiences, and anxieties related to 
uncertainty (Slovic 1987). Additionally, economic interests, cultural values, and intuitive biases also 
play a role in risk perception (Kasperson et al. 1988). This construction of risk is obvious in the 
comment data; commenters cited previous oil spills (like the 2010 Kalamazoo River spill in 
Michigan) as a reason to deny these newer pipeline proposals, despite increased requirements for 
pipeline integrity for both KXL and NGP and the unlikelihood of such large spills. While risk 
perception is a result of all these multiple and coinciding factors, technical risk assessment tends to 
focus more narrowly on the probability of an event, and the magnitude of its consequences 
(Kasperson et al. 1988). This tends to leave impacts that will affect the future, or affect space beyond 
a specific local boundary, out of risk assessment; and this is certainly reflected in the procedures for 
both regulators under examination here. An emphasis on short-term, localized impacts by institutions 
has left many, with a more complex (although sometimes distorted) perception of the risks posed by 
these pipelines, to believe that these institutions are not acting in the public interest. This paper asks 
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these questions from the institutional side, examining the purpose of such narrow definitions of risk 
and impacts, and the consequences of failing to apply a broader interpretation of the public interest.  
4.2.2 The Public Interest and Regulatory Capture 
The contemporary regulatory state largely rests on the concept of the ‘public interest’—the idea that 
state-sponsored regulation is meant to protect social welfare as opposed to private stakeholder 
interests—known as the public interest theory of regulation (Posner 1974). Beginning in the 1950s in 
most wealthy industrialized nations (including Canada and the United States), consumer safety was 
given serious consideration in sectors like agriculture and food production, and environmental site 
assessments and hazard assessments were integrated into the regulatory compliance process for a 
variety of large  infrastructure projects, including oil pipelines (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014). The 
broad trend was towards regulatory agencies that were more inclusive of consumer safety, 
environmental sustainability, and measures to reduce vulnerability in an effort to both protect the 
public and encourage economic growth (Levine and Forrence 1990).  
However, while there was a proliferation of regulatory mechanisms in the post-war period 
and the pursuit of the ‘public interest’ was recognized as an explicit goal of regulation, in practice the 
operation of regulatory governance was seen to be less than ideal. Criticism of the public interest 
theory intimated that the idea was overly normative, and did not reflect real-world experiences 
(Levine and Forrence 1990; Laffont and Tirole 1991). Access to regulatory mechanisms can be 
restricted to political and economic elites; inefficacies in the system can privilege certain technologies 
and innovations over others; regulatory bodies can be manipulated by the very actors they are meant 
to regulate (Levine and Forrence 1990). The presence of such failures in the regulatory state led to the 
rise of alternative explanatory theories, more positive than normative, the ‘economic theory of 
regulation’, or capture theory, principal amongst them.  
Fundamentally, capture theory is the idea that in practice, regulatory mechanisms can evolve to 
facilitate private interests over the public interest (Stigler 1971). Many empirical studies of the 
regulatory capture phenomenon focus on institutions that were created to ensure the public good, but 
whose mechanisms have been manipulated by powerful, well-organized private sector actors 
(Portman 2014; Carpenter and Moss 2013). This theory came to prominence in the 1960s, with the 
work of economists like George Stigler, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, and George Tsebelis, and 
has remained a fundamental pillar of regulation theory since. This work has several central tenets: 
that private sector actors are no different than individuals and will pursue advantageous policies; that 
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these actors can coordinate better than other civil society groups; and that regulation is itself a product 
that can be acquired by industry (Downs 1957; Olson 1965; Stigler 1971; Tsebelis 2002). It should be 
noted that ‘capture’ is not a dichotomous condition, but a scalar one.  
Capture theory proposes that the regulatory state, despite good intentions, can be manipulated 
by private sector interests. This has serious implications for North American energy infrastructure, 
due to the oft-controversial nature of contemporary pipeline projects and increasing uncertainty 
regarding regulatory processes, especially in Canada where most large pipelines proposed in the last 
decade have failed after years of contestation. However, while industry influence on regulatory 
agencies is undeniable in some instances, the strength of this influence ebbs and flows across regimes, 
administrations, and institutions (Carrigan and Coglianese 2011). Both public interest regulation and 
capture theory seek to analyze the purpose of regulatory mechanisms and the interaction between the 
regulator, the regulated, and the consumers of the regulated product. The theory of regulatory 
capitalism goes one step further, suggesting that these institutions were not created with the public 
interest in mind, but that these institutions were in fact created to facilitate industrial development and 
growth rather than constrain these activities in any meaningful way. 
4.2.3 Regulatory Capitalism 
As a critical counterweight to public interest and capture theories, the theory of regulatory capitalism 
suggests that the goal of regulation is not to protect the public good (even under capture theory, 
regulatory agencies rarely start out captured), but rather as a tool of capital accumulation (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2001). As defined by David Levi-Faur, regulatory capitalism suggests that “regulation 
made, nurtured and constrained the capitalist system and capitalism creates the demand for 
regulation” (Levi-Faur 2017). In regulatory capitalism, the links between political economy and 
regulation scholarship become most explicit due to the emphasis on the state-market relationship as 
cyclical and interdependent (Levi-Faur 2005). Under a framework of regulatory capitalism, regulatory 
mechanisms are one of many institutions that constitute the capitalist state, and can be manipulated to 
cultivate strategies of commodity accumulation, the raison d’être of capitalism. 
In the 1990s, after a period of de-regulation in the 1980s in most liberal democracies, a kind 
of “regulatory explosion” took place, with a rapid and sharp increase in the number and mandate of 
regulatory agencies (Braithwaite 2008). To some scholars, notably John Braithwaite, David Levi-
Faur, and Jacint Jordana, this represented a shift in the way we think about regulation; the concept of 
the ‘regulatory state’ seemed to place too much emphasis on state actors, without accounting for 
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broader global social/political/economic forces; but neither public interest regulation nor capture 
theory could explain this rapid expansion in regulatory services(Braithwaite 2008; Jordana and Levi-
Faur 2004; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005a; Levi-Faur 2017). So the theory of ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
was instead proposed; that regulation was increasingly transforming into a part of government, with 
all its associated ideological accoutrements, rather than an administrator to ensure the provision of 
public and private services (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Braithwaite 2008).  
Regulatory capitalism pushes back against the idea that neoliberalism has been the guiding 
institutional principle of politics since the 1970s. Neoliberalism as a concept is somewhat contentious 
in both scholarship and beyond; but broadly, under a neoliberal directive, there is a tendency towards 
privatization, deregulation, and ‘small government’ (Castree 2008b; MacNeil 2014a; McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004). And there were deregulatory impulses in the 1980s across the world; as evidenced by 
the Thatcher regime in the UK and Reagan administration in the US, the Mulroney Conservatives in 
1984, and beyond in Europe, Latin America, and Australia (Quirk and Derthick 1985; Braithwaite 
2008). But as Levi-Faur and Jordana posited, the regulatory explosion in the 1990s suggests that 
deregulatory impulses were short-lived; we have been in a broad period of ‘re-regulation’ (in terms of 
regulatory agencies and rule-setting) for decades (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004).  
In summary, regulatory capitalism takes this notion of regulation as a tool of state power one 
step further, intimating that increased regulation, both from within the state and without, actually 
further entrenches global capitalist power structures by privileging large multinational corporations 
(MNCs). These firms are often well-equipped to satisfy a heavy regulatory burden and they have the 
technical expertise and financial resources to propose regulations that privilege their business 
development. Regulatory capitalism, and this is borne out by the evolution of regulatory institutions 
globally, suggests that both markets and the state have become stronger, and regulatory institutions 
have evolved to strengthen the state-market relationship rather than act as a bureaucratic bulwark 
between the two. The state increasingly shares governance with non-state actors (like industry 
associations, NGOs, civil society organizations, etc.), but the wealth and market power that is 
produced under contemporary capitalist structures in turn gives states the capacity to regulate more 
than ever, therefore maintaining its own power over market forces.  
4.3 The Politicization of Pipeline Regulation 
Energy regulation was originally conceived as largely economic in both the United States and 
Canada, and the economic factors of regulation (ie. setting toll and tariff rates) remain central to the 
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process in both countries. To “intervene” in the regulatory process in the United States and Canada, a 
person or organization must prove a direct impact of the proposed pipeline, and the burden of proof is 
high. In the Northern Gateway process, the vast majority of intervenors represented municipalities or 
landowners that were geographically located directly along the pipeline route. In the Keystone XL 
process, the opportunities to participate meaningfully are even fewer; for the most part, only federal 
agencies and some Indigenous groups can officially participate; most other engagement is via legal 
challenge.  For all other Canadians and Americans who feel impacted by a proposed project, there are 
multiple opportunities to record a public statement of support or opposition—which are theoretically 
available to regulatory agencies throughout the process—in practice these are rarely addressed 
explicitly. Ultimately this is where accusations of regulatory capture or failure come to light; these 
processes define ‘impacts’ extremely specifically and locally (usually disregarding broader second-
order impacts that occur outside of a certain region, like climate change or ecosystem degradation), 
shutting out interested parties which do not operate directly on the pipeline route, whereas industry 
stakeholders have nearly constant access to the regulator. And there is certainly a close relationship 
between pipeline regulators and regulated companies; for instance, most regulatory officials have 
worked in industry for at least some time in order to accrue the technical expertise required to 
evaluate these complex pieces of infrastructure(Taft 2017; Meghani and Kuzma 2011; Graham, 
Carroll, and Chen 2019). But while there are often “revolving doors” between industry and 
regulator—where personnel move between private firms and regulatory institutions, bringing with 
them highly specialized knowledge but also potentially eroding public trust in  institutions and 
encouraging industry bias—we rarely see environmental or consumer safety organizations have the 
same kind of access (Meghani and Kuzma 2011; Hong and Lim 2016).  
In Canada, the NEB was created in 1959 with an initial mandate to both direct and regulate 
the economic aspects of energy extraction and transportation. Additionally, the NEB was initially 
directed to develop a national energy policy, which made the Board a slightly anomalous regulator in 
that it was implicitly allowed not only to regulate industrial activity, but also to propose policy; 
however, no such national energy plan every came to fruition from the NEB, which chose to focus its 
efforts on increasing the trade relationship with the United States (Doern and Gattinger 2003). In its 
initial mandate as an economic regulator only, the NEB was meant to act as “a specialized, 
independent, impartial, non-partisan agency, employing a court-like process and [with] appropriate 
powers could defuse conflicts” (Doern and Gattinger 2003, 83). 
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When the NEB was created, the universe of interested parties was small due to the focus on 
the economic aspects of regulation, but with the emergence of consumer safety and environmental 
movements from the 1970’s onwards, the NEB has undergone a huge shift in mandate as diverse 
interests from a variety of public, private, and intergovernmental stakeholders recognized the impacts 
of the regulator’s decisions, and therefore pursued the right to participate in the decision-making 
process (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014; Schultz and Alexandroff 1985).The result of this explosion 
of new and diverse interest was the rapid politicization of the regulatory process as these new actors 
sought to benefit (or mitigate the harm of) regulatory decisions (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014). 
However, while this increase in the set of interested stakeholders certainly exacerbated and 
complicated the politicization of energy regulation, the NEB has never been, despite initial ambitions, 
a non-political or independent mechanism. Even in 1959, while the NEB could give advice on 
particular projects, the final decisions were to be approved by Cabinet, rendering the regulatory 
process inherently partisan. This has rendered these regulatory decisions volatile and uncertain, as one 
administration may overturn the previous’ regimes based on differing ideological or policy priorities 
(Hinte, Gunton, and Day 2007). Keystone XL epitomizes this problem, as the pipeline went through 
several rounds of approval/rejection before its eventual cancellation in 2021; although the saga 
continues as TC Energy moves forward with legal action against the United States government.  
However, the initial emphasis on preventing abuse of market power and the setting of tolls 
and tariffs largely shielded the NEB from societal socio-environmental concerns. As the potential 
risks of energy extraction and transportation became known, and became more salient to the general 
population, the NEB took on these additional aspects of regulation, and was given the resources to 
evaluate environmental impact assessments, Indigenous consultation, and social impacts, the details 
of which were laid out in the NEB Act of 1985 (National Energy Board Act 1985). But the initial 
mandate of the regulator—to prevent abuses of market power and ultimately facilitate resource 
development in Canada—never significantly changed. Specific social and environmental goals were 
never explicitly addressed in the NEB mandate, and only a vague direction to operate in the public 
interest steers the decision-making process; according to the Act, the NEB was simply meant to take 
into account “any public interest that in the Board’s opinion may be affected by the issuance of the 
certificate or the dismissal of the application” (National Energy Board Act 1985). This is extremely 
vague and allows for project-specific assessment guidelines, resulting in an environment of 
significant regulatory uncertainty for private firms and a lack of commitment to social, cultural, and 
environmental protection from the Canadian government. This lack of clarity calls into question how 
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the NEB is meant to evaluate the public interest without any clear explanation of the meaning of such 
a term.  
The story of unclear mandate and vague appeals to the public interest is similar in the United 
States, although the emphasis in the State Department, is in promoting the ‘national interest’ rather 
than acting as an economic regulator. It should be noted that while KXL was chosen as a case 
precisely for the somewhat atypically centralized federal coordination that a cross-border pipeline 
entails, federal regulatory processes do not parallel the institutions of individual states. In terms of 
domestic pipelines, both inter- and intra-state, federal departments have authority over specific areas 
of pipeline construction. In particular, the EPA manages the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and 
National Environmental Protection Act, while the PHMSA has some authority over pipeline 
accidents. However, most authority is delegated to state environmental and safety authorities. Even 
within the states, regulatory authority over oil pipelines is dispersed; for example, while the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality is the delegated authority for the EPA in matters of oil 
pipelines, the Texas Railroad Commission is the state regulator that ultimately approves or rejects 
pipeline projects, and their relationship is often contentious (McBeath 2016).  
The Bureau of Energy Resources (BER) within the State Department, which coordinates all 
federal and state authorities with regards to international pipelines like KXL, is much newer than 
Canada’s NEB (now CER) and was founded in 2011.  However, the State Department has been 
responsible for the regulatory processes of international pipelines since 2004, when President George 
W. Bush delegated that authority via Executive Order 13337.The official mandate of the BER and the 
State Department, which is subject to executive direction rather than legislative mandate like the NEB 
or CER, is to “to develop and execute international energy policy to promote: energy security for the 
United States and its partners and allies; U.S. economic growth that benefits American business and 
people; and global political stability and prosperity through energy development” (Bureau of Energy 
Resources 2020).  
Pipeline operators contend that pipelines are the best (safest and cheapest) method of crude 
oil transportation, and so it is in the national/public interest to build new pipelines since reliance on 
older pipelines increases risk. Pipeline firms operate on the assumption that without significant policy 
change, oil demand justifies new pipelines because that oil will be transported anyway; it should be 
transported by the safest and most efficient method. However, this logic further reveals the 
politicization of pipeline regulation; significant shifts in environmental policies both domestically and 
abroad indicate that the global oil demand that pipeline firms have relied upon for decades may be 
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decreasing (or at least, its growth may be slowing). Demand for oil is not an apolitical characteristic 
of the global marketplace, but rather has been a goal of industrialized states for almost a century to 
support rapid economic growth (Bridge 2008; Matt Huber 2013; DiMuzio 2014).This is not to say 
that economic regulation is unnecessary or incorrect, but simply that this type of regulation has never 
been apolitical, and the politicization of these regulators has increased significantly as the universe of 
interests has expanded to include social, cultural, and environmental issues. However, as the number 
of interested actors and the types of risks assessed has expanded, regulatory mechanisms have not 
fundamentally changed their mandates. There has been significant addition of socio-environmental 
assessment, but despite these assessments there is still significant and vocal opposition to these 
projects and the processes that govern them. Questions remain regarding the ability of these 
institutions to adequately assess these newer, more complex risks. By investigating the nature of these 
risks as they are perceived by the public, we can better understand the gap between the public interest 
as it is characterized by regulatory institutions and the facets of the public interest that are not yet 
accurately defined by these institutions. 
4.4 Methods 
This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the public comments and regulatory compliance 
documents of the Northern Gateway (NGP) and Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline projects, both of which 
were proposed to carry crude oil from Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands. Enbridge, Inc. (Enbridge) 
submitted their application to the NEB in 20120 for the twin NGP pipelines to carry 525,000 bpd to a 
new marine terminal in Kitimat, British Columbia.  
 
Figure 9: Route of Proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline (Enbridge 2010) 
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The KXL project, first proposed in 2008 by TransCanada Keystone Pipeline Limited (TransCanada) 
is an expansion of the current Keystone pipeline system (with a capacity of 590,000 bpd), and aims to 
carry 830,000 bpd to Steele City, Nebraska. KXL is the fourth phase of the larger Keystone system, 
which consists of the following segments: 
 
Figure 10: Keystone Pipeline System with proposed KXL extension route (Source: TC Energy) 
 These pipelines are comparable for several reasons:  
• they are both large pipelines which were developed in the mid-2000s, after regulators became 
responsible for a much broader set of socio-environmental issues;  
• they are subject to federal regulation as opposed to subnational, which is much more diverse 
and piecemeal in both Canada and the United States; 
• they have both been subject to significant controversy and opposition from landowners, 
environmental activists, and Indigenous communities (although the nature of this contestation 
is not the subject of this analysis);  
• they were both cancelled via Cabinet rejection 
This paper makes use of qualitative content analysis to establish the interpretation of the public 
interest by pipeline regulators, and the gaps in that governance perceived by a significant swath of the 
public itself. (Bowen 2009; Neal 2012). The activities of regulatory agencies and industry are 
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identified via relevant legislation, official mandates, and socio-environmental assessments prepared 
by firms or regulators themselves. The largest and most complex piece of the empirical results come 
from an analysis of public comment data. Regulatory processes in Canada and the United States allow 
for the submission of public comments regarding pipeline projects, which is largely unencumbered by 
rules or restrictions. 
While there was a sustained and relatively coordinated opposition to both Northern Gateway 
and Keystone XL, there is a significant amount of silent support for these projects as well; in 2016, 
30% of Canadians generally supported Northern Gateway and another 28% supported the project 
under certain conditions (Anderson and Coletto 2016).  In the lead-up to the revived Keystone XL 
hearing in 2017, 42% of Americans supported the project. This did decrease considerably from 2013, 
when the project was first proposed; then, 66% of Americans supported the project, showing a 
significant downward trend in the wake of publicized anti-pipeline protests and questions regarding 
the need to re-assess a project that had already been rejected (Suls 2017). 
Having said that, there is little doubt that Canadians and Americans feel that their voices are 
not being heard in their regulatory processes. Northern Gateway received over 5000 public 
comments, most opposed. Keystone XL received over 10,000 distinct comments in 2017, and 
thousands during the initial application process in 2013/2014.12 For this project, 750 comments from 
each project were randomly selected from online regulatory depositories (the NEB website for NGP, 
Regulations.gov for KXL). The KXL comments were selected from the 2017 process, as this round 
captured both the initial points of opposition as well as newer concerns that had propagated during the 
regulatory process. These comments were coded according to nature of opposition and support. 
Common trends and themes were analyzed in order to examine the perceived gaps in the regulatory 
process, and investigate how these concerns were being addressed. Due to the self-selection of 
commenters as overwhelmingly (strongly) opposed to these projects, these comments do not represent 
the whole of Canadian/American public opinion. However, this data still reveals the perceived gaps in 
regulatory governance, due to issues that are consistently referenced and common trends that show a 
preponderance of public concern and perception of regulatory inadequacy.  
 
12 KXL initially received over two million public submissions; the vast majority of these comments came in the form 
of petitions from activist groups, and so distinct and independent online submissions were not available. However, 
there were tens of thousands of distinct comments submitted in 2014, many as form letters, and another 10,000 
distinct comments submitted in 2017.  
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For this chapter, the ‘public interest’, ‘process’ and ‘capture’ codes captured the vast majority 
of relevant comments. It is important to note that in both regulatory processes, the definition of 
‘public’ or ‘national interest’ is kept high-level and vague. So for the purposes of generating and later 
analyzing these codes, the public interest is defined as “a balance of economic, environmental, and 
social interests that changes as society’s values and preferences evolve over time” (National Energy 
Board 2015). Any comments related to the interpretation of these interests or preferences were 
collected under the ‘public interest’ code, and issues related to the specific regulatory process itself—
for instance, that the Canadian Coast Guard was not appropriately consulted in the Northern Gateway 
hearings—were placed under the ‘process’ tag. Additionally, references to regulatory capture, where 
a regulatory process has been manipulated by private sector interests, were placed under the ‘capture 
code’ Finally, the ‘government’ code, which collected issues to do with specific government officials 
or parties, was scanned to ensure completeness and avoid misidentification. The full list of codes for 
this dissertation can be found in the Appendices, and the codes examined for this chapter are detailed 
in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Public interest/regulatory process-related codes for NGP and KXL public comments 
Code Description Comments References 
CAPTURE Reference to regulatory processes; specifically 
industrial influence on these processes. 
27 29 
GOVERNMENT Reference to issues with current government as 






Reference to broad oil supply/demand 






PROCESS Issues with the regulatory process itself, usually 
related to lack of public participation; often but 
not always correlated with “capture” code 
 
146 250 
PUBLIC INTEREST Direct reference to the public or national 
interest with regards to the pipeline 
141 226 
In the comments, there was significant attention paid to the public interest and the regulatory 
process in general; comments brought up concerns that the federal government had decided to 
approve these  pipelines regardless of legitimate opposition, that the regulatory process deliberately 
shut out anyone who did not live along the pipeline route and that other citizens who would be 
impacted by the pipeline (albeit less directly) had no recourse, and that broader environmental/social 
concerns were ignored in favour of extremely specific potential impacts. Below, I discuss the 
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common trends from these comments and the response from regulators and firms and examine the 
gap between the two in terms of the interpretation of the public interest.  
4.5 Results 
From the public comments submitted in the regulatory processes for NGP and the second round of 
KXL, several trends concerning the public interest/public participation can be identified: first, that the 
impact assessments required by regulators tend to be very localized in terms of tangible effects, but an 
increasingly broad perception of social, cultural, and environmental risk that is not well captured by 
current definitions of the public interest. Second, that there is a significant lack of understanding of 
the regulatory requirements and the mandate of regulators, particularly with regards to explicit 
industry planning and development. Lastly, there is a lack of trust from a significant portion of the 
general public that believes that regulatory processes are at least partially captured by industry or 
have no power to make and enforce decisions. These trends all point towards regulatory processes 
that are out of step with contemporary perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with oil 
pipelines, and institutions that rely on a narrow interpretation of the public/national interest when 
assessing those pipelines.  
4.5.1 Localization of impact assessment versus a broad perception of risk 
A theme throughout the comments is that the interpretation of the public interest utilized by the NEB 
and BER is perceived to be too narrow, and does not take into account broader, second-order negative 
impacts exacerbated by the pipelines. In particular, issues related to climate change and spills were 
prevalent through both the NGP and KXL processes. Commenters in the NGP process stated that 
“global warming has no borders, and every nation has a right to be concerned about Canada’s 
activities” (NGP 3.1), indicating that the universe of acknowledged stakeholders for this project (and 
others like it) should be much wider than those landowners and municipalities along the pipeline’s 
direct route. NGP commenters also emphasized the risk of spills and that the burden of those spills 
would fall on citizens, not firms, “the rationale that the tar sands and the pipeline are “nation 
building” is a fallacy and not in the best interest of Canadians. Costs of spill clean-ups in wilderness 
areas and coastal waters cannot possibly be calculated, but the fact that the Kalamazoo spill has been 
such a costly expense to taxpayers and the number of spills that have already occurred should be 
cause for serious alarm” (A2X9H7). These comments often referenced specific past accidents, in 
particular the 2010 Kalamazoo River spill where Enbridge’s Line 6B ruptured, and clean-up took five 
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years and cost 2.8 billion USD (mostly borne by Enbridge), although nearby towns were also affected 
and took on some of the burden of repair.  
In the KXL case, similar entreaties to global and regional environmental impacts that occur 
beyond the scope of the direct pipeline route were also common amongst commenters. Submissions 
directly equated these socio-environmental risks with the national interest, stating that “how can it 
possibly be in our best interest to drive a climate crisis which is already killing us and leaving people 
homeless and costing us our savings and our businesses due to floods and fires? How is it in our 
interest to put our water supplies (pipelines cross water ways and run adjacent to them) at huge risk at 
a time when droughts are growing more severe and so much of our water has already been poisoned 
by oil leaks, fracking and toxic chemicals? How is it in our best interest to use eminent domain to 
take people's property and destroy it so that a corporation based in Canada can make a profit? 
Eminent domain is supposed to be used only in cases where property is taken for things that are of 
public benefit? How is it in our best interests to seize and destroy Native American sacred and burial 
sites, especially in light of the U.S. history of genocide toward them?” (KXL 3.1).  Other commenters 
questioned the reversal of the Obama era decision, asking “How can it [the State Department] reverse 
itself when the climate crisis has dramatically worsened since that decision and pipeline leaks and the 
destruction that they cause have been relentless?” (KXL 3.2) 
In both cases, there is a clear indictment of the localization of impacts that regulators assess; 
commenters desire a more holistic and system-wide definition of risk and impact that includes 
regional, national, and global consequences, and that takes into account second- and third-order 
impacts that may result from or be exacerbated by these projects.  
4.5.2 Lack of clarity regarding regulatory process 
A second theme throughout the comments in both cases concerned a lack of clarity regarding the 
mandate of regulators. In the NGP process, this took the form of comments calling for re-investment 
in other types of projects, notably renewable energy projects. Commenters implored the NEB “to 
abandon projects like this and start working towards green energy projects for a sustainable future” 
(NGP 3.3), and to “invest money into solar, geothermal, wind, and other sustainable energy sources 
and open world-renowned schools in the construction, operation and maintenance of these new 
sustainable alternatives instead of dealing with dirty oil…” (NGP 3.4). Other comments called for a 
regimented and explicit national energy plan to help guide the country in its energy development, 
stating that “the companies and governments behind the Gateway project are strongly pushing the 
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view that there are no other options, when in fact there are many options that we as a society need to 
explore. I feel that ANY project of this magnitude should not proceed without Canada first 
establishing a National Energy Plan” (NGP 3.5).  
While these comments reveal a desire for the Canadian government to be more circumspect 
and disciplined in its decisions regarding energy development, they also ask for the NEB to reach far 
beyond its mandate in terms of policy-setting. The NEB does not make policy, nor does it make 
planning decisions for the future; it is charged with evaluating each project independently. However, 
as has been discussed above, no regulator exists in a vacuum, and these comments emphasize that 
while the NEB has maintained a narrow, project-specific evaluation process, there is a large segment 
of the population that expects more ambitious regulation from its institutions.  
In the KXL case, this lack of clarity regarding the regulatory mandate manifests in more specific 
analyses of the process itself. Commenters repeatedly question the findings of the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as inadequate, stating that “it also attempts to assess the 
magnitude of many of those risks, as appropriate to the purpose of the Draft E.I.S. However, I believe 
the risk assessment understates the true magnitude, due to the compounding of prior environmental 
and social damages with the further damage that can be reasonably expected from this large-scale 
project” (KXL 3.3). Additionally, commenters take issue with the extremely segmented nature of the 
regulatory process, pointing out that the risks of the pipeline are assessed in pieces and rarely as a 
whole, “the XL Pipeline crosses Tribal lands and may go by different names in prior States and prior 
crossings, therefore due diligence(sic) must be accomplished by including the performance of the 
FULL TRAJECTORY of the Pipeline from its beginning and ALL leaks and accidents leading up to 
and including the Keystone XL Pipeline in question must be taken into account in assessing the 
viability of building the Keystone XL Pipeline” (KXL 3.4). It should be repeated that the KXL 
process, due to its coordination by the State Department, is much less segmented than typical 
interstate pipeline projects, which often piece out regulation by particular water crossing.  
4.5.3 Lack of public trust/perception of political interference 
Lastly, comments in both cases reveal a concern regarding government interference in these 
regulatory processes. In the NGP case, comments are centred around Conservative Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper’s government spending reforms from 2006-2015, which aimed to and reduce 
government spending by implementing budget cuts to several departments which provided 
environmental assessments and reviews, including the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the 
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Department of Environment, as well as streamline the regulatory review process for pipelines (Angela 
Carter 2016; MacNeil 2014a; 2014b). The Harper government was explicit in their support for NGP, 
with Harper stating in 2012 that opposition to the pipeline was the result of “foreign money and 
influence”(National Post 2012). Prime Minister Harper also stated that the project would be 
“evaluated on an independent basis scientifically, and not simply on political criteria”(CBC News 
2012)—a statement seemingly at odds with both the significant budget cuts to research and 
development as well as the regulatory streamlining that demanded an accelerated review process. 
Additionally, as discussed above, NEB advice has always been subject to Cabinet approval, rendering 
calls for independence somewhat moot. 
 In the public comments submitted, Canadians push back at Harper’s characterization of the 
opposition with concerns of their own; that their government was pushing through NGP without 
appropriate review, stating “I am concerned that politics and the economy are pushing the pace of the 
environmental review of the Northern Gateway Project (NGP) into overdrive. Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper used his majority to weaken environmental review processes so that this project, among 
others, could be rushed through within his current term of office” (NGP 3.6). Others questioned “the 
legitimacy of the process and project, given the way the regulatory system has just been massively 
overhauled, seemingly for the purpose of making it easier for this project to go ahead without delay 
and for it to operate without any obstacles once permitted…Good decisions are not made in haste. 
Good oversight, for the sake of protecting our ecosystems and communities, cannot be done by 
gutting monitoring programs and terminating large numbers of expert staff” (NGP 3.7). 
Comments in the KXL case also expressed concerns regarding influence on the regulatory 
process. In the United States, there is no single agency that coordinates interstate oil pipeline 
regulation, and international oil pipeline regulation is coordinated by the State Department—there is 
no attempt at institutional independence or bipartisanship, since this is a political department that 
changes with presidents. Further complicating the KXL case in particular is the initial rejection by the 
Obama administration and the re-invigoration of the project by the Trump administration, when these 
comments were submitted. Commenters express confusion over this re-invigoration, stating that 
“President Obama made it clear that this was going to be an environmental nightmare so he blocked 
the continuation of this pipeline. Then Trump came in and reversed this decision, as he has done with 
anything that supports sustainable environmental issues” (KXL 3.4), and that “This KXL pipeline was 
reviewed during Pres. Obama's term and was deemed to be harmful. to all. Why are you reinventing 
the wheel?” (KXL 3.5). It should be pointed out that the tendency towards pipeline opposition within 
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the comments needs to be accounted for here; if one was supportive of the initial KXL project 
proposal, one may argue that the Obama administration had hijacked the regulatory process due to 
pressure from environmental groups. It is also worth noting that many of the documents submitted in 
the initial Obama-era proposal are almost identical to those submitted to the Trump administration, 
often simply with a different recommendation indicating different policy priorities. Also, due to the 
dozens of agencies involved, as well as TransCanada itself, in providing impact assessments, there 
were dissenting views even within the process itself despite the State Department’s final 
recommendation.  
Other comments bring up this inherent politicization more generally, expressing concerns that 
the controversial and highly publicized nature of the project makes it difficult to produce independent 
and objective assessments. One comment stated, “I am against this project as I have strong worries 
about the political pressures under which the NEPA report was created. We have seen other situations 
where highly politicized pipelines and projects have had extreme flaws in their NEPA assessments, 
like in Virginia where the US Forest Service has been found to have "suddenly, and mysteriously, 
assuaged in time to meet a private pipeline company's deadlines" according to judges. This casts 
doubt on the ability of these political pipelines to be fairly evaluated, especially one where the 
president has explicitly spoken in favor of this project” (KXL 3.6). 
These three themes point to a lack of confidence in regulatory institutions to characterize and 
interpret the public interest in a way that captures the diffuse, indirect, and long-term impacts of oil 
pipelines. Additionally, the regulatory uncertainty that has plagued both these projects has left the 
public concerned about the capabilities of regulators to make decisions and enforce those decisions. 
These regulators give advice which seem to be mutable to suit the policy priorities of the government 
of the day; and so how can they also be operating in the public interest, which exists beyond and 
outside of current government administrations. But these regulatory mechanisms spend significant 
time, effort, and money on assessing the impacts of these projects, and as was noted in previous 
sections public perception of risk is often complicated and mercurial. So before condemning these 
institutions as failing to act in the public’s interest, we must first examine the inputs of regulators 
when it comes to assessing these projects.  
4.6 The NEB and State Department 
So these three trends in the public comment data for NGP and KXL have established several points of 
public dissatisfaction with the state-industry-regulator relationship. Now, we turn to the regulators 
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themselves to identify how the public interest is interpreted by these institutions, in order to define the 
other side of this governance gap. There are some key procedural differences for KXL and NGP; in 
Canada, the firm creates all regulatory compliance documents (including socio-environmental 
assessments, which are often sub-contracted out to a third party firm) according to regulator 
guidelines. The NEB then assessed these documents for completeness and accuracy and requested 
additional information where relevant. In the American case, the firm creates the initial project 
application which includes economic justification for the project. For international pipelines, the State 
Department then coordinates the creation of relevant assessment documents, with several federal 
departments contributing, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Bureau of Land Management, and others. Relevant departments then give their final 
advice to the State Department, which makes a recommendation to the President. For both projects, 
compliance and assessment documents that referenced the public interest were analyzed to delineate 
the state-industry interpretation of the public interest, and emphasize the governance gaps identified 
in the previous section.  
4.6.1 Keystone XL 
The KXL process represents a unique situation in terms of determining the interpretation of the public 
interest, because the project was first rejected, then approved, and then rejected again. For the 
purposes of this paper, President Joe Biden’s second rejection of the project will not be discussed, 
because his administration did not produce any additional documentation and simply cancelled the 
project via executive order. However, the National Interest Determination (NID) from 2015 and its 
supporting interagency comments, the NID from 2017, and the applications for presidential permit 
submitted by TransCanada in 2012 and 2017 will all be examined for their interpretation of the 
national interest.13  
While TransCanada prepared many impact assessments and submissions for the KXL 
process, including environmental studies and commercial forecasts, their articulation of the national 
interest with regards to KXL is clearest in their applications for presidential permit, where the firm is 
meant to justify their project. TransCanada filed their first application for Presidential Permit in 2008, 
 
13 In the American process, the term ‘national interest’ is used, whereas in the Canadian process 
the term ‘public interest’ is utilized; for all intents and purposes, these terms evoke the same 
meaning and so will be used in their appropriate context.  
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which was denied by President Obama in 2012 after Congress mandated a 60-day deadline for the 
administration to make a ruling. Based largely on the grounds that the pipeline route through the 
environmentally sensitive Sandhills region of Nebraska was not appropriately assessed, President 
Obama denied the permit (TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. 2012). In 2012, TransCanada 
indicated their readiness to file an additional permit, with significant re-routes to avoid the Sandhills 
region.  
In their 2012 permit application, TransCanada stated that KXL is in the national interest on several 
grounds, and indicated that “recent Department decisions granting Presidential Permits to similar 
cross-border crude oil pipeline projects” support a determination in the national interest, referring to 
recent decisions to approve the original Keystone Pipeline in 2008 and the Alberta Clipper Expansion 
in 2009 (TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. 2012). While the State Department and President have 
significant discretion over the definition of ‘national interest’, TransCanada referred back to the 
original Supplemental Draft EIS, developed by the State Department with input from the EPA and 
other agencies, for a list of factors considered in past decisions (United States Department of State 
2010, 1–5). The State Department indicated in 2012 that the following factors were typically 
considered in a national interest determination: 
1. “Environmental impacts of the proposed projects  
2. Impacts of the proposed projects on the diversity of supply to meet U.S. crude oil 
demand and energy needs  
3. The security of transport pathways for crude oil supplies to the U.S. through import 
facilities constructed at the border relative to other modes of transport 
4. Stability of trading partners from whom the U.S. obtains crude oil  
5. Impact of a cross-border facility on the relations with the country to which it connects  
6. Relationship between the U.S. and various foreign suppliers of crude oil and the ability 
of the U.S. to work with those countries to meet overall environmental and ' energy 
security goals  
7. Impact of proposed projects on broader foreign policy objectives, including a 
comprehensive strategy to address climate change  
8. Economic benefits to the U.S. of constructing and operating proposed projects 
9. Relationships between proposed projects and goals to reduce reliance on fossil fuels 
and to increase use of alternative and renewable energy sources” (TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline L.P. 2012)  
While TransCanada did address the national interest in their 2008 permit application, the 2012 
documents were much more detailed. TransCanada submitted significant comments addressing each 
of these criteria, ultimately proposing that not only did KXL meet these requirements, but in many 
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cases exceeded them (TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. 2012). TransCanada proposed that: (1) the 
lengthy environmental review went beyond typical requirements for environmental impacts, and 
concluded that the project would result in no significant impacts; (2) that the KXL project would 
positively affect diversity of supply via long-term contracts to bring heavy crude oil from Alberta to 
the Gulf Coast refineries, which deliver substantial supply to the East Coast and Midwest; and (3) that 
KXL had worked with the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to establish 
special conditions that would result in a higher degree of safety than other domestic crude oil 
pipelines, and would far exceed the safety scenarios for truck, rail, or marine transport (2012, sec. A). 
The foreign policy objectives, delineated in factors 4-7, would also be met or exceeded: by 
(4) and (5) maintaining and improving the U.S.-Canada trade relationship, in addition to reducing 
American reliance on other oil sources globally; that due to the comparatively stringent climate and 
environmental policies in Canada and Alberta (as opposed to other global jurisdictions that supply oil 
to the United States) would result in a better climate outcome overall relative to the absence of KXL 
as well as the opportunity for climate coordination between Canada and the United States due to 
aligned environmental and energy security priorities (6) and (7) (2012, sec. A). In terms of economic 
benefit (8), TransCanada proposed an influx of direct and indirect employment opportunities during 
the construction phase as well as longer-term tax revenues for state and municipalities along the 
pipeline route (2012, sec. A). Lastly, TransCanada acknowledged that while the U.S. would continue 
to decrease its reliance on crude oil, demand would remain in the near future, and emphasized that the 
choice was not between KXL and alternative energies but rather between Canadian oil supplies or 
Venezuelan and Mexican sources, or alternative sources further afield (9) (2012, sec. A). 
In response to TransCanada’s extensive appeals to national interest considerations, the State 
Department elicited a number of interagency comments to inform their eventual advice to President 
Obama. The Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and dozens of tribal 
communities through the Department of the Interior provided substantive comments. Tribal 
communities largely opposed the project on grounds of inappropriate consultation proceedings. The 
Department of Energy emphasized that market conditions had changed since 2008, and that as 
domestic oil production in the United States had increased considerably, oil prices had declined, and 
investment in Canadian oil fields had declined (Department of Energy 2015). The DoE also 
emphasized the minute impact of KXL on direct GHG emissions but declined to offer a firm opinion 
on the national interest (Department of Energy 2015). The EPA’s comments were mostly concerned 
with broader climate change impacts, especially noting that the WCSB crude that would flow through 
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KXL has high GHGs associated with its lifecycle than other oil sources (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2015). The EPA reiterated that climate and environmental concerns should be central to a 
national interest determination (Environmental Protection Agency 2015). 
In both TransCanada’s and the EPA’s submissions, an interesting dynamic regarding climate 
intensity is revealed; TransCanada maintains that WCSB oil is more climate friendly because Canada 
has instituted more stringent regulatory requirements and is easier to transport than alternative sources 
from Mexico, Venezuela, and beyond, whereas the EPA affirms that WCSB crude is more emissions-
intensive than alternative sources due to its associated extraction processes. Both are partially correct; 
WCSB is more emissions-intensive than many other sources, but it is comparatively highly regulated, 
industry has made huge strides in reducing direct extraction emissions, and pipelines have lower 
associated emissions than marine tankers. The difference is how these organizations framed their 
data; TransCanada emphasizing the stringent regulatory requirements (including emissions standards) 
in Canada and the EPA emphasizing the geophysical nature of WCSB oil in global context. 
While these comments and supporting documents were submitted in 2012, the Obama 
administration did not release its NID until 2015, where it rejected the KXL application. The 2015 
NID emphasized the climate change impacts associated with KXL, in terms of both directly 
associated GHG emissions and indirect lifecycle emissions of WCSB crude extraction (Department 
Of State 2015, 10). Secondly, the NID also referenced the short-term volatility of oil prices as a factor 
in its decision, although also acknowledged that this short-term volatility was not indicative of the 
sector as a whole (Department Of State 2015). Thirdly, the NID addressed the possibility of crude-by-
rail transport, concluding that existing pipeline capacity combined with new safety rules for train 
transportation meant that the future utilization of rail was uncertain at best, and would be covered by 
announced regulatory reforms (Department Of State 2015). Lastly, the NID addressed socioeconomic 
impacts, acknowledging that concerns regarding human health, environmental justice, and 
employment opportunities played a factor in its determination. The NID also dismissed the claim that 
KXL, as one singular infrastructure project, would have an appreciable impact on American energy 
security, and would not prevent the import of Canadian oil to the United States (Department Of State 
2015, 28). For these reasons, the State Department advised President Obama against permitting the 
KXL project, which he consequently denied in January 2015. 
When TransCanada re-submitted its application for Presidential Permit in 2017, much of the 
supporting documents and impact assessments were re-used, with only minor updates attached. A 
new supplemental EIS was produced, which regurgitated much of the same data as the 2008/2012 
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processes, and modified route maps were submitted as well. The application for Presidential Permit 
contained a truncated discussion of the national interest that focused on economic benefits, energy 
security, and facilitating the Canadian-American trade relationship (TransCanada Keystone Pipeline 
L.P. 2017). Importantly, the 2017 application did contain a new reference to the regulatory 
uncertainty that had plagued KXL, stating “issuance of a Presidential Permit for the proposed Project 
would send a signal to American industry that permitting decisions for critical infrastructure projects 
will be assessed based on their merits and based on the relevant facts; that these reviews will be 
conducted in a timely, fair, and predictable manner; and that projects will not be rejected based on 
alleged perceptions or political considerations” (TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. 2017, 12).   
The NID released in 2017 which advised President Trump to approve the project also utilized 
much of the same data, although the section on climate change was significantly reduced. However, 
while there was significant overlap between the first, second, and third applications for Presidential 
Permit, and in fact much of the text was recycled verbatim, the final judgments differed. In the 2017 
NID, the State Department advised the President to grant the KXL permit based on: 
“the proposed Project’s potential to bolster U.S. energy security by providing additional 
infrastructure for the dependable supply of crude oil, its role in supporting, directly 
and indirectly, a significant number of U.S. jobs and provide increased revenues to local 
communities that will bolster the U.S. economy, its ability to reinforce our bilateral 
relationship with Canada, and its limited impact on other factors considered by the 
Department, all contribute to a determination that the issuance of a Presidential 
permit for this proposed Project serves the national interest.” (Department Of State 
2017, 30)  
This process of multiple applications, unique to the KXL case, emphasizes the role of executive 
decision-making in the American regulatory process for oil pipelines. The NIDs issued in 2015 and 
2017 contained much of the same information, presented similarly, and were based on the same 
socio-environmental assessments (while the 2017 process did produce a supplemental EIS eventually 
completed in 2019, it largely concluded with few significant changes from the 2012 process)—but 
they proposed opposite outcomes, with the Obama administration State Department recommending a 
rejection, and the Trump administration recommending an approval.  
4.6.2 Northern Gateway 
The Northern Gateway process was in many ways much simpler with regards to the determination of 
the public interest, since the project was not proposed and re-proposed so many times. But the 
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determination of the public interest in the NGP case is complicated by the changeover from 
Conservative to Liberal governance in the middle of the process, and the lawsuits filed regarding 
Indigenous consultation and extent of environmental assessment. However, we have only one set of 
documents to analyze in this case; Enbridge’s initial 2010 project justification, contained within the 
first application submitted to the NEB, and the Joint Review Panel’s conditional approval of the NGP 
project, issued in 2014 and with 209 mandatory conditions attached.14 In Volume 1, Section 3 of the 
full NGP application Enbridge emphasizes the socio-economic benefits for Albertans and British 
Columbians via property and income taxes (Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines 2010c, 1–4). They 
also propose that “access to Pacific Rim markets for Canadian oil production will create numerous 
and sustaining benefits for all of Canada, while providing secure and essential energy supplies to 
nations such as China and South Korea” (2010c, 1–4).  Enbridge also enlisted a third-party 
assessment of the pipeline from a “Canadian public interest perspective”, which focused largely on 
the potential $270 billion CAD increase to GDP over a 30-year operating period (Enbridge Northern 
Gateway Pipelines 2010c, 1–5). Enbridge’s proposal rests largely on existing approvals of oil sands 
development, arguing that if a certain amount of WCSM extraction has already been deemed in the 
public interest, so too should projects that support that development—like the NGP, which would add 
525,000 bpd of pipeline capacity. Enbridge suggests that “new markets and expanded transportation 
capacity are essential to the development of this oil sands production, which has already been 
determined to be in the public interest”(Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines 2010d, 1–6). While 
Enbridge acknowledges that sustainable development is key to the NEB’s public interest mandate, the 
project justification put forward is based almost entirely on economic benefit.   
After five years of contention—notably from several Indigenous groups in British Columbia 
with regards to a lack of consultation, and the provincial government in BC which opposed the 
project on grounds of inadequate environmental assessment—the Joint Review Panel (JRP) 
recommended the approval of the NGP, subject to 209 conditions. These conditions ran the gamut 
from emergency response, specific ecological impacts, public consultation and employment benefits 
(Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014b). This report also included a detailed section 
on the public interest with regards to the broader NEB mandate as well as the specific application to 
NGP.  
 
14 Enbridge did submit a preliminary application for the Northern Gateway Project to the NEB in 2005, but this was delayed in 
2006 in favour of investing in pipelines to the U.S. Little progress was made and so the focus is on the full 2010 application. 
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The JRP emphasized that the NEB is an “independent federal tribunal” that is “quasi-
judicial…and follows the principles of natural justice and fairness, which have been developed by the 
courts over time” (2014b, 7–8). The report also points out that decisions “are not influenced by the 
number of letters received or by other demonstrations of public opposition or support. Rather, 
recommendations are based on the evidence provided, within a legal framework enacted by the 
legislature and applied by the courts”(2014b, 9). So by its own admission, the public comment 
process has little to no impact on the decisions made by the tribunal, despite the fact that this process 
is often the only opportunity for Canadians who do not live along the pipeline route to make their 
views known. If this process is not for the NEB decision-makers, then its only purpose seems to be to 
collate (some) public views for potential (but not required in any sense) review by the JRP or Cabinet 
when the time comes for a final decision.  
The JRP also explicitly references that “the public interest is inclusive of all Canadians, locally, 
regionally, and nationally, and refers to the integration of environmental, societal, and economic 
considerations” (2014b, 10). Section 52 of the National Energy Board Act requires that the Board 
consider:  
• the availability of oil/gas to the pipeline 
• the potential and actual markets for the pipeline 
• the economic feasibility of the project 
• the financial structure/methods for financing the project 
• any other public interest issue that may be affected by the project, in the board’s opinion 
(National Energy Board 2013; Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014a)  
Four of these public interest concerns are related to finances and market conditions; the last 
encompasses all other public interest concerns without specification. By convention and precedent, 
these “other” concerns have included a variety of social, cultural, and environmental factors, and 
some of these issues are codified in the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and its 
predecessors. However, the fact remains that the NEB was given almost unlimited discretion to define 
matters of the public interest, and was not required to take into account any of the comments 
submitted by the public, advocating for their own interest. The JRP states explicitly that in their view, 
the existence of the JRP itself “is a component of the public interest” via the provision of expert 
evidence and time to consider that evidence (Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014b).  
Lastly, the JRP discusses whether the NGP “is, and will be, in in the present and future public 
convenience and necessity and, therefore, in the public interest” (Joint Review Panel and National 
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Energy Board 2014b, 9). In this determination the JRP finds that there are a variety of environmental 
burdens and that any potential environmental benefits of the project are outweighed by these burdens. 
However, the Panel also concludes that “the potential adverse environmental outcomes are, in the 
Panel’s view, outweighed by the potential society and economic benefits” (Joint Review Panel and 
National Energy Board 2014b, 10). These benefits largely consist of employment opportunities 
(mostly temporary) and potential tax revenues, but also include investment into research projects by 
Enbridge (mostly regarding marine biology and engineering improvements) and community supports 
for Indigenous groups along the pipeline right-of-way (Joint Review Panel and National Energy 
Board 2014a, vol. 1). Lastly, the JRP acknowledges the significant environmental and financial 
burdens of a large oil spill, but assesses that risk as very unlikely due to pipeline spill prevention 
measures (Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014b). However, while acknowledging 
this myriad of risks, the JRP finds that, if its conditions were met, “Canadians would be better off 
with this Project than without it” (Joint Review Panel and National Energy Board 2014b, 14)  
The JRP announced its conditional approval during the Harper regime, which campaigned heavily for 
the project; then-Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver infamously decried any opposition to the 
project as the work of “foreign radicals” and Prime Minister Stephen Harper approved the project in 
2014. In 2015 a coalition of eight Indigenous bands, four environmental groups, and a labour union 
successfully brought a legal challenge to the Federal Court of Appeal in Vancouver, which overturned 
the government’s approval of the pipeline. Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (elected October 
2015) had run on a promise to reject the NGP, and so with the judicial ruling the project was 
cancelled.  
4.7 Discussion: Regulatory Uncertainty and Declining Public Trust 
Ultimately, in both cases there is a significant disconnect between what these regulators do, what they 
were initially created to do, and what large segments of the general public thinks they should do. The 
NEB was created as an economic regulator and took on the burden of additional regulatory 
responsibility without any specific goal-setting or explicit changes in mandate. In a similar position, 
the Bureau of Energy Resources, situated in the State Department, was created to evaluate the 
American national interest, the definition of which is a matter of precedent and convention. The 
public comment data indicates that people expect much more from their regulators; and due to both 
organizations’ explicit reference to representing the public/national interest, this is entirely logical. 
But despite the addition of environmental impact assessments, Indigenous consultation, public 
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hearings, etc., the weight of economic benefit vs. socio-environmental risk has never been clearly or 
explicitly defined in either the United States or Canadian processes; instead, both fall back on vague 
appeals to “the public interest” or “the national interest”.  
The disconnect between issues raised in the public comments versus the standard compliance 
documents submitted for both projects suggests that neither Canadian nor American governance 
mechanisms were developed with large-scale, cross-jurisdictional socio-environmental issues in 
mind, nor with the concept of effective public participation at the forefront. The development of the 
NEB initially placed most emphasis on economic/financial factors, and despite the inclusion of 
significant socio-environmental assessment since the 1970s has largely persisted with an emphasis on 
resource development. In theory, the NEB maintains independence from the final decision-makers in 
Cabinet, as opposed to the American process where the process is embedded in the executive. Unlike 
the United States, the process is fairly judicial in nature, with public hearings and an effort towards 
non-partisanship, although the goal of the NEB is generally to allow rather than constrain industrial 
development; the NEB approved NGP, albeit with a long list of conditions. The project was cancelled 
due to judicial challenge and a new Liberal government. 
In the United States while there is a greater opportunity for differing opinion within the 
process as a variety of federal departments issue assessments, some of which are extremely detailed 
and technical in nature (i.e. those prepared by the EPA), the division of expertise and authority 
amongst these departments results in a patchwork of regulatory responsibility. And ultimately, the 
State Department gives the final advice to the President, rendering the regulation of international 
pipelines in the United States a largely executive process with few legislated standard operating 
procedures. 
In both Canada and the United States, the lack of consistent federal energy strategy has left 
these regulatory processes largely with mandates that are vague in wording and narrow in scope, with 
an emphasis on market potential and financial technicalities. Ideally, regulatory reform which centres 
the public interest with explicit parameters, and ambitious sustainable development goals, would 
assuage many of the concerns raised here and in previous papers. The CER, which superseded the 
NEB in 2019, emphasized the centrality of sustainability in its mandate but made few changes to the 
public interest component. In fact, in a survey of public interest tests for infrastructure decisions in 
Canada, only 6% had explicit definitions of the public interest (Goodday, Winter, and Westwood 
2020). Explicit public interest parameters are extremely rare, and so there is much room for evolution 
in Canada, the United States, and around the world.  
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In both these cases, comprehensive and complex socio-environmental assessments were 
produced, and did address in some fashion many of the concerns raised in the public comments: 
climate change, Indigenous consultation, emergency management and spill prevention, etc. But 
despite the heavy regulatory burden that both firms and other interested stakeholders take on when 
these projects are proposed, decisions mostly depend on who is sitting in the White House and 24 
Sussex Drive. In the NGP case, regulatory assessments ultimately approved the project, albeit with a 
much longer list of conditions than the Harper administration (which explicitly and actively supported 
the project would have preferred); based on similar information, the incoming Trudeau administration 
signalled the project’s cancellation. In the KXL case, the social, environmental, and economic 
information was in many places identical; what changed was the State Department’s conclusions.  
Regulatory systems that are flexible enough to respond to rapidly changing environments, with 
increased avenues for participation and accountability and ambitious but broad policy goals may be 
the way forward, although this would require significant overhaul of the current institutional 
landscape (Young 2017a; Balleisen and Brake 2014). The Canadian process has performed more 
effectively with regards to standardizing the regulatory process and allowing for public participation 
than the American approach. However, in terms of responding to public opinion, the KXL process 
allowed for Presidents Obama and Biden to reject the pipeline on climate grounds—suggesting a 
welcome turn towards more ambitious climate action (although some evidence suggests that 
canceling pipelines is a cumbersome and expensive method for decreasing emissions15)—executive 
supremacy in the American process results in a precarious regulatory environment. American 
regulatory governance of oil pipelines remains fragmented and dispersed, rarely allowing for an 
assessment of the pipeline’s impacts as a whole and focusing instead on specific, localized impacts 
that are assessed individually. The Keystone XL pipeline, under the authority of the State Department 
due to the fact that it is an international project, is one of the most coordinated regulatory processes in 
the US in the last several decades but is still much more fragmented and has a less strict process than 
the NEB in Canada.   
The theory of regulatory capitalism, which proposes that the goal of regulation is not to 
protect the public good but rather as a tool of commodity accumulation supports these pro-
development tendencies (Castree 2008b; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Despite an increase in 
regulatory oversight by including significant socio-environmental assessment and public consultation, 
 
15 See (Toombe 2016) 
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the primary goal of these regulatory processes is to encourage oil development; although safer and 
less environmentally destructive than pre-1985. This holds with the ‘regulatory explosion’ of the 
1980s/90s where these additional regulatory requirements were added to institutions with an initially 
narrow mandate and a small universe of stakeholders (Braithwaite 2008). However, while the 
universe of interested parties has expanded to, essentially, every Canadian and American citizen (and 
beyond if we focus on global impacts like climate change), regulatory mandates have not significantly 
changed. The public comments suggest a desire for a broader interpretation of risk and impact, but 
neither the NEB nor the State Department is required to integrate these public comments into their 
final advice.  
Regulatory capitalism does not perfectly explain the role of executive decision-making in this 
process; as has been discussed here and in the previous papers, while the regulatory mechanisms in 
both countries produce a lot of complex, technical impact assessments, the decision is ultimately 
made by the ruling political party. Theories of regulatory capitalism would suggest that this type of 
executive interference is not necessary as the regulators will pursue strategies of capital accumulation 
on their own; and in these cases this is accurate. Both NGP and KXL were approved by their 
regulators at different times in their respective processes. One interpretation of the KXL case would 
be that Presidents Obama and Biden represented the national interest in a more environmentally 
conscious manner as the project was rejected by both on environmental grounds. Additionally, 
regulatory capitalism does not neatly explain the way that both Canada and the States are leaning 
towards decarbonization and a clean energy transition, and using executive power to (sometimes) 
cancel these pipelines rather than push them through. What we are seeing in these institutions is a 
failing regulatory capitalism, that is at odds with bigger, more complex problems that are increasingly 
politically relevant.  
This paper identified three trends in the public comments that speak to legitimate discontent 
with the interpretation of pipeline regulators public interest mandate. The regulatory requirements 
speak for themselves. Localized socio-environmental impacts are heavily prioritized, which makes 
sense as these are usually the most immediately damaging or the highest risk to public/environmental 
health; however, there is little emphasis on the diffuse and indirect impacts of these pipelines which, 
commenters argue, still matter in a public interest determination. Additionally, these projects both 
epitomize an increasing regulatory uncertainty for these projects, as they were both approved and 
rejected at different times under different conditions; there was significant procedural volatility in 
both these cases. Lastly, a lack of public trust in these institutions did not come out of thin air; Prime 
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Minister Harper did slash environmental regulations and proclaim his support for the project, and 
President Trump did re-invigorate a rejected project. So the risks identified in these comments are 
applicable to these pipeline projects, and reveal a governance gap between the interpretation of the 
public interest mandate by regulators and the public itself (or one segment of the public that feels 
excluded from these regulatory processes. However, there is a potential for alienation of expert 
assessment in favour of less-informed public participation, as institutions grapple with this declining 
public trust (Wynne 2002). Conversely, the reliance on narrow, technical risk assessment has thus far 
not been able to eliminate complex socio-environmental threats like climate change or energy 
poverty. Ultimately, the issues at stake here are not simply technological problems; they have social, 
cultural, and political impacts. Our assessment of those risks needs to address those broader anxieties, 
even if they do not originate with perfectly informed experts.    
The takeaway for the dynamics of regulatory institutions analyzed in this paper is that the 
way that states conceive of and take part in risk mitigation is at odds with the ways that individuals 
are perceiving the risks of these large pipelines. To the commenters in both projects, the risks 
associated with fossil fuel transportation and extraction are simply too great; to regulators and firms, 
these risks are worth the potential economic benefit.  
However, two pipelines do not represent the entirety of the Canadian and American oil 
industries. Oil development will not be noticeably hindered by the cancellation of these projects; in 
fact, the Trudeau government purchased Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline in an 
effort to see that project completed and increase pipeline capacity to the west coast after NGP was 
cancelled. Many of the issues raised in the NGP public comments also exist in the TMX project, but 
market forecasts do indicate need for enhanced pipeline capacity in the short-term; without it, 
transport via train and truck will likely increase. The United States will still import large amounts of 
WCSB crude with or without the KXL project, utilizing the existing Keystone system, the Enbridge 
Mainline and Express network, and a variety of smaller pipelines. The cancellation of these projects 
by centre-left political leaders, on grounds of climate impacts, lack of Indigenous consultation, and 
environmental assessment, does not necessarily indicate a broad turn away from pro-resource 
development regulation, but rather indicates that the controversy of these particular projects precluded 




This paper aimed to examine the characterization of the public interest in oil pipeline regulation in 
Canada and the United States by utilizing public comment data and regulatory compliance documents 
to compare the Northern Gateway and Keystone XL pipeline projects. While the regulatory 
mechanisms in both these cases have integrated socio-environmental assessment to a significant 
extent in the last several decades, both institutions maintain a pro-resource development stance. The 
State Department/President and Cabinet/Prime Minister are the final decision-makers in both cases, 
exacerbating the inherently political nature of these processes (despite theoretical independence of the 
NEB).  
In both cases three trends were identified: a lack of clarity regarding regulatory mandates, 
perceived interference by government, and insistence on a broader assessment of risk and impact. The 
regulatory applications submitted by both NGP and KXL included significant technical and 
environmental assessments, as well as records of public consultation, but the interpretation of the 
public/national interest for both projects rested on a market-focused project justification. The role of 
executive decision-makers is paramount in the interpretation of the public interest, as in both cases 
different ruling parties made different decisions based on very similar regulatory information.  
The Canadian process theoretically maintains an independence from government, but the 
NEB generally approves of projects with a number of conditions and Cabinet makes the final 
deliberation (in the NGP case, a judicial challenge resulted in an overturning of the approval by the 
Conservative Harper government). The American process is more explicitly political, as it is led by 
the State Department which is partisan by nature. Presidential decisions rarely contradict State 
Department advice, but the State Department (and every other federal department that contributes to 
pipeline assessment) is a part of the administration.  
There are several avenues for future research building on the data collected here; as was 
referenced throughout, the dynamics of risk perception are not the focus here, but they could be given 
the extremely detailed and accessible public comment data for these projects. Additionally, further 
case studies would strengthen the claim that these regulators are disconnected from the public’s idea 
of the public interest. Finally, an international comparison of regulatory institutions, to investigate for 
best practices beyond Canada and the United States, could provide some inspiration for regulatory 
reform. Both the NGP and KXL projects were ultimately cancelled, but this does not on its own 
represent a significant turn away from oil development in either country. However, these processes do 
reveal a disconnect between public expectations and regulatory mandate, as well as between partisan 
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decision-makers and regulatory processes that are perceived as independent. These regulatory 
mechanisms are inherently and actively political. In the absence of a clear, ambitious, and 
legislatively protected mandate, these institutions will continue to rely on a narrow, market-focused 





Discussion: Institutional Defects in Pipeline Regulation 
Canada and the United States have struggled to balance the economic benefits of their fossil fuel 
resources with the socio-environmental toll of this industry. Oil pipelines play a crucial role in this 
balance, as their construction places vulnerable ecosystems and communities at risk and locks in 
fossil fuel development for decades; conversely, they also create regional employment opportunities 
and facilitate the export of a valuable global economy. Regulatory mechanisms, built mostly to 
oversee the market conditions and maintain continuous supply and demand of these resources, are 
also responsible for representing the public interest and mitigating the socio-environmental impacts of 
these pipelines. But while these impacts have increased in breadth, intensity, and political salience in 
the last several decades, regulatory institutions have not evolved to the same extent or at the same 
pace. Socio-environmental assessment is a huge part of the regulatory processes for pipelines; but 
vague mandates, partisan interference in decision-making, and the geographically diffuse nature of 
contemporary risks associated with fossil fuel development and transportation have left these 
institutions unable to fulfill their mandate to its fullest extent. To be clear, while this dissertation has 
found inadequacies and weaknesses in these regulatory mechanisms, it should be stated that the extent 
of socio-environmental assessment and public consultation for these pipelines is, compared 
internationally, fairly comprehensive. These findings are not meant to detract from the extensive 
technical risk assessment undertaken for these projects, but rather to identify ways that these 
institutions, already best in class by many metrics, can improve. The bar is set low for pipeline 
regulation internationally, as few institutions go beyond hyper-localized risk assessment and narrowly 
defined impacts. Canadian and American institutions perform better than many of their peers, but 
have not adequately addressed problems with scope and integrating complex socio-environmental 
issues. The issues presented here are complex, and there are no easy answers. But there is room for 
improvement, both incremental and transformative, to make these institutions work better for more 
people.  
  Questions remain regarding the ability of regulatory mechanisms to address an ever-
expanding and increasingly complex universe of interests. In this project, I examined three topics—
climate change, energy security, and the public interest—which epitomize the nuance and complexity 
of contemporary socio-environmental impacts from oil pipelines and how regulatory institutions in 
Canada and the United States have interpreted these impacts. 
 
 144 
Utilizing comparative analysis of two large and controversial pipeline projects, Enbridge’s 
Northern Gateway and TransCanada’s Keystone XL, I compared the interpretation of each of these 
issues by the National Energy Board in Canada (now superseded by the Canada Energy Regulator) 
and the State Department in the United States. Initially, this thesis asked three questions, and each 
was addressed in one paper. However, there are also several cross-cutting themes that can be 
identified through the theoretical lens of regulatory capitalism and the political economy of energy, 
upon which this project rests.  
This discussion will briefly recap each of the research questions asked at the start of this 
thesis, with reference to the three empirical papers. I will then propose three cross-cutting themes: the 
role of partisanship and executive power; the re-definition of interested stakeholders in the question 
of oil pipelines; and the inadequacy of institutional mandates that, despite significant advancements in 
socio-environmental assessment, continues to privilege economic development over other 
fundamental public issues. These themes reveal that the capacity of regulatory institutions has not 
evolved at the same pace as the impacts they are meant to assess, and the lack of clear and specific 
institutional goals has left these decision-making processes opaque and easily coopted by partisan 
actors. I will then move on to discuss the theoretical contributions and limitations of this project, with 
particular attention paid to the novelty of the data sources and the contribution to regulatory 
capitalism and energy security frameworks. Finally, I will address potential reform for these 
regulatory institutions, as well as avenues for future research.  
5.1 Research Objectives 
The overarching objective of this project was to examine how national regulators address cross-
jurisdictional issues with broad and diffuse socio-environmental impacts in the context of pipeline 
governance in Canada and the United States. In pursuit of this analysis, three specific topics were 
addressed: climate change, energy security, and the public interest. Climate change has rapidly 
increased in salience for energy producers in the last several decades, but to date pipeline regulators 
have kept their assessment narrow, focused on the direct GHG emissions from constructing and 
maintaining pipelines despite the long-term fossil fuel development to which these infrastructure 
assets commit. Energy security has traditionally been considered by states largely in terms of 
continuous, affordable oil supplies, but concerns about the accessibility and acceptability of fossil 
fuels, especially now compared to renewable energies, mean that this conventional definition is no 
longer acceptable. Lastly, the universe of interested parties affected by these pipelines has exploded 
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since the 1970s; consumer safety groups, environmental activists, and Indigenous communities 
demand more attention and nuanced assessment of indirect impacts, many of which are difficult to 
quantify and assess. The concentrated benefits and diffuse risks of these pipelines demand a broader 
look at different types of impacts. 
These particular topics were chosen due to their relevance for theories of political economy 
and regulatory capitalism, which focus on the intersection of state-market power, as well as the 
vagueness with which they are defined by regulatory mechanisms. It is important to note, and this 
will be elaborated upon later, that this thesis took a deep look at two pipeline projects, rather than a 
broader examination of many projects. Consequently, while some interesting results and dynamics 
can be gleaned, it is not possible at this time to characterize the whole of pipeline governance in 
Canada and the United States. Both Northern Gateway and Keystone XL illustrate some of the most 
pressing issues in energy sector governance, and so their selection is valuable in that it allows close 
examination of some of these dynamics. Additionally, while both projects are distinctive in their 
respective institutional landscapes due to their size and controversy, both are subject to standard 
regulatory requirements that all pipelines of their ilk must satisfy to be constructed, and so while the 
social, political, and economic context is specific to each pipeline, the regulatory dynamics for 
Northern Gateway and Keystone XL are fairly typical for each country.  
The first empirical paper, Chapter 2: Utilizing pipeline regulation to manage the diffuse risks 
of climate change answered RQ1, which asked how climate change is interpreted in regulatory 
processes for oil pipelines, with regards to the public interest, private interest, and government. This 
chapter concluded that pipeline regulators in Canada and the United States interpret the risks of 
climate change in extremely narrow and site-specific contexts, despite the global nature of climate 
impacts. While both regulatory institutions accept that climate change does not respect national 
borders, both processes assess climate change in a vacuum, focusing mostly on the direct GHG 
emissions from constructing and operating the NGP and KXL pipelines. The KXL process, which 
went through several cycles of proposal and re-proposal due to turnover in the White House, did more 
explicitly acknowledge the indirect impacts of climate change but given the concentration of 
decision-making power in the executive branch, this is more a reflection of party ideology rather than 
a standard regulatory procedure to assess broader climate impacts (Department Of State 2015; 2017). 
In the analysis of public comments, both cases revealed a significant dissonance between the impacts 
that regulatory institutions focus on (direct GHG emissions) and public concerns. Both sets of 
comments revealed concerns regarding the need to reduce fossil fuel dependence now in order to 
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mitigate climate change, the need to invest in renewable energies, and that the particular oil marked 
for transport through these pipelines is especially carbon intensive. None of these issues are clearly 
addressed through regulatory compliance guidelines for oil pipelines; however, due to significant 
pressure from environmental and other civil society groups starting in the 1970’s in both countries, 
socio-environmental impact assessment makes up the bulk of these project proposals (J. M. Baker and 
Westman 2018; Doern and Gattinger 2003). In terms of quantity, at least, environmental assessments 
are by far the most thorough and detailed section of project applications. But the extent to which 
climate change is taken into account for the approval or rejection of these projects is largely left to 
final executive decision-makers, rather than embedded in regulatory procedures. Neither the NEB nor 
the Bureau of Energy Resources (in the State Department) were originally created to assess global 
issues like climate change; they were created based on an oil-centric view of the political economy of 
energy, and a market-based regulatory mandate (Gunningham 2013; Moran 2002). In the 21st century, 
they were charged with assessing a much broader and more complicated set of issues, but their core 
mandate did not drastically change. Ultimately, these institutions rely on patchwork and inconsistent 
assessment of climate change, resulting in a state of regulatory uncertainty that increases costs for 
firms, decreases public confidence, and contributes to a disconnect between energy governance and 
climate goals.  
Chapter 3, Cheap, Local, Ethical: Addressing Energy Security through Pipeline Regulation 
investigates RQ2, which asks how energy security is interpreted in regulatory processes for oil 
pipelines, with regard to the public interest, private interest, and government. This paper utilizes the 
Four A’s framework of energy security (Benjamin K. Sovacool 2011c) to compare the 
characterization of energy security in both cases. Relying on public comment data and industry 
compliance documents, this paper explores the characterization of energy security in both projects 
and discusses the broader implications for regulatory governance. Analysis of the public comment 
data revealed several points of similarity between the two cases. Commenters in both cases were 
concerned about the energy independence of their states, with an emphasis in the Northern Gateway 
case on increasing domestic refining capacity (as opposed to shipping oil to Asia for refining/selling), 
whereas the Keystone commenters desired an increase in domestic oil extraction, refining, and 
consumption. These comments did simplify or disregard some facts of the global energy marketplace; 
Canada does refine a significant amount of oil (and produces more than domestic demand), and the 
United States produces a lot of oil (although not enough to satisfy domestic demand). Additionally, 
the goal of ‘energy independence’ may be at odds with concerns regarding affordability, which were 
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also examined in both cases. Finally, and most novel for the study of energy security, both sets of 
comments revealed an unwillingness to allow certain states with poor human rights records to receive 
the benefit of these pipeline projects; namely China and Saudi Arabia, whose NOC owns the largest 
oil refinery in the United States. Conversely, regulators addressed these issues of availability and 
acceptability from a very different perspective; in both cases, the prospect of market diversification 
(from both a demand and supply perspective) was frequently utilized as justification for the projects, 
and the potential economic benefits were proposed to outweigh any changes in fuel prices that would 
result from the pipelines’ operation. Ultimately, this shows that regulators are (for the most part) 
emphasizing narrow and conventional interpretations of energy security, focused on maintaining 
continuity of a relatively inexpensive supply of oil, and are not integrating more complex energy 
security issues into their standard assessment procedures. 
Finally, Chapter 4, In Whose Interests? Interpreting the Public Interest in Pipeline 
Regulation dealt with RQ3, which asked how the concept of ‘the public interest’ is characterized and 
represented in the governance of oil pipelines in the United States and Canada. This paper aimed to 
examine the characterization of the public interest in oil pipeline regulation in Canada and the United 
States by utilizing public comment data and regulatory compliance documents to compare the 
Northern Gateway and Keystone XL pipeline projects. From the public comments submitted in the 
regulatory processes for NGP and the second round of KXL, several trends concerning the public 
interest/public participation can be identified: first, that the impact assessments required by regulators 
tend to be very localized in terms of tangible effects, but an increasingly broad perception of social, 
cultural, and environmental risk that is not well captured by current regulatory mechanisms. Second, 
that there is a significant lack of understanding of the regulatory requirements and the mandate of 
regulators, particularly with regards to explicit industry planning and development. Lastly, there is a 
lack of trust from a significant portion of the general public that believes that regulatory processes are 
at least partially captured by industry or have no power to make and enforce decisions. These trends 
all point towards regulatory processes that are out of step with contemporary challenges and 
problems, and institutions that rely on a narrow interpretation of the public/national interest. While 
the regulatory mechanisms in both these cases have integrated socio-environmental assessment to a 
significant extent in the last several decades, both institutions maintain a pro-resource development 
stance (Doern and Gattinger 2003; Renfro 2018). The State Department/President and Cabinet/Prime 
Minister are the final decision-makers in both cases, exacerbating the inherently political nature of 
these processes (despite theoretical independence of the NEB.  
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Table 5: Key Similarities/Differences in the NGP and KXL Cases 




Direct GHG’s during 
construction/operation 




Secondary factor in 
project rejection.  
2014-2015 (Obama): A critical 
factor in denying the Presidential 
permit   
2017-2019 (Trump): Direct GHG 
emissions from project are 
mentioned. 
2021 (Biden)): Climate change 
cited as justification to reject, 
although no further regulatory 
assessments are completed. 
In the NGP case, there was a 
consistent interpretation of 
climate change, but it was 
extremely narrow during the 
hearing process.  
In the KXL case, 





Focused on market 
diversification and 
access to Asian 
markets.  
Focus on maintaining continuity 
of supply for the United States.  
 
Both maintain narrow 
interpretations of energy 
security, focused on 
supply/demand. 
Interpretation 
of the Public 
Interest 
The NEB was meant 
to maintain “a balance 
of economic, 
environmental, and 
social interests that 




The State Department’s mandate 
is to “develop and execute 
international energy policy to 
promote: energy security for the 
United States and its partners and 
allies; U.S. economic growth that 
benefits American business and 
people; and global political 
stability and prosperity through 
energy development” 
Mandates are extremely 
vague. The NEB, over its 
tenure, tended to find almost 
all projects within the public 
interest if certain conditions 
were met. The State 
Department’s 
characterization was 
acknowledged as variable 
and based on convention. 
 
These regulatory processes reveal a disconnect between public expectations and the regulator 
interpretation of the public interest, as well as between partisan decision-makers and regulatory 
processes that are perceived as independent. These regulatory mechanisms are inherently and actively 
political. In the absence of a clear, ambitious, and legislatively protected mandate, these institutions 
will continue to rely on a narrow, market-focused characterization of the public interest. 
5.2 Cross-Cutting Themes 
The overarching objective of this project is to investigate how effectively national regulators address 
complex, cross-territorial problems with diffuse socio-environmental impacts in the context of 
pipeline governance in Canada and the United States. The three empirical papers presented here 
focused on three issues that epitomize this type of problem: climate change, for its global impacts and 
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capacity to enhance other negative socio-environmental impacts around the world; energy security, 
due to the volatility of oil and gas markets and the rise of renewable energies; and the public interest, 
due to the increasing universe of interested and affected parties, all of whom have competing 
priorities. It is concluded that with regards to the characterization and interpretation of these issues in 
the two cases of Keystone XL and the Northern Gateway pipeline, Canadian and American regulatory 
mechanisms have tended to rely on outdated, narrow mandates that do not appropriately assess these 
issues, due to a lack of capacity or policy mandate, and executive-level decision-makers are the 
deciding factor, resulting in a largely ideological process rather than the quasi-judicial mechanisms 
that these regulators aspire to. I identify several cross-cutting themes across the three empirical foci, 
that contribute not only to the scholarship on the political economy of energy, regulatory capitalism, 
and the energy sector, but to policy advisors and decision-makers as these institutions are targeted for 
reform.    
5.2.1 Partisanship & Executive Power  
First, and as has been briefly mentioned, is the role of executive power and political ideology in these 
regulatory decisions. Both the State Department-led federal processes for international pipelines and 
the National Energy Board (until its replacement by the CER in 2019) have immensely increased the 
amount of environmental assessment and community consultation required in any major pipeline 
project in the last several decades, to the point where these components make up the vast majority of 
any project application. For context, the NGP project contained eight volumes of compliance 
documents; five were concerned with community consultation, socio-environmental impacts, and 
spill response, while only one was dedicated to economics and financing. KXL’s Environmental 
Impact Statement was similarly large, with four of six sections (excluding appendices) dedicated to 
socio-environmental impacts. This is largely due to the CEAA, passed in 1992 and updated in 2003, 
and the NEPA, passed in 1970 and significantly updated for the first time in 2020.  However, with 
regards to climate change, energy security, and the public interest, vague wording and a lack of 
explicit mandate leaves these issues largely up to the regulator and firm to navigate. The NEB was 
plagued with uncertainty over the calculation of pipeline-related GHG emissions from 2010 onwards; 
the general convention was to exclude upstream and downstream emissions and only account for 
those directly generated by the pipeline itself, but this was contested by environmental activists on 
 
 150 
several occasions and there were exceptions made.16 Both the NEB and State Department have relied 
on narrow definitions of energy security that privilege availability and affordability of oil supply 
despite increasing attention paid to other facets of energy security, like the acceptability of certain 
energy sources given increasing environmental degradation caused by fossil fuel extraction or the 
ethical aspects of exporting oil to countries with dire human rights records. Lastly, both regulatory 
mechanisms are meant to represent the public/national interest; but due to the placement of the State 
Department in the American executive, as well as the final decision-making power resting in the 
hands of Cabinet in Canada, calling into question any façade of institutional independence.  
In the American case, it is not clear that independence was ever the goal for international 
pipeline regulation. These regulatory processes, unlike their state-level counterparts, have been led by 
the State Department for decades, which is an inherently partisan department that changes with 
Presidential administrations. This results in a flexibility that Presidents can take advantage of, for 
better or worse. President Joe Biden explicitly cancelled the KXL project in 2021 on climate grounds, 
and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau cancelled the NGP project after legal challenges brought by 
several Indigenous communities revealed a lack of consultation by Enbridge. But both of these 
projects had at one time been approved by their regulators—so there is clearly a disconnect between 
regulators and the public interest since these projects are getting cancelled at the eleventh hour by 
ruling parties.  
There are some key differences in the Canadian and American cases. While both have 
significant partisan influence in their processes, the Canadian NEB (now CER) is more independent 
than the American institutions. The NEB does not change over with each new government, and is 
meant to be a ‘quasi-judicial tribunal’ of experts that conduct public hearings, assess evidence, and 
give informed advice to the Cabinet. By contrast, the State Department is partisan by nature and its 
mandate is given by the President; it is extremely unlikely that the State Department would provide 
advice contrary to the President’s policy goals, although some federal departments do submit 
testimony that may be qualified in some way. In the NGP case, the NEB issued advice to permit the 
pipeline but this approval was struck down judicially and then by Prime Minister Trudeau.  
All of this is to say that these regulatory mechanisms, which can be perceived as apolitical and largely 
administrative, are mostly subject to partisan policy goals. These institutions provide an important 
service in transparency by compiling socio-environmental assessments and records of community 
 
16 See the Energy East Project 
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consultation. But ultimately, they are mostly part of macro-level political processes that prioritize 
certain policy goals. For Presidents Obama and Biden, that goal was environmental conservation and 
the mitigation of climate change. For Prime Minister Trudeau, environmental conservation and 
appropriate consultation with Indigenous communities. For Prime Minister Harper and President 
Trump, the goal was oil development and the economic benefits that would result. While some civil 
society groups will rejoice at the cancellation of these projects, there is a serious issue in the 
application of executive power in these regulatory processes. The role of executive power in these 
processes results in a lack of procedural transparency for citizens, a high financial burden for firms, 
and a state of regulatory failure where these institutions cannot fulfill their role to represent the public 
interest because they have been co-opted by party ideology. There is no doubt that had Donald Trump 
won the 2020 American presidential election, or if Stephen Harper’s Conservatives had won another 
term in 2015, then oil would be pumping through both of these pipelines today. 
5.2.2 Beyond the State and Market: Re-defining the universe of interests  
The second theme which persists throughout all three papers despite their differentiated theoretical 
underpinnings is that of defining the universe of interests in pipeline governance. In Chapter 2, 
analysis of public comment data and compliance documents for each project revealed a disconnect in 
the ways that the general public (or at least the segment thereof that opposed these projects to the 
point of public comment) and the regulators defined the impacts of climate change. Commenters 
pointed out the global impacts of climate change, and how a continued dependence on fossil fuels 
would have significant impacts on our ability to mitigate GHGs in the short term. Regulators focused 
solely on the project-specific emissions, dismissing the upstream and downstream impacts of oil 
extraction and consumption as beyond their purview. Chapters 3 and 4 reveal a similar disconnect in 
the ways that ‘interests’ and ‘impacts’ are defined by regulators, with an emphasis on security of 
supply and demand in the context of energy security and a vague definition of the public interest. 
With regards to Chapter 2 and climate change in particular, the KXL case shows the ability of 
Presidential administrations to accommodate different subsets of interests, depending on their own 
policy goals.  
Since the 1970s/80s, these pipeline regulators have been asked to take on a much greater 
burden of socio-environmental assessment (Doern, Prince, and Schultz 2014). But as that universe of 
interests and interested stakeholders has expanded, the fundamental underpinnings of these 
institutions have not expanded at the same rate. Socio-environmental impacts like climate change are 
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usually defined as locally as they can be by regulators; although President Joe Biden, upon cancelling 
the KXL project in early 2021, explicitly referenced the broader climate impacts of fossil fuel 
infrastructure (McKibben 2021). Broader impacts like climate change, ecosystem degradation, and 
community opposition are difficult to quantify, and so difficult to assess using a scientific evidence-
based framework, as both the NEB and State Department have done.  
Additionally, these regulators are bound by their territorial jurisdiction, and so do not assess 
impacts beyond that jurisdiction. This is seen most clearly with regards to climate change and energy 
security, where the NEB and State Department stop assessment at their national borders. But climate 
change does not respect states, and the energy sector (and the security concerns that result) is global, 
and these issues cannot be adequately identified or interpreted via a state-centric lens. When a state-
centric regulatory lens is applied, the global consequences of the fossil fuel sector are diminished. On 
the one hand, these are national regulators with no jurisdiction beyond their territory; but these 
pipelines do not end at the border, and are emblematic of the globalized nature of the energy sector, 
which has few international standards to govern it. No regulatory institution with any enforcement 
capabilities is assessing these global issues, and no country-level institution will bear the 
responsibility for fear of losing a competitive advantage.  
Additionally, both Canada and the United States have to reckon with their federal systems. 
As Chapters 2, 3, and 4 all indicated, the benefits and risks of these large infrastructure projects are 
not equitably or equally distributed; while one region may benefit from economic growth bolstered by 
oil extraction, another may take on disproportionate environmental risk. In the NGP case, this 
manifested in an Alberta-versus-British Columbia sentiment in the public comment data, where 
commenters from B.C. lamented the risks to sensitive ecosystems like the Great Bear Rainforest as 
well as local tourist economies while Albertan firms and workers would reap the economic benefits. 
In the KXL case, commenters were also concerned about the risks to sensitive ecosystems like the 
Nebraska Sandhills (which the pipeline was re-routed away from after the Obama administration 
rejection) where they questioned the benefit to the states that KXL would pass through on its way to 
the Gulf Coast refineries. In the American context particularly, state-level regulation is most often 
utilized for oil pipelines and there are rare opportunities for total project assessments. On the one 
hand, this allows states to protect their own interests to an extent, but on the other there is rarely a 
chance for assessment of an inter-state pipeline as a whole (except for certain safety issues), and some 
states have extremely spare regulatory processes. The Canadian system, conversely, utilizes federal 
regulation every time a pipeline crosses a provincial border, allowing for total project assessment but 
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at the cost of regional authority within the regulatory process. The KXL and NGP projects are 
international and interprovincial, respectively, and so are subject to federal oversight. Both the NEB 
and State Department are national regulators and so are making national decisions, but it is clear that 
some regions feel ignored no matter the final outcome. Balancing regional interests should be of 
significant concern to these institutions in future, both to avoid political fragmentation and to better 
support communities—those resource-dependent as well as those that take on disproportionate risks 
of these pipelines—as we transition away from fossil fuels.  
5.2.3 Vague Institutional Mandates 
The last cross-cutting theme across all three empirical papers and issue areas is that of institutional 
mandates that do not explicitly indicate the extent to which complex, international issues like climate 
change or energy security should be addressed by either regulator. Both regulators have mandates to 
act in the public/national interest, passed down by legislation in the NEB and executive directive in 
the State Department; both the NEB and State Department are largely free to interpret that interest. 
This vagueness does have advantages—it means that regulators can take into account context-specific 
factors for any given project—but it also means that the public interest is decided without any clear 
parameters for what that interest means. Without clear and explicit assessment criteria for public 
interest factors, these institutions both emphasize the parts of their mandates that are better defined; 
these are mostly market factors like the setting of tolls and tariffs, financing, and economic benefits, 
as well as ensuring continuity of supply and demand. As was discussed in all three empirical papers, 
these regulatory institutions were not built to assess these complex issues with large numbers of 
interested stakeholders, but rather out of the need to regulate market conditions in the case of the 
NEB and ensure domestic energy availability and economic growth in the case of the State 
Department and Bureau of Energy Resources.  
A logical pushback against these alleged regulatory failures would be the meteoric rise of 
socio-environmental assessment in both countries, with both the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency contributing significant technical expertise for 
individual pipeline projects in the last several decades. Firms are also expected to produce extensive 
field assessments and records of community engagement, either via mandatory compliance guidelines 
or requests by the regulator. In fact, the bulk of interprovincial/international pipeline applications 
consist of these assessments. There has been a clear expansion of both regulatory capacity and 
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responsibility. So why do we need a clearer public interest mandate if there is such attention paid to 
social and environmental issues? 
Regulatory uncertainty has been on the rise in the Canadian and American energy sectors, 
and these two cases exemplify that uncertainty. KXL was rejected, re-rejected, approved, and then 
rejected again; NGP was conditionally approved, overturned, and then cancelled. Major pipeline 
projects are almost universally controversial and contested, leading to uncertain ground not just for 
firms but for sector-dependent labour forces and ultimately, consumers. Perhaps these are the 
inevitable growing pains of two countries struggling to uncouple themselves from fossil fuel 
dependence. But how we navigate this transition depends in part on the strength of our institutions, 
and neither the NEB nor the State Department is in possession of an explicit public interest mandate 
that integrates issues that consistently arise over oil pipelines; climate change and energy security, but 
also Indigenous consultation, ecosystem conservation, and risk management. These institutions were 
built to privilege capital accumulation over sustainability, and without a clear change in policy 
objectives this will continue despite the addition of extensive socio-environmental assessment.  
5.3 Research Contributions  
This research contributes to a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between regulatory 
institutions, the sectors they govern, and the interests they represent. This project strengthens 
theoretical understanding of how regulators characterize and interpret complex, cross-jurisdictional 
problems like climate change and energy security, and further exposes some institutional failures that 
hinder long-term strategies for sustainable natural resource management and decarbonization. 
Additionally, this project adds to the empirical literature on regulatory capitalism, energy security, 
and the political economy of climate change via novel data sources and underexplored facets of 
energy sector governance. Finally, I propose two takeaways for policy-makers in terms of regulatory 
reform. Below, I discuss how this research enhances our understanding of regulation and energy 
governance in each of these theories, as well as the implications this research has for policymaking 
going forward.  
This project contributes to our understanding of the international political economy of 
energy, which investigates the uniqueness of energy systems in global political and economic 
structures. Energy has long been a case study of interest for IPE scholars, but the debate over whether 
energy is a commodity like any other or holds a singular position due to its underpinning of most 
social and economic activities remains contested; critical scholars in particular tend to posit that 
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traditional IPE theories do not fully explain the relationship between states and markets when it 
comes to developing and consuming energy (DiMuzio 2014). Chapter 2, which focuses on the 
interpretation of climate change in energy regulation, emphasizes the distinctiveness of energy 
systems by examining the state-market-climate nexus. Energy regulators require that projects submit 
intensive technical assessments for localized impacts on communities; and in fact, many of the risks 
from pipelines are local and specific, like accidents or spills (Spence, n.d.). However, the indirect 
impacts of fossil fuel extraction and the pipelines that facilitate that extraction contribute 
disproportionately to climate change relative to most other industrial infrastructure projects (Davis, 
Caldeira, and Matthews 2010). And the material commitment to long-term fossil fuel development 
that these pipelines represent works against the climate actions that both Canada and the United States 
are taking at the national level. This ‘have our cake and eat it too’ mentality emphasizes the 
supremacy of global market forces in state decision-making processes (MacLean 2017; Matthew 
Huber 2009). These countries—two of the largest fossil fuel producers in the world—are unwilling to 
fully decouple their economic growth from fossil fuels, and so despite both rhetorical and policy 
commitment to climate action in other contexts, neither country is at this point asking their fossil fuel 
industries to fully account for the consequences of its actions. This chapter corroborates a burgeoning 
sub-field of the IPE of energy which examines the ways that market-focused governance institutions 
are at odds with the deep decarbonization efforts required for ambitious climate governance (Falkner 
2018; MacNeil and Paterson 2018). This chapter also reiterates the role of specific powerful actors in 
international political economy, regarding the evolution of these regulatory institutions. Climate 
change is a deeply partisan issue in the United States, and less so in Canada, but the extent to which 
these regulatory mechanisms account for climate change is very much affected by the political 
priorities of government leaders.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature on energy security in two distinct ways. First, 
it examines regulatory institutions, which are under-explored in the energy security literature despite 
the fact that decision-making processes in these institutions explicitly address issues of availability, 
affordability, and accessibility. Chapter 3 adds to the empirical literature, contributing to a trend 
within the energy security scholarship to expand beyond a focus on supply and demand of fossil fuels 
(Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Bradshaw 2014). This chapter examines regulatory governance within 
the Four A’s framework and finds, similarly to other case studies focusing on other 
sectors/institutions, that there is a need to focus on other aspects of energy security like accessibility 
and acceptability, and to evaluate different energy sources based on these aspects (Benjamin K. 
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Sovacool 2012b; Indriyanto, Fauzi, and Firdaus 2011). National-level regulatory institutions are 
under-examined in the energy security literature, which tends to focus on broader globalization 
processes (Benjamin K. Sovacool and Brown 2010; Bradshaw 2014). While I do find an emphasis on 
international trade issues in the comment data for both projects, commenters were largely 
unconvinced that the benefits of this trade would trickle down. This is at odds with the proposal 
documents submitted for both projects, which emphasize a much rosier look at the benefits of export 
growth. These findings support recent forays in energy security that interrogate the supposed benefits 
of fossil fuel development, despite their relative affordability and accessibility (Proskuryakova 2018; 
Matt Huber 2016). Secondly, Chapter 3 presents a novel understanding of ‘acceptability’ within the 
energy security framework, focusing on the trade partners that will purchase oil flowing through these 
pipelines. In energy security scholarship specifically, ‘acceptability’ usually refers to the type of 
energy source that is being extracted/consumed, or the inequities inherent in one type of energy 
extraction vs. another, rather than which regime is doing the extracting/consuming. The concept of 
‘ethical’ international trade is not new in academia, but it is relatively novel when applied to energy 
security frameworks. And its inclusion is logical; if we contend that energy security needs to expand 
beyond simple, state-level calculations of supply and demand, and that social/environmental issues 
need to be integrated both into energy security scholarship and policy-making processes, then the 
issue of which regimes are benefiting from the extraction of these resources is pertinent.  
Thirdly, Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on regulatory capitalism by adding to the 
case study empirical literature via an examination of energy regulators specifically. Chapter 4 
proposes that, in line with regulatory capitalism theory, that energy regulators were created to serve 
capitalist impulses of commodity accumulation as opposed to limit firm’s behaviour for 
social/environmental/cultural reasons (Braithwaite 2008; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005b). However, 
despite these origins, these institutions have been asked to take on the assessment of these issues 
(which may result in the impairment of capital accumulation). Due to a lack of clear, entrenched 
policy mandate in favour of sustainable development, these institutions are struggling to assess 
complex socio-environmental issues, leading to almost constant controversy when these large projects 
are proposed. This chapter gives a systematic look at relatively novel data—public comments— and 
adds to the growing body of empirical literature on regulatory governance (Spence, n.d.; Ashford and 
Hall 2018; Carrigan 2013). Additionally, theories of regulatory capitalism are tested in new case 
studies, in this case energy regulators), and are found to support the hypothesis that despite an 
exponential expansion of regulatory authority in the 1990s/2000s, these institutions are not account 
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for the larger universe of interests for which they are now responsible. The public comment data 
supports this hypothesis, as commenters contest the legitimacy of regulatory procedures that assess 
pipelines.  
Finally, I propose two main takeaways for policy development and institutional reform. First, 
as I have emphasized repeatedly throughout this project, these institutions need an explicit definition 
of public interest criteria, which should include sustainable development. Both these regulators state 
that they aim to balance the economy and the environment in their processes, but these institutions 
need a more detailed and transparent mandate in order to standardize their processes and rely less on 
executive decision-making. What are the thresholds for environmental degradation, social impacts, 
and community opposition? Ideally, regulators would start with an explicit sustainable development 
mandate and expect firms to meet a higher threshold of social and environmental requirements. 
Second, and more difficult to implement, there needs to be less regulatory volatility between 
administrations. This is a tall order, especially in the United States where the regulators are in the 
administration. But increasing institutional autonomy, alongside clearer thresholds for sustainable 
development, would go a long way in restoring public trust in these institutions. This would also  
reduce uncertainty for firms and allow for longer-term energy sector planning.  
Complex, cross-jurisdictional issues—like climate change, like energy poverty, like risks to 
drinking water and indigenous rights and treaties, and vulnerable ecosystems—are increasingly more 
important to the electorate, and therefore to the democratic state, than the rapid economic growth that 
fossil fuel development allowed for. Both Canada and the United States are actively pursuing 
decarbonization on the one hand, while continuing to promote fossil fuel development via pipeline 
regulators (among other mechanisms) on the other.  
Governments are ultimately asking these institutions to implement a national energy strategy, 
without giving them the tools to do so. These regulators have come a very long way and engage in 
significant socio-environmental assessment. But they are helping make big, long-term decisions about 
our energy future on an unstable institutional foundation. Their decision-making processes are vague, 
and their mandate is huge. 
This project adds to our understanding of how institutions that operate at the nexus of state 
and society try to balance these problems for states (while also mindful of the importance for 





This dissertation has contributed to the literature on the international political economy of 
energy, energy security, and regulatory capitalism largely through new case studies (energy 
regulation) and relatively novel data sources (public comment data for pipeline projects). However, 
there are several limitations of this data which should also be noted, in order to contextualize these 
contributions. 
5.4 Research Limitations 
Public comments are not a perfect sample of public opinion; the submission process will inherently 
attract people with strong opinions rather than moderate, generally opposed rather than in favour, and 
civil society groups may be over-represented due to information campaigns (G. Brown and Eckold 
2020). Additionally, further case studies and large-N analysis would allow for broader conclusions 
about the pipeline industry and what its development means for climate change, energy security, and 
the public interest (Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015). While the contributions of this thesis are 
important, they must be contextualized in order to strengthen the validity of the conclusions made.  
 First, two pipelines were examined, one each in Canada and the United States. While this small-N 
comparison allows for depth of analysis, and for a nuanced contextual investigation, it means that 
conclusions cannot be definitively drawn regarding pipeline operations and fossil fuel development as 
a whole. As Barack Obama noted in 2015,  
“for years, the Keystone pipeline has occupied what I, frankly, consider an 
overinflated role in our political discourse. It became a symbol too often 
used as a campaign cudgel by both parties, rather than a serious policy 
matter. All of this obscured the fact that this pipeline would neither be a 
silver bullet for the economy, as was promised by some, nor the express 
lane to climate disaster proclaimed by others” (The Obama White House 
2015).  
The Northern Gateway and Keystone XL pipelines do not represent the whole of the pipeline industry 
in Canada and the United States. Both were ultimately rejected, which for now has had little to no 
impact on the amount of fossil fuels extracted in Western Canada.  
Second, it is important to take note of the biases present in the public comment data. This is a 
useful data source in that it is an easily accessible avenue for any citizen to submit their opinion and 
provide detailed rationale of that opinion. However, the responses for both projects skew 
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overwhelmingly in opposition (less so in the Keystone XL case), and in the NGP case there was a 
clear regional concentration of commenters in British Columbia (commenters were not required to 
give addresses for the KXL process). Other groups may also be over-represented, such as property 
owners, those with higher levels of education, or English-speakers (although in the NGP case a 
French comment form was available, and for this project French comments were translated), but most 
commenters did not self-identify according to these identifiers. Those neutral or in favour of these 
projects are less likely to submit a public comment, but less detailed polling data suggests that there is 
a ‘silent majority’ of citizens that do passively support these projects (Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015). 
It is also crucial to emphasize that just because a project decision is not in one groups favour, this 
does not automatically equal regulatory failure; these are huge projects with cascading effects across 
multiple groups and communities, as this thesis has proposed, and as a result there is no decision 
without negative impact. An approval of a new Canadian pipeline may disappoint climate activists, 
but may encourage economic prosperity for some communities, allow market diversification in a 
traditionally bilateral trade relationship, and encourage new trade partners to import comparatively 
better-regulated Canadian resources.  
Nevertheless, these comments represent perceived gaps in the regulatory process because 
there are clear trends and issues that are consistently referenced. If these issues were being well 
addressed within existing regulatory mechanisms, they likely would not be the subject of public 
comment en masse. Additionally, both projects drew huge numbers of comments; over two million 
for both phases of the KXL process (although this included many petitions and form letters) and over 
8000 for the NGP process, which provides a large dataset from which to draw samples, and indicates 
a high level of interest in these projects from the general public.17  
Despite the limitations of this data and research, important contributions to scholarship were 
made in the form of adding case study support to three bodies of scholarship which are all evolving to 
better understand contemporary energy challenges. And while this public comment data skews 
heavily towards opposition, it tells us a great deal about the nature of contested energy projects in 
Canada and the United States, and the myriad aspects of the public interest that citizens expect their 
institutions to consider.  
 
17 For context, Enbridge’s Alberta Clipper expansion in Minnesota (meant to upgrade the pipeline to 800,000 bpd 
capacity) proposed in 2016/2017 received 90,000 comments; the Trans Mountain Expansion in Canada received 
about 400 during its initial application process in 2013/2014. 
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5.5 Future Research  
This project has investigated how effectively national regulators address complex, cross-territorial 
problems with diffuse socio-environmental impacts in the context of pipeline governance in Canada 
and the United States. Via a comparative analysis of two cancelled and contested pipelines, the 
Keystone XL in the United States and the Northern Gateway in Canada, the interpretation and 
characterization of three issues were examined: climate change, energy security, and the public 
interest. Ultimately, it is concluded that pipeline regulators in Canada and the United States originated 
as market-focused rules enforcers that were beholden largely to industry and the relevant government 
department. There has been an attempt to equip these institutions with the tools to address a broader 
set of issues, mainly focused on public safety and environmental protection. However, the 
fundamental structures of these institutions are built to encourage oil development in support of high 
levels of economic growth, and under these circumstances cannot appropriately evaluate complex 
contemporary issues like climate change and energy security which have significant but diffuse 
impacts on a wide variety of stakeholders. If these regulatory mechanisms are to persist with 
expansive mandates of representing the public interest, encouraging energy security, or balancing 
economic and environmental goals, they need an even bigger toolbox that, at the very least, defines 
what it means by these terms. And perhaps entirely new institutions are needed. In the American case 
in particular, taking the bulk of regulatory processes out of the State Department and placing it in an 
arms-length structure, like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or something new, may be the 
only way to mitigate some of the inconsistencies of these processes. Having said that, as seen in the 
NGP case, government priorities tend to impose themselves on these regulatory decisions regardless.  
This project contributed to the scholarship on the international political economy of energy, 
energy security, and regulatory governance by examining a relatively novel data source—public 
comments submitted for oil pipeline projects—to draw the boundaries of the gap between what these 
regulatory institutions do and what some segments of the population think they should be doing. In 
particular, a desire to weigh environmental protection more heavily in the economy-environment 
balance, to define ‘energy security’ as more than ‘oil security’ and to consider the global impacts of 
the fossil fuel trade, and to reform regulatory institutions to more explicitly represent aspects of the 
public interest apart from potential economic benefit.  
There are several avenues for future research from this project. First, there is significant space 
for a focus on the ‘acceptability’ and ‘accessibility’ aspects of energy security with regards to energy 
regulation. Energy security in this context is often defined with a focus on ensuring continuous supply 
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and demand of oil resources. But it is becoming increasingly clear that this is a narrow and shallow 
definition of energy security, not only due to the climate and environmental aspects of fossil fuel 
extraction and the rise of renewable energies, but also because the benefits of those oil resources have 
never been equitably distributed. Local dependence on the industry at the point of extraction, impacts 
on communities and public health along pipeline routes, and energy poverty at the point of 
consumption globally have always been associated with oil (Healy, Stephens, and Malin 2019). And 
so to rely on this antiquated definition of energy security as justification for pipeline approval, as both 
of the projects studied here did in some contexts, points to a gap between how states define energy 
security, and how energy security actually manifests. More work can be done with regards to 
pipelines but also the fossil fuel sector as a whole to define and close this gap. 
Related to this issue of energy security, but also to broader questions within climate justice 
and deep decarbonization scholarship is the role of fossil-fuel dependent communities in a just 
transition away from fossil fuels (Healy and Barry 2017; Delina and Sovacool 2018). Many of the 
issues raised in this thesis run parallel to the just transition scholarship; the need to decarbonize 
rapidly but equitably, concerns of how industry-reliant communities figure into the contestation of 
these large pipeline projects, defining the public interest at a local, regional, and national level. A 
focus on utilizing principles of a just transition to reform regulatory institutions to be flexible and 
ambitious while also protecting vulnerable regions and communities is a logical next step for this line 
of inquiry.  
There is also the question of what a truly reformed regulatory mechanism for the energy 
sector might look like. Some suggest the need for flexibility, to adapt to changing social and 
environmental circumstances. Others posit that regulation needs to have an ambitious sustainable 
development mandate in order to balance the economy-environment scale (Young 2017b; 2017a). We 
also need to further examine the role of executive power in our regulatory institutions (Goldthau 
2012). While in Canada, the NEB (and now CER) maintains a quasi-judicial independence, in the 
United States the regulator is the Cabinet. Complex issues like climate change and energy security are 
increasing in salience to the average citizen, but these regulators were not built to answer these types 
of questions. The NEB started as an economic regulator, and despite the addition of significant socio-
environmental assessments to its processes, it never fundamentally changed in mandate (and the CER 
is built on the same institutional scaffolding). The State Department’s priority is the President’s 
priority, which changes depending on administration leading to a state of regulatory uncertainty for 
firms, and incentive for those firms to materially support Presidential candidates that would approve 
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their projects. The supremacy of Cabinet does allow for some maneuverability; President Joe Biden 
was able to cancel the KXL project almost entirely on climate grounds, a welcome turn for 
environmental activists fighting fossil fuel extraction. NGP’s approval was overturned judicially, but 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau halted a potential re-application by Enbridge by rejecting the project. 
But it also results in institutional uncertainty and a policy mandate that no longer matches the impacts 
these institutions assess. Examining the power hierarchies in these institutions more closely, and 
designing a regulator that is: ambitious, flexible, with a clearer public interest mandate, and more 
capable of assessing systemic socio-environmental impacts is the natural next step from this project. 
Ultimately, we need to actively interrogate what we want regulation to accomplish: is it 
industrial development? Is it to support climate change mitigation? Is it to encourage energy 
independence? We are asking these institutions to bear a lot of responsibility for issues that they were 
not built to assess. While we have built up the institutional infrastructure necessary to address some of 
these issues, the fundamental epistemological questions of what these regulators are meant to do have 
not been adequately answered, leading to outrage from all sides.  But these bigger socio-
environmental issues cannot be removed from energy regulation; as we are increasingly aware, 
energy does not exist in a vacuum. This industry impacts and is in turn impacted by climate change, 
issues of energy security, and an increasingly discontented populace. The way that these regulators 
define complex socio-environmental issues, like the three discussed in this thesis, does not line up 
with what (some) groups expect from their institutions. Going forward, the public interest should be 
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Public Comment Coding Scheme (Chapters 2/3/4) 
 
Name Description Comments References 
CAPTURE Reference to regulatory processes; specifically 
industrial influence on these processes. 
27 29 
OPPOSITION General opposition to pipeline, no 
supplementary information 
67 74 
ECONOMICS Discussion of revenue/trade/employment as 




Reference to lack of economic benefit 
generated from pipeline, references to 
domestic production over international 
(includes refining capacity for NGP) 
29 42 
EMPLOYMENT Reference to employment related to pipeline 57 69 
OTHER SECTORS Impact (negative) of pipelines on other sectors 




General opposition based on accident 
response, spill cleanup/liabilities 
275 524 
SPILLS Reference to specific spills/accidents in 
specific regions 
224 344 
ENVIRONMENT General opposition based on environmental 
impact 
208 316 
CLIMATE CHANGE Specific reference to relationship between 
pipelines and climate change (often but not 
always related to decarbonization) 
135 358 
DECARBONIZATION Reference to renewable energies, need to 
decarbonize (often but not always correlated to 
climate change) 
214 316 
ECOSYSTEMS Reference to specific impacts on specific 
ecosystems (ie. Great Bear Rainforest in BC 
for NGP, Sandhills region in Nebraska for 
KXL) 
188 228 
WILDLIFE Reference to specific wildlife populations 82 101 
 
 184 
EXTRACTION Opposition based on issues with fossil fuel 
extraction, rather than pipeline itself (e.g. 
Tailings ponds) 
48 82 
FUTURE Reference to creating a ‘better future’; for 
children and society 
29 32 
GOVERNMENT Reference to issues with current government as 
opposed to the pipeline itself (e.g. Trump, 
Harper) 
59 86 
HEALTH Impacts on human health (e.g. Carcinogens, air 
pollutants) 
24 37 
INDIGENOUS ISSUES Broad reference to Indigenous issues within 
the process 
99 242 
CONSULTATION Specific reference to inadequate consultation 13 15 
TREATIES Specific reference to ceded/unceded territories 




Reference to international socio-economic 
trends and relationships; often cited with 
regards to risk/benefit (ie. Canada benefits 
from KXL, but USA takes on risk) 
108 195 
LAND USE Issues with land use; often private landowners 14 24 
MARINE 
TRANSPORTATION 
NGP specific; related to Kitimat tank terminal 199 211 
NECESSITY Reference to broad oil supply/demand 
forecasts, capacity of other pipelines 
76 90 
PROCESS Issues with the regulatory process itself, 
usually related to lack of public participation; 
often but not always correlated with “capture” 
code 
146 250 
PUBLIC INTEREST Direct reference to the public or national 
interest with regards to the pipeline 
141 226 
WATER reference to water contamination, water 
crossings 
40 147 
DRINKING WATER Specific reference to certain drinking water 
sources/ aquifers 
59 65 
SUPPORT General support for the project 21 40 





SAFETY Reference to safety of pipelines vs. train/truck 19 21 








Code Breakdown for Chapters 2/3/4 
 
These tables represent each time text was coded in the 750 comments each for Keystone XL and 
Northern Gateway. Since most comments had multiple codes, these numbers correspond to discrete 
coding instances, not number of comments.  
 
Chapter 2: Climate Change 
 
Chapter 3: Energy Security 
 








Maps of Keystone XL and Northern Gateway Pipelines (Proposed) 
 
 
Northern Gateway Pipeline Route, Enbridge 
 




Major Oil Pipelines in the United States and Canada 
 
  
